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THE METAL EYE: ETHICAL REGULATION OF
THE STATE’S USE OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY AND

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO OBSERVE †
HUMANS IN CONFINEMENT
JENNIFER A. BROBST*

† Surveillance is defined as “close observation, esp. of a suspected person.”
Surveillance, THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIC ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1457 (Joyce M.
Hawkins & Robert Allen, Clarendon Press 1991). Oddly, there is no word in English
or French that means “the one who surveils.” Neither spy, which presupposes an
enemy, nor observer, which lacks the deliberate focus of surveillance, equates to
“surveilleur”, should such a word exist. In 1900, one of the first English language
thesauri aptly distinguished between the words observe (the chosen word for the title
of this article) and watch: “These terms agree in expressing the act of looking at an
object; but to observe is not to look after so strictly as is implied by to watch; a general
observes the motions of an enemy when they are in no particular state of activity; he
watches the motions of an enemy when they are in a state of commotion; . . . .”
GEORGE CRABB, ENGLISH SYNONYMES EXPLAINED 635 (New ed., Harper & Bros.,
1901) (emphasis in original).
* Jennifer A. Brobst, J.D., LL.M., is an Assistant Professor at Southern Illinois
University (SIU) School of Law, cross-appointed in the SIU School of Medicine
Department of Medical Humanities. She was formerly a deputy prosecuting attorney
in Indiana and legal director of a mental health center in North Carolina. Many thanks
to the student editors of the California Western Law Review, especially Brooke
Raunig, Hana Willard, and Eric Clarkson. They provided excellent editing support
on this article, as well as confident leadership during the Second Annual Legal Ethics
Symposium on February 17, 2018, “Artificial Intelligence – Real World Ethics.”
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“How can we control the vast impersonal forces that now menace
our hard-won freedoms?”
– ALDOUS HUXLEY (1958) 1
“The officers of Congress may come upon you now, fortified with
all the terrors of paramount federal authority. . . . They may, unless
the general government be restrained by a bill of rights, or some
similar restriction, go into your cellars and rooms, and search,
ransack, and measure, every thing [sic] you eat, drink, and wear.
They ought to be restrained within proper bounds.”
- PATRICK HENRY (1788) 2

INTRODUCTION
Law, humanity, and human nature reflect a mastery of negotiation
between the individual’s need for both a private and a social life. Since
its founding, state and federal government and their legal structures in
the United States have been designed by and for humans to thrive as
individuals in society, which, in turn, benefits government and society. 3
1. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED 334 (Harper Perennial
2010) (1958).
2. JONATHAN ELLIOT, 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, A CENTURY OF LAWMAKING FOR
A NEW NATION: U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS AND DEBATES, 1774-1875, at
448-49 (2d ed. 1836), available at https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?
collId=lled&fileName=003/lled003.db&recNum=2&itemLink=r?ammem/hlaw:@fi
eld(DOCID+@lit(ed0032))%230030003&linkText=1 (Convention of Virginia
debate on June 14, 1788) (enter “448” in the “Turn to image” query box). See also
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 316 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (referring to
this passage of Patrick Henry’s debate).
3. Most state constitutions in the U.S. explicitly uphold this assertion. E.g.,
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“That all political power is inherent in the people, and all free
governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit; and that,
therefore, they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to change their
form of government in such manner as they may deem expedient.”); IDAHO CONST.
art. I, § 2 (“All political power is inherent in the people.”). See generally PRISCILLA
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For example, the State Constitution of Louisiana provides that the
purpose of government is to protect the individual, which will protect
“the good of the whole” of society:
All government, of right, originates with the people, is founded on
their will alone, and is instituted to protect the rights of the individual
and for the good of the whole. Its only legitimate ends are to secure
justice for all, preserve peace, protect the rights, and promote the
happiness and general welfare of the people. 4

Similarly, Patrick Henry spoke eloquently at the Convention of
Virginia in 1788 of the need for a bill of rights and checks on federal
government, asserting that “the power of a people in a free government
is supposed to be paramount to the existing power.” 5
As inventors continue to design technology to supplant human
interaction or constantly monitor human behavior, the role of the state
in protecting individual rights to autonomy in navigating privacy and
social interaction requires a close examination. 6 Fortunately, in the
United States, a hard-fought legal respect for the rights of the individual
in a free society remains a steady, rational force, capable of moderating

M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 27-28 (1995) (asserting that individual rights,
including the right to privacy, are also of societal importance, as discussed by theorists
Alan Westin and others); DAVID F. LINOWES, PRIVACY IN AMERICA: IS YOUR PRIVATE
LIFE IN THE PUBLIC EYE? 174 (1989) (quoting Edmund Burke in support of an
individual right to privacy – “Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to
provide for human wants.”). In Rousseau’s social contract, as a voluntary pact of
individuals, “the natural law of the sovereignty of the people” proclaims that the
government “only exists by its mandate; [government] is constantly subordinated to
the sole legitimate sovereign: the people.” ERNST BLOCH, NATURAL LAW AND
HUMAN DIGNITY 62 (Dennis J. Schmidt transl., The MIT Press 1986) (1961)
(referring to The Social Contract (1762)).
4. LA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
5. Henry, supra note 2, at 410 (June 14, 1788).
6. To effect the purpose of this article, determining the motives and cause of
dramatic technological change is unnecessary. However, it is worthy of note that over
the last two centuries some conspiratorially have identified the human role of an “elite
of scientists”, while others have asserted a “runaway world” of technological
determinism spinning out of human control. See Lawrence Quill, Technological
Conspiracies: Comte, Technology, and Spiritual Despotism, 28 CRITICAL REV. 89
(2016) (discussing Auguste Comte’s post-revolutionary and H.G. Well’s pre-world
war visions of the future respectively).
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intrusive surveillance through the common law, as well as state and
federal constitutional jurisprudence. 7
In a mature society, the process of drawing the lines of privacy
against state intrusion should look first to those who have the least
power and social capital—persons confined by the state, such as prison
inmates and those who are involuntarily committed. As the Supreme
Court has repeatedly affirmed: “[H]aving stripped [prisoners] of
virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to
outside aid, society may not simply lock away offenders and let the state
of nature take its course.” 8 Protected by common law and
constitutionally-based duties of care to ensure a secure and safe
environment, this population without much political power or voice is
owed much by the State. Nevertheless, in a technological age of
surveillance, the State has much greater opportunity to infringe on the
rights of confined persons than it has on persons at liberty in the public
sphere, thereby testing the bounds of basic individual rights. If those in
state institutions—the most vulnerable or dangerous of us all, and
arguably most in need of monitoring and observation—have a right to
autonomy with respect to privacy and social interaction, then so do we
all.
If it were technologically possible, would the United States
lawfully permit a residential facility—a prison, immigration detention
center, mental hospital, or nursing home—to be run solely by remote
technology, using artificial intelligence (AI) 9 to subject confined
7. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., PRIVACY AND
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, SECURITY & PRIVACY ISSUE BRIEF NO. 2 (Mar. 1981)
at 1 [hereinafter DOJ BRIEF NO. 2], available at https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/pii.pdf
(addressing efforts to regulate intelligence-gathering
information in the United States after the Watergate scandal and other “publicity
surrounding covert police intelligence and surveillance activities against dissident
groups [which] has heightened public awareness of the potential threat to individual
privacy associated with this kind of police activity”).
8. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (addressing whether the state ignored the risk of prison rape). See also
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1245 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Farmer v.
Brennan when examining whether solitary confinement is cruel and unusual
punishment); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(expressing concerns that “[p]risoners are shut away – out of sight, out of mind”).
9. In this article, artificial intelligence (AI) is defined using the definition of
Margaret Boden, a research professor in cognitive science at the University of Sussex.
That is, AI involves machine-based logical reasoning and psychological skills such as
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persons to constant surveillance or completely replace human
interaction with machine-based interaction? Can technology enhance
the quality of human experience in confined settings or is reliance on
such technology merely an expedient, harmful substitute for human
supervision and social interaction?
These questions are not dystopian or utopian speculation. In South
Korea, the world’s first autonomous robotic prison guards, with AI
capabilities that include use of surveillance technology and facial
recognition software designed to assess a prisoner’s mental state, are
being tested in facilities. 10
In Australia, the Technological
Incarceration Project has tested a relatively inexpensive home detention
system with constant AI presence that monitors verbal and facial cues
and delivers a shock if the monitored person appears to be about to
commit a violation.11 The European Union INDECT research project
“for the security of citizens” is conducting a feasibility design for a
constant surveillance system for automatic threat detection in public
spaces, compliant with current national and international privacy laws:
The value that will be added by deployment of INDECT research
outcomes is that existing systems would operate with less human
intervention, which will lower the level of subjective assessment and
the number of human mistakes. This means less staff will be required
for supervision of surveillance activities (e.g.[,] monitoring of CCTV
camera networks). This will result . . . in less opportunities for
illegitimate use of such information, or for human error to result in
violations of the rights of the individual. There will also be economic

“perception, association, prediction, planning, [and] motor control” to problem-solve
and process information. MARGARET A. BODEN, AI: ITS NATURE AND FUTURE 1-2
(2016).
10. See World’s First Robot Prison Guard, YOUTUBE: CBS (Apr. 13, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dM9BJjjLU9U&feature=player_https://www.co
rrectionsone.com/corrections/videos/7591864-Worlds-first-robot-CO/; Lena Kim,
Meet South Korea’s New Robotic Prison Guards, DIGITAL TRENDS (Apr. 21, 2012,
11:20 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/meet-south-koreas-new-robotic
-prison-guards/ (discussing the robotic application of pattern recognition algorithms
to detect safety concerns and signal the need for additional security).
11. Antony Funnell, Internet of Incarceration: How AI Could Put an End to
Prisons as We Know Them, ABC NEWS AUSTL. (Aug. 13, 2017, 9:28 PM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-14/how-ai-could-put-an-end-to-prisons-as-weknow-them/8794910.
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benefits, in terms of the reduced staffing requirements. Police
officers could be freed up to carry out frontline policing tasks. 12

Surveillance in these contexts is linked to public security concerns,
which must be moderated by civil liberties. In the realm of national
security, the AI international arms race continues to place pressure on
democratic nations to undermine their values and recognition of civil
rights. 13 Autonomous, untethered AI technology that would be
implemented to kill without human decision or control is already
possible, although the Department of Defense under both Presidents
Obama and Trump has restricted their military applications. 14 The
United Nations also continues to debate the need to restrict such
weapons. 15 In the public-private sphere, technology companies, such
as Google, have faced pressure to opt out of continuing to contribute

12.
INDECT Research Project Ethics Board, Ethical Issues: INDECT
Approach to Ethical Issues, INDECT, http://www.indect-project.eu/approach-toethical-issues (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
13. See Anna Varfolomeeva, Robotic Vehicles: Russia’s Quest for the Weapons
of Future Wars, THEDEFENSEPOST BLOG (May 23, 2018), https://thedefensepost.
com/2018/05/23/russia-robot-vehicle-ugv-uran/ (“As the artificial intelligence
technology race unfolds, more countries, including China, France, the United
Kingdom, other European Union members, and the United States, have become
heavily invested in the research, which has been controversial.”).
14. See U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF. DIRECTIVE, AUTONOMY IN WEAPONS SYSTEMS,
No. 3000.09 (Nov. 21, 2012, amended May 8, 2017), available at http://www.esd.whs
.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf (requiring “appropriate
levels of human judgment over the use of force”); see also Caroline Lester, What
Happens When Your Bomb-Defusing Robot Becomes a Weapon? Treating a
Technology as a “Platform” has Consequences, ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/04/what-happens-when-yourbomb-defusing-robot-becomes-a-weapon/558758/; Ted Piccone, How Can
International Law Regulate Autonomous Weapons?, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 10,
2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/04/10/how-can-inter
national-law-regulate-autonomous-weapons/.
15. See Chris Pash, The World’s Top Artificial Intelligence Companies are
Pleading for a Ban on Killer Robots, BUS. INSIDER AUSTL. (Aug. 21, 2017,
12:01AM), goo.gl/emD37e (reprinting the text of An Open Letter to the United
Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, signed by 116 CEOs of AI
research companies, including over 20 American companies). The letter states in part:
“Lethal autonomous weapons threaten to become the third revolution in warfare. . . .
We therefore implore the High Contracting Parties to find a way to protect us all from
these dangers.” Id.
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their AI research to military purposes. 16 Google’s contract with the
U.S. Department of Defense reportedly “worked extensively to develop
machine learning algorithms for the Pentagon, with the goal of creating
a sophisticated system that could surveil entire cities.” 17
In the United States, state and federal departments of correction and
mental health facilities increasingly incorporate and rely on security
technology to maintain order and ensure the safety of confined
prisoners and patients. Prison guards use aerial drones to supervise and
record the activities of prisoners. 18 Psychiatrists conduct telehealth
assessment and diagnosis of prisoners in multiple facilities from a
single office computer. 19 AI video alert systems monitor the hallways
16. See Kate Conger, Google Plans Not to Renew Its Contract for Project
Maven, a Controversial Pentagon Drone AI Imaging Program, GIZMODO (June 1,
2018, 2:38 PM), goo.gl/JvouXn (noting that Google’s decision followed thousands of
signatures and dozens of resignations by Google employees in protest against the
company’s involvement in the military contract).
17. Id. See also Jack Schofield, Pentagon Delays Disputed JEDI Cloud
Contract, ZDNET (May 31, 2018, 22:47 GMT), https://www.zdnet.com/article/
pentagon-delays-disputed-jedi-cloud-contract/ (discussing a potential $10 billion
cloud computing federal defense contract with Amazon and other private tech
companies); Samuel Gibbs, Google’s AI is Being Used by US Military Drone
Programme, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2018, 06:11 EST), https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2018/mar/07/google-ai-us-department-of-defense-military-droneproject-maven-tensorflow (revealing that while Google does not currently use its
cloud-computing technology to hold classified information for the U.S. government,
both Amazon and Microsoft are contracted to provide such services).
18. See Meg Kinnard, South Carolina Plans to Use Drones to Remotely Watch
Inmates, US NEWS (May 24, 2018, 2:16 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/south-carolina/articles/2018-05-24/sc-prisons-embrace-drones-to-keepremote-eye-on-inmates; see generally Public Safety Drones: An Update, CTR. FOR
THE STUDY OF THE DRONE, BARD COLLEGE (May 28, 2018), available at
http://dronecenter.bard.edu/public-safety-drones-update/ (reporting an 82% increase
in public safety drone acquisition in the United States from 2017 to 2018, including
at least 910 state and local police, sheriff, fire, and emergency services agencies); cf.
Darlene Ricker, Taking Flight: Navigating Drone Laws Has Become a Growing and
Lucrative Legal Niche, ABA J. 56, 58 (July 2017) (reporting that as of February 2018,
there were 49,857 commercial drone operators and 664,688 hobbyist drone operators
registered with the Federal Aviation Administration, which represents approximately
1.6 million drones in the private sector).
19. See generally U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS’ USE OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING FOR INMATES WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 46
(July 2017) [hereinafter DOJ RESTRICTIVE HOUSING], available at https://www.over
sight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/e1705.pdf; Human Rights at Home: Mental
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at night outside bedrooms in mental health facilities to identify potential
physical assaults or self-harm. 20 Several states statutorily authorize
constant video surveillance of nursing home residents’ rooms, with
their consent or that of their guardians. 21 Many of these measures cut
costs by reducing the need for human staffing. 22
For the public at large, privacy interests are embodied in common
law and statutory law, 23 with additional protections found in the shifting
penumbra of constitutional rights. 24 Those subject to state confinement
Illness in U.S. Prisons and Jails, S. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Human
Rights and the Law and the Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 4-5 (Sept. 15,
2009) (statement of Harley G. Lappin, Director, Federal Bur. of Prisons), available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/testimonies/witnesses/attach
ments/2009/09/15/2009-09-15-bop-lappin-mental-illness.pdf.
20. Whether to approve a remote surveillance system in the hallways of a
juvenile facility in lieu of a human seated near the residents’ rooms at night was an
issue voted upon during the author’s term as Chair of the Rules Committee of the state
administrative body, The North Carolina Commission for Mental Health, Substance
Abuse, and Developmental Disabilities between 2008 and 2012.
21. See, e.g., Authorized Electronic Monitoring in Long-Term Care Facilities
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-430, 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 32 (effective Jan. 1, 2016) (authorizing
resident or guardian’s consent to constant private bedroom surveillance); see also
Nat’l Ctr. on Elder Abuse et al., Fact Sheet, Balancing Privacy and Protection:
Surveillance Cameras in Nursing Home Residents’ Rooms, available at
http://ltcombudsman.org/uploads/files/issues/cv-ncea-surveillance-factsheet-web.pdf
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (identifying Illinois, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and
Washington as states that had laws by 2017 that permit the installation of cameras in
nursing home residents’ rooms, with their consent).
22. See, e.g., Nat’l Law Enforcement & Corr. Tech. Ctr., Camera System Stems
Prison Violence, Saves $$$, TECHBEAT (Spring 2011) (opting for a new prison video
surveillance system in Oklahoma City for $384,000 in lieu of hiring 200 additional
prison guards at a cost of $10 million per year in wages and benefits), available at
https://www.justnet.org/interactivetechbeat/spring_2011/camerasystem.pdf; Meera
Narasimhan, Data Driven Decisions and Outcomes in Telepsychiatry, AM. PSYCH.
ASS’N.: TELEPSYCHIATRY BLOG (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.psychiatry.org/
psychiatrists/practice/telepsychiatry/blog/data-driven-decisions-and-outcomes-intelepsychiatry (noting that telepsychiatry “is the more cost-effective option”).
23. See generally OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 184-85 (1993) (discussing the American
development of privacy-related tort claims in the context of technology and
surveillance, including intrusion into seclusion, false light publicity, and appropriation
of likeness or name).
24. The “shadows cast by a variety of provisions in the Bill of Rights,” Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977), reflect what has come to be known as the zone

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019

9

California Western Law Review, Vol. 55 [2019], No. 1, Art. 2
FINAL Brobst camera ready (Do Not Delete)

10

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

1/8/2019 10:36 AM

[Vol. 55

also have constitutional and statutory privacy rights, as well as common
law parens patriae protections, all requiring consideration of legitimate
governmental interests. 25 Rapidly changing technologies offer greater
facility and breadth of surveillance, while the biology of the human
species, with its essential mental and physical needs, remains relatively
static, evolving gradually. 26 The pressures of technological change
place a toll on humanity’s well-being, particularly when the balance of
personal and governmental interests does not sufficiently respect the
realities of what level of autonomy our species inherently needs to
thrive.
Autonomy in navigating both privacy and social interaction are
essential to human well-being and the fulfillment of human potential.
As Justice Douglas observed, “[p]rivacy involves the choice of the
individual to disclose or to reveal what he believes, what he thinks, what
he possesses.” 27 Privacy and social interaction mutually reinforce each
of privacy in a penumbra of privacy rights in the U.S. Constitution. See also Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 324 (1967) (“these penumbral rights of privacy and
repose”); Matter of Welfare of Colyer, 600 P.2d 738, 741-42 (Wash. 1983) (“The
United States Supreme Court has identified a right of privacy emanating from the
penumbra of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights and from the language of the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
25. See, e.g., Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Minn. 1976) (addressing
the state as parens patriae in examining its authority to administer electroshock
therapy to treat an involuntarily committed minor patient without his natural
guardian’s consent), superseded by statute as stated in In re Civil Commitment of
Raboin, 704 N.W. 2d 767 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
26. See generally Peter Ward, What May Become of Homo Sapiens, SCI. AM.,
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-may-become-of-homo-sapiens/
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (outlining the differing views of causation for continuing,
but gradual, human evolution, including technological impact, gene drift, and genetic
engineering); see also HUXLEY, supra note 1, at 8 (“The sciences of matter can be
applied in such a way that they will destroy life or make the living of it impossibly
complex and uncomfortable; but, unless used as instruments by the biologists and
psychologists, they can do nothing to modify the natural forms and expressions of life
itself.” (Preface to the 1946 edition)); Clive Norris et al., Algorithmic Surveillance:
The Future of Automated Visual Surveillance, in SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT
TELEVISION AND SOCIAL CONTROL 255, 259 (Clive Norris et al. eds., 1998) (“The cost
of autonomy and privacy lies not so much in the growth of surveillance but in its
changing form: from the local and intimate, based on personal knowledge and
mutuality of associations, towards the impersonal, the standardised and the
bureaucratic.”).
27. Warden, 387 U.S. at 323 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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other, allowing a person to safely choose and resist social interactions.
As psychological research demonstrates, humans despair from too
much of either: from loneliness and isolation, and from lack of privacy
and difficulty in creating a self-identity. 28
Surveillance technology, including AI applications, presents new
opportunities to undermine humanity’s basic need for autonomy,
human social interaction, and privacy. It is not a disruptive technology,
a technology which inadvertently happens to cause social disruption,
but rather it is a technology designed to disrupt. 29 From a cynical
perspective, commercial and governmental interests seek to convince
the public that loss of privacy is inevitable because technology too
easily invades our privacy or because this invasion is needed to protect
society from unseen attacks. They do so to financially profit from the
sale and development of security technology or to better monitor and
control individual behavior for political purposes.
This is nothing new. When restricting state use of eavesdropping
devices on the public to detect crime in Berger v. New York in 1967, the
Supreme Court implied that profit motives foster technological
innovation in spying: “Since 1940 eavesdropping has become a big
business. Manufacturing concerns offer complete detection systems
which automatically record voices under almost any conditions by
remote control.” 30 More recently, sociologist Barry Glassner noted just
prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks: “The short answer to why Americans
harbor so many misbegotten fears is that immense power and money
await those who tap into our moral insecurities and supply us with
symbolic substitutes.” 31 According to Glassner, symbolic substitutes
are the bogeymen of commercial and media alarm, manipulating
anecdotal incidents and statistically unsupported risks to further
powerful interests at the expense of societal interests. 32 Surveillance
28.
29.

See infra Part IV(A).
See generally CYRUS FARIVAR, HABEAS DATA: PRIVACY VS. THE RISE OF
SURVEILLANCE TECH (2018) (addressing the legal history of increasing state
surveillance on private citizens).
30. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 47 (1967).
31. BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE AFRAID
OF THE WRONG THINGS xxviii (1999).
32. See generally id. (providing examples of general alarm over unfounded
perceived trends, such as road rage and violent crime despite clear evidence of low
numbers and a decrease over time, respectively).
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technology manufacturers admit as much: “Every unfortunate event we
hear about, whether it’s cyber-related or just flat out terrorism, these are
drivers for our business. It’s unfortunate that they are and that they
happen, but they do drive this industry and this market.” 33
If the technology industry can create invasive and intrusive
technology, it can certainly craft technology with better privacy
protections if properly motivated. 34 In the 1800s, when privacy of
written communications was not practically assured, public approval
for the innovations of envelopes and locks on mail bags compelled
Congress to enact statutory protections for the privacy of the postal
service. 35 Such efforts resulted in paper mail receiving greater legal
privacy protections today than digital information. 36 Technological
innovation and legal privacy protections can be and have been
compatible. For this to occur, however, the American legal system
must fulfill its obligation to enforce existing protections of the
autonomy rights of individuals in the face of commercial and
governmental interests intent on overreaching.
To illuminate how existing legal tenets identify and enforce privacy
rights, it is critical to examine the contexts where individual privacy
rights are already most suppressed under American law: the arena of
persons in civil and criminal state confinement. The use of technology
to constantly monitor humans in confinement without their consent
presupposes a legitimate purpose of public health and safety pursuant
to state police power and other common law doctrines. 37 More constant

33. Tim A. Scally, State of the Market: Video Surveillance 2018, SDM MAG.
(Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.sdmmag.com/articles/94822-state-of-the-market-videosurveillance-2018.
34. See, e.g., Alice Gregory, This Startup Wants to Neutralize Your Phone – And
Un-Change the World, WIRED (Jan. 16, 2018, 06:00 AM), https://www.wired.com
/story/free-speech-issue-yondr-smartphones/ (designing data suppressive neoprene
bags to lock and store cellphones in hospitals, schools, and churches, and at events in
order to limit unauthorized recording and distracting use).
35. REGAN, supra note 3, at 46-47.
36. See Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2112 (2009).
37. See Wiseman v. Massachusetts, 398 U.S. 960, 963 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting with approval the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court which held that the public interest in viewing recordings of
patient abuses at the Bridgewater State Hospital for the criminally insane “outweighs
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monitoring is arguably warranted based on the lesser right to autonomy
and privacy of persons who are subject to court-ordered confinement
for the protection of themselves or others, but is facing a reexamination
in the courts.
This article begins by introducing in Section I the legal recognition
of the basic human need for autonomy in navigating privacy and social
interactions, including its origins in natural law, adoption in
international human rights, and emerging statutory and regulatory
frameworks in the United States. Section II examines how and to what
degree the courts have recognized the essential human and societal need
for individual privacy and social interaction, with a focus on common
law doctrines, as well as state and federal constitutional protections of
the autonomy rights of persons in state confinement. Section III
outlines the comparative state interests when infringing on the
individual autonomy rights of confined persons in prisons and medical
settings, including identification of interests common to all institutional
settings. Finally, Section IV addresses the need for courts to realign the
balance of these interests in light of emerging psychological research
which reveals the continued importance of individual privacy with
respect to technological innovation facilitating constant surveillance.
I. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF THE BASIC HUMAN NEED FOR AUTONOMY
IN NAVIGATING PRIVACY AND SOCIAL CONTACT
Privacy has a long history of legal and cultural protection and is
deemed essential to human and social well-being. 38 Apart from
constitutional provisions, legal recognition of individual privacy
interests arise in a myriad of state and federal contexts, such as
privileges of confidentiality, 39 cyberstalking criminal statutes,40

any countervailing interests of the inmates and of the Commonwealth
(as parens patriae) in anonymity and privacy”).
38. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 386 (1960) (“at the
present time the right of privacy, in one form or another, is declared to exist by the
overwhelming majority of the American courts”).
39. E.g., Paxton v. City of Dallas, 509 S.W.3d 247, 270 (Tex. 2017) (upholding
the attorney-client privilege as well established and enduring “because the systemic
harm from denying it is real even if it is not quantifiable”).
40. See generally Jennifer A. Brobst, The Modern Penny Dreadful: Public
Prosecution and the Need for Litigation Privacy in a Digital Age, 96 NEB. L. REV.
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invasion of privacy torts, 41 informational privacy protections, 42 medical
and genetic privacy regulations, 43 and exemptions to sunshine laws.44
These privacy interests are held by all persons, whether confined in
state institutions or living at large in society. Among these, the primary
focus of this article is the observational right to be let alone, 45 which
includes the right not to be touched, seen, heard, or watched without
consent. 46 This essential right has been protected since the founding of
281 (2017) (addressing the rise of online stalking methods and limitations on public
prosecution to protect the privacy of victims).
41. E.g., McConnell v. Georgia Dept. of Labor, 814 S.E.2d 790, 799 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2018) (public disclosure of private facts and negligent disclosure of personal
information class action). “[I]t may seem surprising that our legislature has so far not
acted to establish a standard of conduct intended to protect the security of
personal information, as some other jurisdictions have done in connection with data
protection and data breach notification laws.” Id.; see id. at 799 n.16 (listing
numerous state jurisdictions that have enacted data protection privacy laws).
42. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (“the individual interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters”); Mick Mulvaney, Memorandum for the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
PRESIDENT (Feb. 27, 2018) (explaining the cybersecurity provisions of the federal
Modernizing Government Technology Act (signed into law Dec. 12, 2017)), available
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/M-18-12.pdf. See
generally Julie E Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000).
43. E.g., Higgins v. Sommerville Hosp., No. 914748, 1994 WL 903009 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 1994) (interpreting a state statute which defined as public record the
identity of patients with some types of sexually transmitted infections but not others);
see also Barbara Zabawa, FDA Regulation of mHealth and Wellness Devices: What
You Need to Know, 30 ABA: THE HEALTH LAW. 38, 38 (Dec. 2017) (addressing the
complexity of federal and state regulation, including HIPAA privacy regulations, once
a wellness tracking personal device enters the realm of diagnosis and treatment).
44. E.g., Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 485 S.W.3d 857 (Tenn.
2016) (strictly construing the applicable public records exemption when denying
newspaper defendants’ access to the criminal investigative case file in a sexual assault
prosecution); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9 (“No person shall be deprived of the right to
examine documents . . ., except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy
clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.”).
45. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 193 (1890) (asserting that the broadening of common law legal rights
now includes “the right to be let alone”).
46.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 145 (7th Cir. 1995)
(distinguishing between visual and tactile inspections, and classifying both as a form
of search under the Fourth Amendment).
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the United States, promoting the “sanctity of a man’s home and the
privacies of life.” 47 Indeed, the Court has connected these interests to
“the very essence of constitutional liberty and security.” 48
A. The Ability to Respond to Intrusions on Privacy
While the need for and interest in privacy have remained constant,
the ease of intrusion has changed in substantial and varied ways over
time. In 1963, Chief Justice Warren wrote in Lopez v. United States:
[T]he fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication
constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual; that
indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave
constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments;
and that these considerations impose a heavier responsibility on this
Court in its supervision of the fairness of procedures in the federal
court system. However, I do not believe that, as a result, all uses of
such devices should be proscribed either as unconstitutional or as
unfair law enforcement methods. 49

Perhaps because the value of privacy has often been taken for granted,
the Court has not consistently felt the need to express its essential value
to humanity; yet, the increasing intrusiveness of surveillance
technology should compel the Court to underscore more fully why
privacy requires robust protections in the law. 50
Over time, a focus on the individual right to privacy in certain
contexts, rather than a general right to privacy, has emerged in the
47. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (addressing Fourth
Amendment privacy protections). See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Ways may some day [sic] be developed by
which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce
them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home.”).
48. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
49. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring).
50. Of course, the oft-cited 1890 law review article by Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis, concerned with the emergence of photojournalism, connected
“modern enterprise and invention” with a negative rights common law concept of
invasion of privacy and the “right to be let alone.” See Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 45, at 193.
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United States, 51 as well as a new understanding that the time for
regulatory measures has come. U.S. Representative Greg Walden,
Chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, stated in
response to a question about regulating the technology industry: “If
responsibility doesn’t flow, then regulation will.” 52
The European Union (“EU”) has taken the lead in moving forward
legal strategies to protect consumer privacy in a digital age, strategies
which may influence and further support American interest in
individual privacy protections. In January 2018, a tech reporter for The
Irish Times noted that 2017 had been the year of media focus on AI,
while 2018 would be the year of privacy:
Thanks to widespread heavy social media use, data breaches, US
threats to demand account passwords from travellers, concerns about
secretive state-run surveillance, some US and EU critical court cases
and a consequent acceleration in popular awareness, the general
public and the business world have never been as aware of privacy
issues as they are now. 53

On May 25, 2018, the EU rolled out its General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”), which contains more robust compliance
enforcement provisions, including the potential for millions of euros in
51. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstadt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016)
(enforcing the right to abortion against undue burdens imposed by state law); Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (right to individual privacy in choice on important matters
and to informational privacy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to individual
privacy and reproductive choice in abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(right to individual privacy and reproductive choice in contraception); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy and reproductive choice).
See generally REGAN, supra note 3, at 39-40 (discussing the transition in American
jurisprudence from privacy interests and civil liberties, to individual privacy rights in
the 1960s and 1970s).
52. Nancy Scola, Tech Scrambles to Shape U.S. Privacy Debate as EU Rules
Loom, POLITICO (May 25, 2018, 05:09 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018
/05/25/tech-privacy-debate-us-eu-rules-565741.
53. Karlin Lillington, Privacy and Security will be the Big Tech Stories of 2018,
THE IRISH TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018, 05:15 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/
technology/privacy-and-security-will-be-the-big-tech-stories-of-2018-1.3344154.
See also Scola, supra note 52; Leonid Bershidsky, Tech Underestimates Future
Demand for Privacy, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2017, 8:07 AM), https://www.bloom
berg.com/view/articles/2017-03-31/the-tech-industry-underestimates-the-futuredemand-for-privacy.
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fines for American companies that do not comply and enforcement in
in the European Court of Justice if necessary. 54
The current efforts to regulate the intrusiveness of technology
require a clear understanding of the interests involved. When balancing
state and individual interests, the U.S. Supreme Court has articulated
the value of legal privacy protections as a means of defending against
state tyranny, a threat articulated in the Declaration of Independence
and founded on Locke’s ideals of the social compact. 55 In a democracy,
citizens bear the burden of self-protection from state tyranny. The
Declaration of Independence addresses when the people have a right
“to provide new Guards for their future security.” 56 That is, security
against a ruling power’s “long train of abuses and usurpations.” 57 In a
modern context, addressing the legality of federal surveillance of
domestic political organizations, the Court noted: “Its resolution is a
matter of national concern, requiring sensitivity both to the
Government’s right to protect itself from unlawful subversion and
attack and to the citizen’s right to be secure in his privacy against
unreasonable Government intrusion.” 58

54. See Nancy Harris, A Practical Guide to the European Union’s GDPR for
American Businesses, RECODE (May 16, 2018, 2:00 EDT), https://www.recode.net/
2018/5/16/17360944/gdpr-us-business-eu-european-union-data-protection-privacy;
2018 Reform of EU Data Protection Rules, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.
europa.eu/commission/priorities/justice-and-fundamental-rights/data-protection/201
8-reform-eu-data-protection-rules_en (last visited Dec. 3, 2018); GDPR Portal: Site
Overview, EUGDPR.ORG, https://www.eugdpr.org/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
55. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 888 n.32 (2010) (referring
to Blackstone and Locke for the proposition that one grants to the state duties of
protection when joining civil society); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 646 (1977)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state must be empowered to establish
order to protect individual liberty and freedom, as public protection “surely is at the
core of the Lockean ‘social contract’ idea”); Texas v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 3d
810, 841 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (addressing Locke’s and Blackstone’s concept of
separation of powers as “not merely convenient in avoiding tyranny, but a necessary
feature of any government ruled by laws [] not men”).
56. THE DECL. INDEP., para. 2 (1776). See also id. at para. 30 (“A prince, whose
character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the
ruler of a free people.”).
57. Id. at para. 2.
58. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. E. Dist. Mich., So. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 299
(1972).
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Some citizens have more power and skill to resist tyranny than
others. In 2016, after the Illinois legislature approved the optional law
enforcement use of body cameras, the police department of Minooka
opted in and then opted out of its use following reportedly excessive
public information requests by suspects and their lawyers for video
footage. 59 Freedom of information laws thus helped protect privacy
interests and served as a practical deterrent to ubiquitous surveillance
by law enforcement when implemented by a cadre of legally
represented individuals.
Even single individuals may resist tyranny in the form of
surveillance effectively. In November 2017, Ricardo Palacios, an
attorney and rancher in Texas happened upon a portable camera
strapped by the government to a mesquite tree on his son’s private
property. 60 He sued the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency
that threatened to arrest him after he removed their camera, accusing
the government of trespass and “1984-style” constitutional violations.61
The camera, one of allegedly thousands of low-cost, commerciallyavailable cameras placed near the border, was in constant use and
purportedly provided information to federal, state, and local
authorities. 62 In addition to the camera, the complaint alleged that
“Plaintiffs have encountered agents of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) going onto their land, at will, day and night, without
any warrant or legal authority, without landowner consent, over
landowners’ objection, and without exigent circumstances that would
permit such intrusions upon private property, and roaming freely
about.” 63 One of the Plaintiff’s attorneys stated publicly the importance
59. Tom Boggioni, Illinois Police Department Gives Up on Body Cameras
Because They’re Tired of People Asking for Videos, ALTERNET (Apr. 13, 2016, 7:00
AM), https://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/illinois-police-department-gives-bodycameras-because-theyre-tired-people-asking.
60. Cyrus Farivar, Man Removes Feds’ Spy Cam, They Demand It Back, He
Refuses and Sues, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 22, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/2018/02/rancher-finds-creepy-and-un-american-spy-cam-tied-tohis-tree-sues-feds.
61.
Id.; see Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint for General, Injunctive &
Declaratory Judgement, Palacios v. Martinez, No. 5:17-cv-00244, 2017 WL 5903421
(S.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2017) (filing claims for common law and criminal trespass, as
well as a Bivens action for Fourth Amendment violations).
62. Farivar, supra note 60.
63. Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint, supra note 61, at para. 15.
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of protecting against government action without probable cause and
consent: “And if you all are going to keep doing that, you’re going to
have to pay for it. It’s called the right to be left alone. That’s what the
Fourth Amendment is all about.” 64
Confined prisoners and patients often have less capacity and fewer
means to follow in the steps of Ricardo Palacios when asserting their
right to observational privacy. Legal guardians of state nursing home
residents may wish to fight privacy intrusions on behalf of their loved
ones, but they face enormous financial hurdles in pursuing civil
litigation, in addition to affording residential care. 65 Indigent prisoners
may be eligible for public legal assistance, but penological interests in
order and safety in the prison setting weigh heavily in favor of the
state. 66 In mental health institutions caring for involuntarily committed
patients, policies addressing the best interests of patients as well as
serious security concerns may not weigh in favor of respecting
autonomy. 67
All of these groups of confined persons are particularly vulnerable
to acts of tyranny. In Wiseman v. Massachusetts, Justice Douglas
argued in his dissent that the public interest in being informed about
egregious patient abuses at the Bridgewater State Hospital for the
criminally insane “outweighs any countervailing interests of the
inmates and of the Commonwealth (as parens patriae) in anonymity and
privacy.” 68 Here, notably, the remedy for one privacy intrusion is
another privacy intrusion. In institutional settings, a history of accepted
state surveillance, along with advances in surveillance technology, risk
an even more intrusive environment for vulnerable persons than state
efforts to surveil open spaces and the public at large, regardless of the
prevalence of traffic cameras and business surveillance. 69
64. Farivar, supra note 60.
65. See, e.g., Kaley Johnson, The Metro-East has Some of Illinois’ Worst
Nursing Homes, Data Says. Here’s Why., BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (May 10,
2018, 10:48 AM), http://www.bnd.com/news/local/article209570444.html.
66. See infra Part III(B).
67. See infra Part III(C).
68. Wiseman v. Massachusetts, 398 U.S. 960, 962-63 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
69. Michael McCahill, Beyond Foucault: Towards a Contemporary Theory of
Surveillance, in SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION AND SOCIAL CONTROL
41, 45 (Clive Norris et al. eds., 1998) (distinguishing public surveillance, which

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019

19

California Western Law Review, Vol. 55 [2019], No. 1, Art. 2
FINAL Brobst camera ready (Do Not Delete)

20

1/8/2019 10:36 AM

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

In state confinement today, Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon comes
to life. Whether it is a prison or a mental hospital or a nursing home,
“[t]he perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a single
gaze to see everything constantly. . . . a perfect eye that nothing would
escape and a centre towards which all gazes would be turned.” 70
B. Natural Law and the Fight Against State Tyranny
While state surveillance has solidly justifiable purposes,
particularly in ensuring security and safety, 71 arbitrary surveillance –
surveillance run amok – is a longstanding form of tyranny. History is
rife with examples of nations implementing surveillance techniques to
achieve unlawful and abhorrent political goals: the Nazi occupation,72
the Cold War Eastern bloc under Communist rule, 73 South African
apartheid. 74 Even prior to the digital age, technology companies such
as IBM were reportedly involved in facilitating massive data collection
and population control through cooperative agreements with Nazi
Germany and South Africa. 75 More recently, in 2015, the Lucknow
observes unknown persons in an uncontrolled space, where a state reaction to
observed misconduct is less easily responded to than surveillance in confined,
controlled settings).
70. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
173 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995).
71. See infra Part III(A).
72. See Forum: Surveillance in German History, 34 GERMAN HISTORY 293,
306 (2016) (providing a transcript of an academic forum on the historical complexities
of the rise of mass surveillance in nation-state building, including its use in Nazi
Germany as a means of terror and genocide).
73. See VALENTINA GLASJAR ET AL., SECRET POLICE FILES FROM THE EASTERN
BLOC: BETWEEN SURVEILLANCE AND LIFE WRITING (2016); see also MILAN
KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING (Michael Henry Heim trans.,
1984) (addressing the 1960s Czechoslovakian police state).
74. Michael Kwet, Cmore: South Africa’s New Smart Policing Surveillance
Engine, COUNTERPUNCH.ORG (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.counterpunch.org/20
17/01/27/cmore-south-africas-new-smart-policing-surveillance-engine/ (addressing
cyber-policing for crowd control in post-apartheid South Africa, including “[f]acial
recognition CCTV cameras on the streets, UAV surveillance, and vast data collections
used for predictive policing”).
75. See EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION (2000);
Michael Kwet, Apartheid in the Shadows: the USA, IBM, and South Africa’s Digital
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police of Uttar Pradesh, India, demonstrated drones that can be used to
pepper spray an “unruly mob,” which they asserted was “less harsh than
a baton charge.” 76
Beneficent uses of technology, science and medicine have a way of
being coopted, or some might say corrupted, for other purposes. In the
United States, the packbot, a mobile robot first designed by the
company iRobot twenty years ago, has saved numerous lives in search
and rescue, law enforcement, and military bomb-defusing
applications. 77 In 2016, in a police stand-off in Dallas, a similar robot
was weaponized and used for the first government-authorized robotic
or drone killing of a person on American soil. 78
In this digital age, Amnesty International reports on unlawful
government surveillance as a human rights violation. For example, it
has decried such violations in Uzbekistan, where the government has
spied on its own citizens both within and beyond its borders. 79 The
concern, according to the Amnesty researchers, is that “[t]he
Uzbekistani authorities have designed a system where surveillance and
the expectation of surveillance is not the exception, but the
norm.” 80 “It’s an environment of constant fear for Uzbekistani people,
where every phone call, every email and every text message might not

Police State, COUNTERPUNCH.ORG (May 3, 2017), https://www.counterpunch.org/
2017/05/03/apartheid-in-the-shadows-the-usa-ibm-and-south-africas-digital-policestate/.
76. India: City Police to Use Pepper-Spray Drones, BBC.COM: NEWS FROM
ELSEWHERE (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere32202466 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Lester, supra note 14 (“They were used in 9/11 search-and-rescue efforts,
during the manhunt for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev [the Boston Bomber], and in the
Fukushima plant [nuclear disaster], rolling around in areas with radiation levels too
high for human engineers.”).
78. Id. (“But that morning, the police attached a pound of C4 explosives to the
robot’s extended arm, and sent it down the hallway where Johnson had barricaded
himself. The bomb killed him instantly. The machine remained functional.”).
79. Uzbekistan: Tentacles of Mass Surveillance Spread Across Borders,
AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 31, 2017, 00:01 UTC), https://www.amnesty.org/en/
latest/news/2017/03/uzbekistan-tentacles-of-mass-surveillance-spread-acrossborders/.
80. Id.
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be private. The restrictions that this places on people’s lives and
freedoms are unbearable and unacceptable.” 81
In parts of the world without enforced individual rights or a
separation of powers, police states emerge more easily. In China, for
example, Amnesty International reported that since a 2015 government
crackdown on dissent, hundreds of human rights lawyers and activists
have been arrested, had their homes raided, and been subject to constant
surveillance as well as limits on their freedom of movement.82
Members of the public detained at a bus checkpoint, suspected of civil
unrest on the basis of Muslim ethnicity, are regularly subject to some
of today’s most modern surveillance tools in roadside kiosks, including
digital fingerprinting, iris-recognition scans, and a cradle device which
downloads the bus passengers’ cellphone contents. 83
Thus, the risk of state surveillance enables tyranny today, as it has
in the past, when, as in Foucault’s interpretation of the panopticon, 84
the fear of being surveilled escalates. That is, tyranny occurs when
those surveilled know they are surveilled, and that this monitoring
brings the potential for additional coercive or disciplinary acts by the
state. In state institutional facilities in the United States, constant
surveillance may lead to physical or chemical restraints or solitary
confinement, 85 as those who are confined well know. Even without
such physical restraints, Foucault would warn that fear alone
repressives freedom of action and choice. Americans are no exception
81. Id.
82.
China: Human Rights Lawyer Released on Bail Amid Relentless
Crackdown, AMNESTY INT’L (May 10, 2017, 14:48 UTC), https://www.amnesty.
org/en/latest/news/2017/05/china-human-rights-lawyer-released-on-bail-amidrelentless-crackdown/.
83. China has Turned Xinjiang into a Police State Like No Other, ECONOMIST
(May 31, 2018), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/05/31/china-has-turnedxinjiang-into-a-police-state-like-no-other/ (describing hundreds of thousands of
Uighur Muslim Chinese disappearing into re-education camps in Xinjiang Province
after violent civil unrest).
84. See FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 200 (discussing the negative social
implications of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, the antithesis of the hidden dungeon,
where a prison-like structure exists with a central tower that can see all of the inmates,
but no prisoner can communicate with the tower or others and the prisoner never
knows when he or she is being directly observed).
85. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 460.114 (2017) (authorizing chemical restraints in
state elder care facilities).
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to having to fight state action that ensures “visibility is a trap,” 86 a trap
designed to reduce the power that comes from autonomy of choice in
human interactions. 87
Among developed nations, the United States is late to the table in
adopting data protection laws. It is the last to create a federal agency to
enforce those laws; yet, through its relatively functional separation of
powers it has emerged as a strong force in avoiding some of the
surveillance state aspects of its sister nations. 88 Sweden was the first
nation, in 1973, to enact federal data protection laws. 89 Even prior to
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, West Germany had developed the
most protective data privacy legislation in the Western World, a model
for later American and Canadian legal restrictions on mass
surveillance. 90
Depriving a prisoner of privacy without consent may reach such
levels of degradation as to constitute an international human rights
violation, even torture. 91 It is used as a form of social control in a police
86. See FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 200.
87. See RANDOLPH LEWIS, UNDER SURVEILLANCE: BEING WATCHED IN
MODERN AMERICA 25 (2017) (reflecting on the novel KINDRED (2004) by Octavia
Butler, in which constant scrutiny was used as a tool to enslave the protagonist, a
modern Black woman from Los Angeles who travels back in time to the horrors of
the ante-bellum South).
88. See JAMES MICHAEL, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE STUDY, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 81 (1994) (“The United States probably produces more
privacy case law than any other common law jurisdiction.”); Mike Maguire,
Restraining Big Brother? The Regulation of Surveillance in England and Wales, in
SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION AND SOCIAL CONTROL 229, 234 (Clive
Norris et al. eds., 1998) (outlining the slow emergence of privacy legislation in the
United Kingdom, particularly with regard to police surveillance).
89. DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES:
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE UNITED
STATES 93 (1989) (providing a comparative legislative overview of privacy
protections).
90. Id. at 21.
91. For example, The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms states in Article 8(1): “Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” The United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights more generally commits in its Preamble to
“freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want . . . as the highest
aspiration of the common people,” rights more specifically related to privacy under
Article 3 (right to life, liberty, personal security), Article 5 (freedom from torture and
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state, where armed military roam the streets and invade homes to cause
terror. 92 American courts are increasingly taking notice of the risk that
deprivation of privacy and social isolation are deliberately used by the
state to demean, control, and terrify. 93 As the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated in 2017, “we, too, fear the Orwellian-style surveillance
state that could emerge from unfettered government collection of
personal data.” 94
In the United States, the judicial branch has served as a key force
in elucidating the privacy rights and interests of individuals, particularly
when the other branches of government have been reluctant to regulate
the surveillance industry or governmental use of surveillance products.
For example, in Carpenter v. United States, in 2018, the Supreme Court
demonstrated its willingness to support individual privacy rights under
the Fourth Amendment against state intrusion in the face of “the seismic
shifts in digital technology that make possible the tracking of
[individuals] . . . for years and years.” 95 Some argue that overreliance
on the judiciary for such a task results in a stinted approach:

degrading treatment), and Article 12 (freedom from interference with privacy, family,
home and correspondence), among others, as well as Article 30 (freedom from state
or personal interference in the above rights).
92. See Henry, supra note 2.
93. See Shilpa Jindia, Secret Surveillance and the Legacy of Torture have
Paralyzed the USS Cole Bombing Trial at Guantánamo, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 5,
2018, 9:18 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/03/05/guantanamo-trials-abd-alrahim-al-nashiri/ (reporting that defense lawyers of detainees in the Guantánamo Bay
American military facility in Cuba could not proceed “for fear of [American]
government surveillance”); Denver Nicks, Government Spying Hurts Journalists and
Lawyers, Report Says, TIME (July 28, 2014, 4:51 PM), http://time.com/3048380
/government-spying-hurts-journalists-and-lawyers-report-says/ (reporting on U.S.
National Security Administration efforts to weaken public cybersecurity development
to better enable surveillance of the American public, including targeted surveillance
of lawyers and journalists who fear for the safety of their clients and sources).
94. United States v. Thompson, 866 F.3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir. 2017)
(dismissing dicta in Supreme Court precedent that technological innovation might
diminish expectations of privacy). See also Richards v. County of Los Angeles, 775
F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that a state employer secretly
videotaping employees without their knowledge or consent violated the Fourth
Amendment and “goes against the grain of our strong anti-Orwellian traditions”).
95. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
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Although the courts may be a natural venue for resolving legal
questions, they provide a poor locus for policy making about issues
of technological change and privacy because they deal with
individual-level disputes and because their legal analysis is likely to
reemphasize the individual character of the rights at issue rather than
exploring the social implications.96

However, the individual nature of the right to privacy is where the
importance of privacy begins, even if privacy is essential to societal
well-being. Natural law and its influence on the American Bill of
Rights conceptually reflect this. Rather than merely atomizing the need
for privacy, the privacy discourse in case law repeatedly discusses the
role of the individual in society and the mutually reinforcing concept
that society’s protection of the individual is protective of society itself.
Autonomy, privacy, and the need for human contact as a social
species are ancient values. Natural law suggests a common thread of
human need that is so inextricably intertwined with the human
experience that it is endowed with lawful authority, whether or not it is
expressly stated in a book of laws. 97 Yet natural law, much like the
fading of the Titans, 98 has been battered in the storms of time,
eventually replaced by the sharper edges of scientific and medical
understanding. 99

96. REGAN, supra note 3, at 41.
97. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE FORUM AND THE TOWER: HOW SCHOLARS
AND POLITICIANS HAVE IMAGINED THE WORLD, FROM PLATO TO ELEANOR
ROOSEVELT 21 (2011) (explaining that Plato’s The Laws averred that there are
“recurrent processes of human knowing by which the laws can be tested, evaluated,
and improved, always with a view toward ‘the freedom, unity and wisdom of the
city’”).
98. See Velvet Yates, The Titanic Origin of Humans: The Melian Nymphs and
Zagreus, 44 GREEK, ROMAN & BYZANTINE STUDIES 183, 191-92 (2004) (identifying
the role of the mythological Titans who violently created the many Greek gods from
the one ruling deity, after which Zeus, one of the many, ultimately punished and
destroyed the Titans by incinerating them with thunder and lightning, resulting in the
birth of mankind “from their ashes”).
99. See, e.g., RONALD NIEZEN, PUBLIC JUSTICE AND THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
LAW 36 (2010) (inferring that the international human rights movement is a product
of the politics of indignation, a reaction to the state as perpetrator rather than deserving
of patriotism); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV.
L. REV. 443, 452 (1918) (“The true science of the law does not consist mainly in a
theological working out of dogma or a logical development as in mathematics, or only
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The English philosopher and physician John Locke “taught that
men establish governments to protect their natural rights to life, liberty,
and property.” 100 Globally, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
adopted Article 12 in 1948, recognized humanity’s common concerns
with individual privacy rights, asserting that “no one shall be subjected
to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home, or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.” 101 All
of these concepts are bound up with freedom and autonomy. As Bloch
argued, “[t]o be free means that a person is not imposed upon from the
outside,” or at least has a choice and a will with respect to human,
environmental, and other causal pressures. 102
Whereas the glorified American Declaration of Independence and
its language of inalienable rights has been criticized for its overly
aspirational and nebulous statements, 103 it does still inspire an effort in
legal discourse to define the rights that are owed, because it assumes
that some inalienable, inherent rights exist and that government has a

in a study of it as an anthropological document from the outside; an even more
important part consists in the establishment of its postulates from within upon
accurately measured social desires instead of tradition.”); Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918) (“The jurists who believe in natural law
seem to me to be in that naïve state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and
accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men
everywhere.”); Steven J. Macias, Utilitarian Constitutionalism: A Comparison of
Bentham & Madison, N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 1028, 1050 (2018) (explaining
Bentham’s criticism of natural law, “since there was no universally accepted authority
on what exactly that law contained”).
100. GLENDON, supra note 97, at 107.
101. See MICHAEL, supra note 88, at 19 (discussing the context of international
law unambiguously identifying privacy as a universal, fundamental human right).
102. BLOCH, supra note 3, at 154.
103. See, e.g., William F. Dana, The Declaration of Independence, 13 HARV.
L. REV. 319 (1900) (asserting that the clarity of the Declaration’s language served to
justify separation from England, whereas the ambiguity of the principles stated served
merely as a foundation for what Congress would eventually make concrete); John
Inazu, We Disagree on the ‘Self-Evident Truths’ in the Declaration of Independence.
But We Always Did., WASH. POST (July 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/07/05/we-disagree-on-the-self-evident-truths-inthe-declaration-of-independence-but-we-always-did/?noredirect=on&utm_term
=.5253cf68ee2f (arguing that fundamental disagreements regarding the meaning and
scope of the Declaration of Independence have continued since it was first written).
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duty to protect them. 104 Even if the concepts are aspirational, they still
present value to their skeptics. Jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, critical
of natural law and deeply saddened by war, still extended hope for the
social contract and the search for the common wants of man, “the
chords of a harmony that breathes from the unknown.” 105
When one hears in popular culture that privacy is dead, it is as if
individual privacy never mattered. The legal profession knows
better. 106 Even if the source of privacy rights for the public and persons
in confinement is under debate, the courts in the United States have
never asserted that privacy is dead. 107 The courts appear to adopt an
anthropological approach, recognizing that cultural values are diverse
and change with time and experience. 108
Nevertheless, even
104. E.g., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 848
n.2 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Anglo-American legal tradition
recognizes Lockean core private rights, while non-core rights are privileges created
as a matter of public policy, and therefore should not be blithely recognized or adopted
by the courts); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 646 (1977) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that in order to protect individual liberty and freedom, the state
must be empowered to establish order, including the assessment of who deserves the
death penalty where public protection is “surely at the core of the Lockean ‘social
contract’ idea”).
105. Holmes, Natural Law, supra note 99, at 44.
106. Compare Jacob Morgan, Privacy is Completely and Utterly Dead, and We
Killed It, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2014, 12:04 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
jacobmorgan/2014/08/19/privacy-is-completely-and-utterly-dead-and-we-killedit/#562959c731a7 (“It doesn’t appear that businesses or governments are going to
protect us either, if anything there is a lack of education and no desire to educate the
masses on these issues.”), with Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data
Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 395 (2014) (“privacy (and privacy law) are
very much alive”).
107. In the author’s online search of state and federal case law in the United
States, no case includes the popular phrase privacy is dead. See also Johnson v.
Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Wolfish assumed without deciding that
prisoners retain some right of privacy under the fourth amendment” (citing Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979))); Hickman v. Jackson, No. 2:03CV363, 2005 WL
1862425, at *6 n.24 (E.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2005) (explaining that federal courts have
chosen not to clearly identify the source of precedent for a prisoner’s right to privacy,
but that the right is consistently recognized nonetheless).
108. See, e.g., Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 92 (1994)
(addressing compulsory urine collection in drug testing of athletes, while stating “in
our culture the excretory functions are shielded by more or less absolute privacy, so
much so that situations in which this privacy is violated are experienced as extremely
distressing, as detracting from one’s dignity and self-esteem” (quoting Skinner v. Ry.
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anthropologists have asserted that when the public voice lacks clarity
and struggles to assert its autonomy rights, “it faces a likelihood of
becoming invisible and therefore of being subject to the will and whims
of illegitimate power.” 109 In the arena of privacy rights, the courts need
to continue to serve as a champion of authentic reliance on past
principles, 110 particularly when the other branches of American
government are reluctant to do so. 111
C. Common Law Doctrines Protecting Autonomy: Police Power and
Parens Patriae
Without adequate regulation of surveillance in public and private
spaces clearly affirming an individual right to privacy, the courts are
left to define what privacy is due and why it is important to the
individual and society. In addition to state and federal constitutional

Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 645-46 (1989))); cf. Holmes, Natural Law,
supra note 99, at 41 (“But while one’s experience thus makes certain preferences
dogmatic for oneself, recognition of how they came to be so leaves one able to see
that others, poor souls, may be equally dogmatic about something else.”).
109. NIEZEN, supra note 99, at 15.
110. See NIEZEN, supra note 99, at 173 (admonishing that powerful state
interests can manipulate historical romanticism, putting forth “plain falsehoods with
moral defences”); WILLIAM VANDERWOLK, VICTOR HUGO IN EXILE: FROM
HISTORICAL REPRESENTATIONS TO UTOPIAN VISTAS 47 (2006) (“The government had
carefully constructed its own mythology, based on past glory, in order to protect its
interests.”).
111. See, e.g., Frank J. Cavico, The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress in the Private Employment Sector, HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 111
(2003) (internal citation omitted) (discussing the weak development of emotional
distress claims in tort law, where “the law has been slow to accept the interest in peace
of mind as entitled to independent legal protection, even as against intentional
invasions”); Catherine Tucker, Empirical Research on the Economic Effects of
Privacy Regulation, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 265 (2012) (addressing the
potential negative financial impact on businesses when internet advertising is
regulated to protect consumer privacy); Anna Minton, CCTV Increases People’s
Sense of Anxiety, GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2012, 13:00 EDT), https://www.theguardian
.com/society/2012/oct/30/cctv-increases-peoples-sense-anxiety
(describing
the
insurance industry’s commodification of fear for profit, with the “defensible space”
concept of home and business protection promoting “purchase of security products,
strongly backed by the insurance industry, which provides lower premiums for
properties”).
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protections, 112 longstanding common law doctrines of police power and
parens patriae provide support for individual autonomy, particularly in
state institutional settings.
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld common law police
power in state and local applications:
Throughout our history the several States have exercised their police
powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens. Because
these are “primarily, and historically, . . . matter[s] of local concern”,
the “States traditionally have had great latitude under their police
powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons.” 113

Police power is protected by the Tenth Amendment, which reserves
to the states powers not delegated to Congress under the Constitution.114
With respect to use of surveillance technologies, searches, and other
restrictive measures, such as solitary confinement, police power is often
a source of authority for states to impose security and safety
measures. 115 In upholding the state’s exercise of police power, as
shown in the practice of body-cavity searches, the court often defers to
the state’s choice of action. 116 Nonetheless, as a matter of public health
law in both criminal and medical state institutions, police power has yet
to be well defined and is often combined with a constitutional analysis
defining the legal bounds of state restrictive measures. 117 At times,
police power and parens patriae applications are in conflict when
112. See infra Part II.
113. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (internal citations
omitted).
114. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
115. See, e.g., J.B. ex rel. Benjamin v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2015)
(permitting strip searches of juvenile detainees pursuant to state police power despite
numerous countervailing privacy concerns).
116. See, e.g., Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990) (asserting
that prison officials are owed deference in choice of restrictive measures due to their
“exceedingly complex task” of safeguarding institutional security), cert. denied, 501
U.S. 1209 (1991); see also infra Part IV.
117. See generally Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the “Old” Public Health,
69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 1427 (2004) (examining the evolving scope of police power
in the United States, with concerns that “[t]he law makes little attempt to identify
separate headings of the police power, such as public health, that operate as limited
exceptions to the general presumption in favor of protecting liberty and property”).
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addressing privacy concerns, despite their shared purposes, perhaps
because they are both broad in scope and highly fact sensitive. 118
The common law parens patriae doctrine also serves to create a
governmental duty to protect the community, but particularly persons
subject to governmental care and control. 119 As the Supreme Court of
Minnesota explained, a state which acts as parens patriae is “fulfilling
its [common law] duty to protect the well-being of its citizens who are
incapable of so acting for themselves.” 120 Again, it may supply the
authority for the state to impose restrictive measures, such as restraints
on prisoners or forced medication of persons subject to involuntary
commitment. For example, in Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute,
the Supreme Court of Alaska engaged in a best interest analysis,
balancing a confined mentally ill patient’s fundamental due process
privacy and liberty interests against the psychiatric hospital’s
compelling state interest as parens patriae, in order to force the patient
to receive psychotropic medications. 121
In the debate over the impact of technological surveillance on
autonomy rights there is often a false dichotomy presented of individual
versus state interests. Political theorist Priscilla Regan explained:
118. Compare J.B. ex rel. Benjamin v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2015)
(holding that a juvenile detainee has a greater privacy interest than an adult prisoner,
but still permitting strip searches on both pursuant to state police power), with State
ex rel. Oregonian Pub. Co. v. Deiz, 613 P.2d 23 (Ore. 1980) (upholding restrictions
on public access to juvenile court proceedings pursuant to state action as parens
patriae which “favored privacy because of their belief that exposing a child’s
misdeeds to the community would reinforce the delinquent’s negative self-image and,
therefore, impede rehabilitation.”).
119. See In re D.C., 4 A.3d 1004, 1021 (N.J. 2010) (restricting child visitation
rights of parents and siblings in the interests of state parens patriae protection of the
child); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1114 (Fla. 2004) (addressing the state’s right as
parens patriae to infringe on parental rights and fundamental liberty interests for the
protection of children); Matter of Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (Wash. 1983)
(addressing the state’s statutory and common law “parens patriae responsibility to
supervise the affairs of incompetents”); In re Angelia P., 623 P.2d 198, 202-03 (Cal.
1981) (addressing parental custodial rights as involving “the liberty
and privacy interest afforded to the parents, the interest of the state, as parens patriae,
in protecting children from harm, and finally, the often silent interest of the child”).
120. Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Minn. 1976), superseded by
statute, Minn. Stat. § 253B.092, as recognized in In re Civil Commitment of Raboin,
704 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
121. Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 185 (Alaska 2009).
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“Framing privacy as a conflict between the individual and society is not
only philosophically difficult, as Dewey suggested, but is also
somewhat simplistic. People are both public and private, they operate
in both contexts, and they see both as important.” 122 As the common
law doctrines of police power and parens patriae demonstrate, both the
individual and the state have an interest in security and safety, but they
also have a mutual interest in preserving the privacy rights of the
individual.
As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals clearly stated when
examining an application of state electronic surveillance,
“the government as parens patriae has an interest in avoiding illegal
invasions of its citizens’ privacy.” 123 Moreover, the state’s crucial
interest in avoiding tyranny is integral to the survival of the government
itself. 124 Therefore, judicial interpretation of the autonomy rights of
persons in confinement find support in both common law doctrines of
police power and parens patriae.
II. STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PROTECTING THE
PRIVACY OF PERSONS CONFINED BY THE STATE
While state and federal courts suggest that there is no general right
to privacy under federal constitutional law, 125 they recognize privacy
rights in special contexts such as those affiliated with bodily autonomy,
the home, and, in a more limited way, institutional settings. 126 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that privacy rights are best crafted
by Congress and state jurisdictions, which may, in fact, create a general
right to privacy: “But the protection of a person’s general right to
privacy—his right to be let alone by other people—is, like
122. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 217-18.
123. In re United States, 10 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 1993) (addressing a Fourth
Amendment claim related to government wiretapping and electronic surveillance in a
criminal investigation).
124. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
125. E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 374 (1967) (stating that there is
no general right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment).
126. See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (declining to extend
a general right to privacy to obscene material outside the home, but recognizing that
“[t]he Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home, just as it
protects other special privacy rights such as those of marriage, procreation,
motherhood, child rearing, and education”).
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the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law
of the individual States.” 127
Generally, state privacy law is not pre-empted by the federal
government, with some exceptions, such as airspace above private
property subject to federal regulation. 128 The Ninth Amendment
assures states that they may provide expansive protection of rights not
carved out in the United States Constitution: “The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.” 129 As discussed above, State
and local jurisdictions are also imbued with more extensive common
law police power than most federal jurisdictions. 130 Nevertheless, the
penumbra of federal privacy rights found in the U.S. Constitution
remains firm and widely applicable to both federal and state
jurisdictions through the Fourteenth Amendment. 131
Protecting the individual’s autonomy to navigate the basic need for
privacy and social contact from the intrusion of state surveillance
invokes a complex overlay of constitutional issues. As with common
law approaches, such as police power and parens patriae doctrines, the
constitutional analysis addressing individual autonomy interests is
inherently fact-sensitive. Efforts to monitor persons in confinement
127. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51 (internal citations omitted). See also United
States v. Thompson, 866 F.3d 1149, 1159-60 (10th Cir. 2017) (promoting state
adoption of enhanced privacy legislation).
128.
See Ricker, supra note 18, at 62 (discussing Federal Aviation
Administration regulation of drone use as a tool of private surveillance). Generally,
when states exercise their state authority, federal preemption is discouraged to ensure
the proper balance between state and federal powers, unless Congress expressly enacts
legislation to preempt state law. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (enforcing
the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act to the California state prison system);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (requiring that Congress must make
its intention to preempt traditional state authority “unmistakably clear in the statute”).
A thorough discussion of federal preemption is beyond the scope of this article.
129. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
130. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
131. See Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir. 1994) (declaring that
“[t]he right to privacy is now firmly ensconced among the individual liberties
protected by our Constitution” when referring to Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 845 (1992)); Berger v. New York., 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (asserting that a
state eavesdropping statute that did not require particularity for authorization was
overbroad in violation of the Fourth Amendment which is made applicable to the
states under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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may take place from a distance or close enough to monitor minute
bodily movements or functions. 132 They may take place openly or
secretly. They may infringe upon a right to observational privacy as
well as bodily autonomy. 133 They may also violate First Amendment
rights to freedom of speech, movement, association, and expression.134
The protection of autonomy, even for those subjected to
surveillance in state institutions, finds support in common law, the
federal penumbra of privacy rights, and a growing number of express
privacy provisions in state constitutions across the United States.
A. Express State Constitutional Rights to Privacy
More than twenty States have taken up the mantle and asserted an
express right to privacy greater than that afforded by the United States
Constitution. 135 The Florida Supreme Court declared that “[b]ecause
the right to privacy is explicit in the Florida Constitution, it has been
interpreted as giving Florida citizens more protection than the federal
right.” 136 While many of these state constitutional privacy provisions

132. E.g., People v. Buell, 16 Cal. App. 5th 682, 690-91 (2017) (addressing the
reliability of continuous remote alcohol intake monitoring as a function of GPS ankle
bracelets in state detention).
133. E.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 566
U.S. 318, 346 (2012) (addressing the constitutionality of state-authorized body-cavity
searches).
134. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (arguing that government surveillance chills freedom of association and
expression); Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1228 (D. Colo. 2017)
(suggesting, in Eighth Amendment and substantive due process claims, that
publication of the sex offender registry and the requirement to register online email
and social media accounts create a “significant incursion” on the registrant’s First
Amendment rights by chilling speech and freedom of association).
135. See Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunicationsand-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx
(identifying an initial eleven states with constitutional privacy provisions: Alaska,
Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, New Hampshire,
South Carolina, and Washington).
136. State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1115 (Fla. 2004). See also Valley Hosp.
Ass’n, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 968 (Alaska 1997) (holding
that the express privacy provision in the Alaska Constitution provides more
protections than that found in the U.S. Constitution).
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expand upon Fourth Amendment search and seizure language, 137 others
adopt narrow applications to certain state actions, such as the right of
crime victims to privacy in legal proceedings. 138 For the slight majority
of states that have not adopted an express constitutional privacy
protection, nearly all provide language comparable to that of the federal
constitution in their bill or declaration of rights, such as due process
rights with respect to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of
happiness. 139 State courts have also maintained a right to privacy based
on more broadly-worded provisions in the U.S. Constitution.140
In 1972, Alaska amended its state constitution to include a broad
and express right to privacy; the amendment in Article I, section 22
states: “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.” 141 Similarly,
California amended the first clause of its state constitutional
Declaration of Rights to add a specific protection of individual privacy:
137. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall
not be violated.”); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures and
invasions of privacy shall not be violated; . . .); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The people
shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions
against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of
communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. . . .”); LA. CONST. art. I, §
5 (“Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures or invasions of privacy. . .
.”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and
unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated, . . .”).
138. See infra note 149.
139. State constitutions that do not contain a clause expressly protecting
“privacy” include Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
140. See infra Part II(B).
141. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22. See Alaska Right of Privacy, Amendment 3
(August 1972), BALLOTPEDIA (noting the amendment passed by over 86% of the vote),
https:// ballotpedia.org/ Alaska_Right_of_Privacy,_Amendment_3_ (August_1972)
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018). See also ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (adopting a broadly
worded provision, which states “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs,
or his home invaded, without authority of law”).
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“All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” 142 Washington also has a
broad constitutional privacy provision, which asserts that “[n]o person
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law.” 143 When a state constitutional privacy provision is
express but broadly stated, the courts tend to grant broad privacy
protections, inclusive of a range of interests and actions. 144
Other states have adopted more limited constitutional privacy
rights, such as the right to a secret ballot, 145 private prayer or
contemplation in public schools, 146 or granting crime victims an express
right to privacy and dignity in the criminal justice system. 147 The crime
142. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). Hawai’i also adopted a broad
privacy rights clause which states: “The right of the people to privacy is recognized
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. The
legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right.” HAW. CONST. art. I,
§ 6.
143. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
144. See, e.g., Kiva O. v. Alaska, Dep’t Health & Soc. Servs., 408 P.3d 1181
(Alaska 2018) (upholding a mother’s state constitutional rights to liberty and privacy
to prevent the state from overmedicating her child in the custody of the Office of
Children’s Services); Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 185 (Alaska
2009) (requiring due process before administration of antipsychotic medications to an
involuntarily committed patient under the Alaskan Constitution Privacy and Liberty
Clauses); Valley Hosp. Ass’n, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 969
(Alaska 1997) (affirming reproductive privacy rights, despite arguments by the public
hospital that the state constitutional privacy provision was to be limited to
informational privacy); N.G. v. Super. Ct., 291 P.3d 328 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012)
(denying defendant access to a crime victim’s mental health records pursuant to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege and the privacy protections of the Alaska
Constitution).
145. E.g., SO. DAK. CONST., art. VI, § 28 (ratified in 2010).
146. W. VA. CONST., art. III, § 15a (“No student of a public school may be
denied the right to personal and private contemplation, meditation or prayer . . . .”).
But see Walter v. W. Va. Bd. of Educ., 610 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (holding
in a declaratory judgment that W. VA. CONST., art. III, § 15a in violation of the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
147. See IDAHO CONST., art. I, § 22(1) (providing crime victims with a right to
“fairness, respect, dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(1) (“The right to be treated with fairness and respect for their
dignity and privacy and to be free from harassment, intimidation, and abuse

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019

35

California Western Law Review, Vol. 55 [2019], No. 1, Art. 2
FINAL Brobst camera ready (Do Not Delete)

36

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

1/8/2019 10:36 AM

[Vol. 55

victim rights’ movement has been particularly effective in laying a
constitutional foundation for privacy rights for vulnerable populations,
whereby the government becomes obligated to protect privacy,
alongside health and safety, as a matter of state police power. 148 This
most recent adoption of state constitutional rights could support
arguments to expand privacy protections for persons in confinement for
many of the same reasons, as some may be victims of crime within their
institutions. Tennessee already specifically mandates “the humane
treatment of prisoners” in its state constitution under article I, section
32. 149
In addition, states have responded to the encroachment of
surveillance in the form of online data collection by adding more
stringent protections of informational privacy in their constitutions. In
2014, Missouri became the first state to adopt a constitutional
amendment specifically protecting the privacy of electronic
communications from unreasonable search and seizure. 150 Prior to that,
New York had adopted a similar provision with respect to earlier forms
of technology, specifically protecting against “unreasonable
throughout the criminal justice system.”); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 36(1) (protecting
the crime victim’s right to refuse investigative interviews and to protect privileged
and confidential information from disclosure); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(A)(1) (“the
right to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy
throughout the criminal justice system”); N. DAK. CONST. art. I, § 25(1) (protecting
the “right to privacy”, including refusal of discovery and protection of confidentiality
information); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a(A)(1) (“to be treated with fairness and respect
for the victim’s safety, dignity and privacy”); ORE. CONST. art. I, § 42(1)(c) (including
a crime victim’s right to protection from discovery requests, although not specifically
using the term privacy); SO. DAK. CONST., art. I, § 29 (amending the constitution in
2016 to provide protection from discovery requests as a “right to privacy”); WISC.
CONST., art. I, § 9m (“This state shall treat crime victims . . . with fairness, dignity
and respect for their privacy.”).
148. See generally Mary Margaret Giannini, The Procreative Power of Dignity:
Dignity’s Evolution in the Victims’ Rights Movement, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 43, 66 (2016)
(identifying adoption of state constitutional protections that assert a right of crime
victims to respect, dignity and privacy as a function of the states’ protection of the
public).
149. TENN. CONST., art. I, § 32 (“That the erection of safe prisons, the
inspection of prisons, and the humane treatment of prisoners, shall be provided for.”).
150. See Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, supra note 135; MO.
CONST. art. I, § 15 (“That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes,
effects, and electronic communications and data, from unreasonable searches and
seizures[.]”).
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interception of telephone and telegraph communications.” 151 In 2018,
New Hampshire voters approved the following constitutional
amendment focused on protecting informational privacy from
governmental intrusion: “An individual’s right to live free from
governmental intrusion in private or personal information is natural,
essential, and inherent.” 152
Among the various state constitutions with express privacy
provisions, several focus solely on governmental intrusion. For
example, the Constitution of Florida, adopted in 1980, states:
Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except as
otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to
limit the public’s right of access to public records and meetings as
provided by law. 153

In Florida, the right to privacy survives death under Article I, section
23; for if it did not, “[it] would render those rights hollow, chilling the
daily operation of them on people as they navigate their lives from
moment to moment.” 154
Finally, in contrast to the more nebulous language of the federal
constitution, several states overtly mention the reason why privacy is
important to members of society. For example, the Montana
Constitution states: “The right of individual privacy is essential to the
well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the
151. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
152.
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/New_Hampshire_Question_2,_
Right_to_Live_Free_from_Governmental_Intrusion_in_Private_and_Personal_Infor
mation_Amendment_(2018) (last visited Dec. 3, 2018). See Dave Solomon, Leading
privacy advocate lauds passage of constitutional amendment, N.H. UNION LEADER
(Nov. 10, 2018), http://www.unionleader.com/news/politics/state/leading-privacyadvocate-lauds-passage-of-constitutional-amendment/article_5ce333c1-68b1-5a9f897c-715bbd56cd76.html; see also Kevin C. McAdam & John R. Webb, Privacy: A
Common Law and Constitutional Crossroads, 40 COLO. L. 55 (2011) (addressing
movements to reform Colorado state rights to privacy).
153. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. Cf. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; Bigley v. Alaska
Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 185 (Alaska 2009) (interpreting the liberty and privacy
rights of a person confined under state mental health care pursuant to the broader
privacy provisions in the Alaska Constitution).
154. See Weaver v. Myers, 229 So. 3d 1118, 1130 (Fla. 2017) (addressing
privacy of medical information).
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showing of a compelling state interest.” 155 The California Constitution
provides: “All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” 156 Given these examples,
Courts would find ample support to suggest that individual autonomy
is not only an individual right, but a right which benefits both the
individual and the state.
Critically, states with express constitutional privacy protections
well adapted to a modern technological age do not have to engage in
unpacking a penumbra of privacy rights in the federal constitution or
determining what level of scrutiny should be applied. 157 A state
constitutional privacy rights analysis is clearer and therefore more
easily enforced against the pressures of the surveillance technology
industry when the privacy right itself is expressly stated in the
constitution.
For example, in Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute, the Supreme
Court of Alaska held that a state mental health facility violated an
involuntarily committed patient’s state due process rights to liberty and
privacy regarding forced psychotropic medications. 158 The state court
applied the following balancing test: “[W]e must balance the
fundamental liberty and privacy interests of the patient against the
compelling state interest under its parens patriae authority to protect
the person and property of an individual who lack[s] legal age or
capacity.” 159 Moreover, “[a]lthough the state cannot intrude on a
fundamental right where there is a less intrusive alternative, the
alternative must actually be available, meaning that it is feasible and
would actually satisfy the compelling state interests that justify the
proposed state action.” 160
In contrast, for states such as Minnesota that have opted not to
follow the suggestion of the United States Supreme Court to adopt
155. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
156. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
157. See supra Part II(A).
158. Bigley, 208 P.3d at 185.
159. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
160. Id. Cf. State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1115-16 (Fla. 2004) (applying state
constitutional privacy protections to a juvenile curfew ordinance, with an efficient
strict scrutiny analysis).
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state-based privacy protections, the analysis remains muddled. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota, in 1976, unable to rely on state
constitutional or statutory guidance, or even on later-developed federal
privacy rights, haltingly addressed the claim of a mental hospital patient
who sought to resist forced tranquilizers:
We recognize that it is far too early in the evolution of the right
of privacy to offer any single definition or rule of what the right
entails. Only its broadest contours have been sketched. We do feel,
however, because of the importance of that emerging right, it is
appropriate for us, at this time, to set forth more than our bare
conclusion that the right of privacy is or is not involved.
At the core of the privacy decisions, in our judgment, is the
concept of personal autonomy—the notion that the Constitution
reserves to the individual, free of governmental intrusion, certain
fundamental decisions about how he or she will conduct his or her
life. Like other constitutional rights, however, this right is not an
absolute one and must give way to certain interests of the state, the
balance turning on the impact of the decision on the life of the
individual. As the impact increases, so must the importance of the
state’s interest. Some decisions, we assume, will be of little
consequence to the individual and a showing of a legitimate state
interest will justify its intrusion; other decisions, on the other hand,
will be of such major consequence that only the most compelling
state interest will justify the intrusion.
But once justified, the extent of the state’s intrusion is not
unlimited. It must also appear that the means utilized to serve the
state’s interest are necessary and reasonable, or, in other words, in
light of alternative means, the least intrusive.161

Before focusing on federal constitutional provisions, it is important
to note that state decisions asserting privacy rights may be based on
both state and federal constitutional principles, as illustrated in the case
of the right to assisted suicide in the State of Washington. 162 Federal
161. Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Minn. 1976), superseded by
statute, Civil Commitment Act, Minn. Laws ch. 282, art.2, §100, as stated in, In re
Civil Commitment of Raboin, 704 N.W. 2d 767 (2005).
162. See Matter of Welfare of Colyer, 600 P.2d 738, 741-42 (Wash. 1983)
(identifying the basis of the holding on Fourteenth Amendment due process liberty
interests in the U.S. Constitution, supported by the Washington Constitution article I,
section 7); James E. Dallner & D. Scott Manning, Death with Dignity in Montana, 65
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constitutional principles supporting a right to privacy are perhaps more
manifold and cumbersome than state constitutional rights, but they are
longstanding and form a strong basis for a rights analysis. Additionally,
the number of state constitutional privacy provisions are growing in
number, but still represent only a minority of states. Therefore, the bulk
of analysis that follows will focus on the developing reliance on federal
jurisprudence to circumscribe the privacy rights of persons in
confinement across the United States. If a majority of states eventually
and wisely adopts express privacy rights in their constitutions, they may
emerge as the dominant influence in identifying privacy rights against
governmental surveillance and potential tyranny.
B. A Penumbra of Federal Constitutional Rights for Persons in State
Confinement
Federal constitutional provisions key to understanding the privacy
rights of confined persons include the Fourth Amendment, Eighth
Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest as a matter
of substantive due process. The applicability of these three federal
constitutional amendments generally reaches state institutions through
the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that “[n]o state shall make any
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.” 163 The privacy-related claims of prison
inmates often assert the protections of all three clauses. 164 Persons
MONT. L. REV. 309, 329-31 (2004) (addressing the development of an express state
constitutional right to privacy in Montana that is inclusive of observational privacy).
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53
(1967) (asserting that a state eavesdropping statute that did not require particularity
for authorization was overbroad in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution).
164. For example, cross-gender surveillance of inmates has frequently raised
simultaneous federal Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and substantive due
process claims. E.g., Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919 (9th
Cir. 2017) (addressing a detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim for a violation of bodily
privacy and Fourteenth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment);
Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995) (addressing Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment claims of a prison inmate). Cf. Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d
462, 472 (6th Cir. 2013) (“excessive force claims . . . can be raised under the Fourth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments”); Bloom v. Toliver, 133 F. Supp. 3d 1314 (N.D.
Okl. 2015) (asserting Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments claims for the
beating of a juvenile inmate by another inmate during transport).
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subject to civil commitment or other civil restraints may assert both
substantive due process and Fourth Amendment claims. 165 However,
as discussed below, the courts may hold that a legally cognizable claim
on one constitutional basis may preclude recovery on another. 166
1. Intruding on Observational Privacy as Fourth Amendment Search
and Seizure
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement remain, such as a
good faith reliance on a complicated arena of precedent related to
privacy. 167 Moreover, the Fourth Amendment demands a degree of
persistence and care on the part of the defendant in asserting privacy
rights, as shown in recent decisions related to the abandonment and
third party doctrines, in which a person may lose existing privacy rights
inadvertently. 168
165. E.g., Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (D. Colo. 2017) (addressing
assertions of federal Fourth Amendment and substantive due process claims against
public dissemination of state sex offender registry).
166. See infra Part IV(A)(4).
167. E.g., United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that
police officers reasonably relied on Fourth Amendment precedent prior to United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) when placing GPS technology on the
undercarriage of defendant’s car in a public place and tracking its movements for two
days without a warrant or the owner’s consent).
168. E.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (maintaining that
a reasonable expectation of privacy remains in geolocation information provided to
third parties, such as cell phone service providers); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct.
2473 (2014) (interpreting the individual’s continued assertion of an interest in privacy
under the Fourth Amendment and the abandonment doctrine); Jones, 565 U.S. at 417
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”); State v. Brown, 815 S.E.2d 761
(S.C. 2018) (applying Riley regarding a burglar’s cell phone left behind in the home
that was burgled). See generally FARIVAR, supra note 29, at 77.
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The Fourth Amendment only protects persons from arbitrary and
unreasonable search and seizure by the government. 169 Its protections
are broader than merely protecting privacy, where searches in public
places may be unlawful in part due to public humiliation. 170 The Court
has recognized that a loss of privacy infringes on human autonomy and
the ability to make important decisions for oneself. For example, when
the state reveals otherwise confidential medical information, it could
deter patients from seeking needed healthcare treatment, despite state
assurances that patients have a subjective and objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in their own medical information. 171
The Fourth Amendment has not brought about a general right to
privacy, but instead protects against “narrowly focused intrusions into
individual privacy during the course of criminal investigations,”172
which may occur in any number of settings. Moreover, defining
reasonableness throughout the Amendment’s history has required
consideration of changes in the tools of surveillance. 173 It should have
considered to a greater extent reasonableness with respect to
technology’s impact on human wellbeing.
The constant and
increasingly rapid advancement of technology, as well as resulting
challenges associated with applying legal tests in our relatively young
endeavor of self-governance, significantly outpace the slow process of
human biological evolution in critical ways. 174 If humanity had the
169. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
170. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.4 (1967) (citing Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) for the proposition that
“a person can be just as much, if not more, irritated, annoyed and injured by an
unceremonious public arrest by a policeman as he is by a seizure in the privacy of his
office or home”).
171. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 n.14 (2001).
172. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977).
173. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring) (“And even if the public
does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they may
eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.”); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967) (“The law, though jealous of individual privacy, has not
kept pace with these advances in scientific knowledge.”).
174. American astronaut and engineer Mae Carol Jamison commented: “People
always think of technology as something having silicon in it. But a pencil is
technology. Any language is technology. Technology is a tool we use to accomplish
a particular task and when one talks about appropriate technology in developing
countries, appropriate may mean anything from fire to solar electricity.” Paula Lipp,
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capacity to adapt well to rapid changes in technology, then perhaps a
general right to privacy would not be needed, but that has not been the
case.
In 1967, in Berger v. New York, the Supreme Court outlined the
longstanding history of American law restricting government
eavesdropping – from ancient common law addressing spying by ear as
a public nuisance, to a California statute in 1862 restricting state use of
telegraph interception of conversations, to similar bans on unrestricted
wiretapping of telephone lines in the late 1800s. 175 By 1967, the Court
was compelled to accept that “[s]ophisticated electronic devices have
now been developed (commonly known as ‘bugs’) which are capable
of eavesdropping on anyone in most any given situation.” 176
Observational privacy was also addressed in 1967 in Katz v. United
States. 177 The decision examined what privacy rights and Fourth
Amendment procedures were due to an individual whose conversation
in a public telephone booth was surveilled and electronically recorded
by the FBI’s listening device attached to the booth. 178 The Court put
forth that there is no general express right to privacy in the Constitution,
but constitutional interests in privacy from government invasions do
arise from the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the United States
Constitution under limited circumstances. 179
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated that the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places; thus, what a person “seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.” 180 According to Justice Harlan, in his
concurring opinion, a federal invasion into a constitutionally protected
area has long been held to be “presumptively unreasonable in the
absence of a search warrant” if the person has a subjective and
A Space to Call Her Own, GRADUATING ENGINEER + COMPUTER CAREERS (Sept. 29,
1999), http://www.graduatingengineer.com/articles/19990929/A-Space-to-Call-HerOwn.
175. Berger, 388 U.S. at 45-49 (holding a state eavesdropping statute to be
overbroad in violation of an individual’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to
privacy).
176. Id. at 46-47.
177. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
178. Id. at 348-49.
179. Id. at 350.
180. Id. at 351.
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objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. 181 This approach asserts
respect for individual choice directing the scope of one’s privacy, such
as the deliberate use of a whisper to preserve confidentiality when one
knows one is under surveillance. 182
Yet, Justice Black in his dissent in Katz questioned the application
of the Fourth Amendment to new surveillance technologies. He
suggested that eavesdropping is an ancient practice that the Framers
chose to leave out of the protections of the Fourth Amendment,
protections that specifically address the search and seizure of tangible
persons and things:
Tapping telephone wires, of course, was an unknown possibility at
the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted. But eavesdropping
(and wiretapping is nothing more than eavesdropping by telephone)
was, as even the majority opinion in Berger, supra, recognized, “an
ancient practice which at common law was condemned as a nuisance.
IV Blackstone, Commentaries s 168. In those days the eavesdropper
listened by naked ear under the eaves of houses or their windows, or
beyond their walls seeking out private discourse.” 183

Noting that the Bill of Rights should be given a liberal construction,
Justice Black does not assert that privacy is unimportant, but rather
suggests that the other branches of government should carve out privacy
rights against state surveillance. 184 Indeed, in the same year as Katz,
Justice Black, dissenting in Berger v. New York, admonished that
privacy deserves protection in a technological age:
The law, though jealous of individual privacy, has not kept pace with
these advances in scientific knowledge. This is not to say that
individual privacy has been relegated to a second-class position for

181. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Llufrio, 237 F. Supp. 3d 735 (N.D. Ill. 2017)
(finding a subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy regarding a man in
custody who mumbled softly to himself, believing that the interview room was
monitored remotely by police).
183. Katz, 389 U.S. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967)).
184. Id. at 365-66 (Black, J., dissenting).
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it has been held since Lord Camden’s day that intrusions into it are
“subversive of all the comforts of society.” 185

Thus, Justice Black resisted carving out judicial privacy doctrines in
Katz because he believed that the Framers left the control of privacy
interests to Congress and the states:
No general right is created by the Amendment so as to give this Court
the unlimited power to hold unconstitutional everything which
affects privacy. Certainly the Framers, well acquainted as they were
with the excesses of governmental power, did not intend to grant this
Court such omnipotent lawmaking authority as that. The history of
governments proves that it is dangerous to freedom to repose such
powers in courts. 186

Since Katz and Berger, and despite Justice Black’s reservations,
Fourth Amendment precedent has consistently affirmed a relatively
narrow right to privacy, including adoption of the exclusionary rule.187
However, interpretation of privacy rights is qualified by the concurring
view of Justice Harlan, requiring a reasonable expectation of privacy. 188
Reasonableness is a nebulous concept, but the Court has reiterated that
the expectation of privacy “has a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property
law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by
society.” 189 The concept that autonomy in directing one’s private life

185. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). Cf.
Weaver v. Myers, 229 So. 3d 1118, 1130-31 (Fla. 2017) (“in Florida, the [state
constitutional] right to privacy is no less fundamental than those other rights and is
even more closely guarded in some respects”).
186. Katz, 389 U.S. at 374.
187. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009) (applying the
exclusionary rule to support Fourth Amendment protections by excluding evidence of
drugs and a gun); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the federal judiciallycreated exclusionary rule in state courts under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments). But see Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1678 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“As federal common law, however, the exclusionary rule cannot bind the
States.”).
188. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
189. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (quoting Minnesota v.
Carver, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)). See also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715
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is a basic need is almost too obvious to define well in law. This is
shown by a long history of continuous efforts to do so, as in natural law
and common law doctrines protecting the individual.
The home is granted significant protection from state surveillance
under the Fourth Amendment, which naturally supports an argument
for the privacy rights of confined persons who reside under state care.
As stated by the Court in Georgia v. Randolph:
Since we hold to the centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy
of the home, it is beyond dispute that the home is entitled to special
protection as the center of the private lives of our people. We have,
after all, lived our whole national history with an understanding of
the ancient adage that a man’s house is his castle [to the point that
t]he poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of
the Crown. 190

In 2018, in Collins v. Virginia, Justice Sotomayor defined a home’s
curtilage to include portions of an open driveway, basing her
interpretation on the longstanding principle that “at the [Fourth]
Amendment’s very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”191
The home is humanity’s affirmatively private space, in contrast to
deliberate movement in public spaces.
Nevertheless, with regard to Fifth Amendment Miranda rights in
custodial interrogation, the Court has held that a guard questioning an
inmate in prison may be deemed non-custodial, as the prison setting is
familiar and less shocking or coercive than a police department
interrogation of an arrestee unaccustomed to confinement. 192 Thus, in
(1987) (“[There is] no talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations
that society is prepared to accept as reasonable.”).
190. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
191. Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
192. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 511 (2012). See also United States v.
Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985) (suggesting a need for “more than the usual
restraint on a prisoner’s liberty to depart” in order to find that questioning of an inmate
requires Miranda warnings); Jennifer A. Brobst, Miranda in Mental Health: Court
Ordered Confessions and Therapeutic Injustice for Young Offenders, 40 NOVA L.
REV. 387 (2016) (discussing Fifth Amendment Miranda rights during court-ordered
mental health treatment in confinement).
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one breath the Court acknowledges that prison is the de facto residence
of an inmate, but in another it suggests that there is little if any
expectation of privacy in a prison cell. While state interests may
supersede those of persons in institutions under certain circumstances,
the individual right to privacy remains. For example, in a case of first
impression, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that an
involuntarily and civilly committed person retains the right to be free
from unreasonable searches, yet found that the state hospital’s policy of
regular body-cavity searches for contraband cell phones was
justified. 193
In 1983, Justice Burger in Hudson v. Palmer definitively stated that
“[a] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is
fundamentally
incompatible
with
the
close
and
continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure
institutional security and internal order.” 194 Thus, in effect, search and
seizure of prisoners are both protected and constrained by Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence by balancing the interests of prisoner
autonomy with the need to establish order and maintain security. In
addition, Fourth Amendment protection is often more limited for
convicted inmates than for pre-trial detainees. 195 Nevertheless,
subsequent decisions have determined that while a prisoner may not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy to his or her personal effects
in a cell search, 196 “a right to privacy in one’s own body . . . is not
fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so fundamental
that society would recognize it as reasonable even in the prison
context.” 197

193. Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir. 2009) (arguing that prisons
and mental hospitals for sexually dangerous patients have comparable security risks).
194. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528 (1984). With respect to pre-trial
detainees, there was initially a presumption that they had retained at least a
“diminished expectation of privacy.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979).
195. See Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1141 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
(finding under an equal protection analysis that pre-arraignment arrestees for
relatively minor offenses were not similarly situated to post-arraignment detainees,
justifying greater privacy for strip searches and body-cavity searches for the former,
notwithstanding the contention that both groups had an equal interest in maintaining
bodily privacy).
196. See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
197. Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016).
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That is, Hudson should not be interpreted to provide state prisons
with carte blanche to exact any form of privacy intrusion, eliminating
the requisite balance of interests. 198 The Court in Hudson expressly
stated that the opinion does not create a “bright line rule” or an “iron
curtain” separating prisons from the reach of the Constitution. 199 Thus,
in 1995, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Phelan
overstated the holding when it determined that Hudson stood for the
proposition that “privacy is the thing most surely extinguished by a
judgment committing someone to prison. Guards take control of where
and how prisoners live; they do not retain any right of seclusion or
secrecy against their captors, who are entitled to watch and regulate
every detail of daily life.” 200 Essentially, the Seventh Circuit attempted
to foreclose all federal Fourth Amendment privacy claims for inmates,
leaving only the more challenging Eighth Amendment analysis that
requires proof of malicious intent on the part of the state. 201 This
holding conflicted with the Ninth Circuit, which held that strip searches
of prisoners could violate the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standard if they are “excessive, vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to

198. See State v. Howard, 728 A.2d 1178 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1998) (finding an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy for a couple in a police interview room
when the state failed to present evidence of a justifiable purpose for the hidden video
surveillance and recording).
199. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523. See also United States v. Llufrio, 237 F. Supp.
3d 735, 745 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (following Hudson by requiring a balancing of interests
to determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a police interview
room); Gilmore v. Jeffes, 675 F. Supp. 219, 221 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (interpreting Hudson
in holding that prisoners “enjoy no privacy right within their cells and that cell
searches do not implicate the Fourth Amendment”). But see Somers v. Thurman, 109
F.3d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Therefore, it is unclear from the dicta
in Hudson whether prisoners retain any rights cognizable under the Fourth
Amendment against searches qua searches of their bodies, or whether the only
safeguard against assertedly egregious searches in prison is the Eighth Amendment.”).
200. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995). Other courts have
followed suit, such as Aranda v. Meyers, which relied on Hudson to find without
analysis that electronic surveillance in prison does not support a Fourth Amendment
claim. Aranda v. Meyers, 369 F. App’x. 874 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished
memorandum opinion) (noting in addition that the prisoner’s assertions of a state
conspiracy to poison his coffee were unsupported).
201. See infra Part II(B)(2); Johnson, 69 F.3d at 147 (relegating prisoner
privacy claims solely to acts of “calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs”).
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any legitimate penological interest,” 202 as well as the Third Circuit,203
and even the Seventh Circuit itself. 204
The Hudson Court reinforced the position that inmates should be
afforded all constitutional rights not “fundamentally inconsistent with
imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of
incarceration,” including freedom from racial discrimination and the
protection of religious freedom. 205 The Court has never stated that
privacy is a lesser constitutional right, nor has it stated that privacy is
inconsequential to the well-being of confined persons. However, the
Court in Turner v. Safley held that judicial review of regulatory
restraints on prisoners’ constitutional rights is only subject to a low
rational basis standard of review; that is, “when a prison regulation
impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 206 This standard
is fairly deferential to the state.
While courts have certainly asserted that privacy rights are
outweighed by other interests at times, no court has argued effectively
that some persons have a right while others have no right at all. The
critical question under the Fourth Amendment is whether one has a
subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy under the
circumstances. This raises an interesting issue regarding state
surveillance at a time when technology facilitates not only constant
surveillance but surveillance in minute detail. Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority in United States v. Jones in 2012, stated in dicta that
public surveillance may still be an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy. 207 In Jones, Justice Alito spoke directly in his concurrence
202. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988).
203. Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that
a right to privacy in one’s own body, unlike a right to maintain private spaces for
possessions, is not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so
fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable even in the prison
context.”).
204. Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding a Fourth
Amendment constitutional privacy right violation when a male inmate was regularly
strip searched by female guards).
205. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523.
206. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (addressing the privacy interests
of inmates with respect to inmate-to-inmate correspondence and the right to marry).
207. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012) (citing Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-32 (2001)).
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regarding the potential impact of technological change on reasonable
expectations of privacy:
But technology can change those expectations. Dramatic
technological change may lead to periods in which popular
expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant
changes in popular attitudes. New technology may provide increased
convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people
may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not
welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they
may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as
inevitable. 208

Justice Alito is musing here for it is far from clear whether society will
eventually concede its right to privacy.
Justice Sotomayor, also concurring in Jones, directly opposed
Justice Alito’s supposition:
I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the
warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site
they had visited in the last week, or month, or year. But whatever the
societal expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status
only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy
as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all information
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment
protection. 209

Today, a reasonable expectation of privacy for detainees remains
in flux. For example, one court may find that a person’s mere presence
in a law enforcement building or vehicle should justify severe
curtailment of an expectation of privacy. 210 In 2017, the Seventh
Circuit held that a paddy wagon with a separate compartment for
208. Id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
210. E.g., State v. Howard, 728 A.2d 1178 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998) (suggesting
that although there is usually no reasonable expectation of privacy in a police
interview room, a married couple in a police interview room post-arrest had a
subjective and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy to marital
communications where video cameras were hidden from view and the state never
proved its interest use of the cameras).
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detainees created no reasonable expectation of privacy, even in the
absence of apparent signs of surveillance and in spite of the fact that
detainees made a concerted effort to speak quietly out of earshot. The
Seventh Circuit argued:
[G]iven the increasing presence of unobtrusive, if not invisible, audio
and video surveillance in all manner of places, public and private,
one wonders how much of a reminder a detainee needs that he might
be under surveillance—particularly in a marked police vehicle—or
that this might be so regardless of whether he can see any obvious
signs of surveillance devices. 211

By contrast, in the same year, a federal district court came to quite
a different result. The court held that a post-arrest detainee, alone in a
police interview room, who suspected federal investigators were
filming him, had a subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy
when he deliberately mumbled to himself to maintain his composure
out of earshot of the camera. 212
As the Fourth Amendment protects the person from the state, rather
than protecting specific places or things, 213 the courts should value and
protect personal privacy assiduously in the face of technological
innovation. Justice Sotomayor has warned of multiple constitutional
rights vulnerable to infringement because of the technological ease of
surveillance and data analytics: “Awareness that the Government may
be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the
Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private
aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.” 214 The heightened interest
in preserving American life without fear of general state surveillance in
a digital and technological age has caught the attention of the Court.

211. United States v. Paxton, 848 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal
citation omitted) (relying in part on two law review articles discussing surveillance
technology, rather than empirical evidence of commonly held beliefs about the
presence of surveillance, to arrive at a reasonableness measure).
212. United States v. Llufrio, 237 F. Supp. 3d 735 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
213. Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967)).
214. Id. at 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Cf. NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958) (upholding the right to associational privacy against mandates
for a private organization to disclose names and addresses of its members).
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2. Privacy Intrusions and Deprivations of Social Contact as Cruel
and Unusual Punishment under the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment,
including torture as punishment. 215 The Amendment does not apply
unless the state action in question is deemed a form of punishment,
which takes into account both subjective and objective factors. That is,
to succeed in a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment a prisoner
must be able to show that (1) “objectively, the deprivation of a basic
human need was sufficiently serious” based on “contemporary
standards of decency,” 216 posing a “substantial risk of serious harm”217;
and (2) that subjectively the prison officials “acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind,” which addresses both excessive punishment
and deliberate indifference to inhumane conditions. 218
The Seventh Circuit has explained that “[e]ven where prison
authorities are able to identify a valid correctional justification for [a]
search, it may still violate the Eighth Amendment if ‘conducted in a
harassing manner intended to humiliate and cause psychological
pain.’” 219 Strip searches, body-cavity searches, and being “paraded in
a see-through jumpsuit” by prison guards have all supported a claim of
cruel and unusual punishment when they are found to be unnecessary
and not serving a legitimate penological purpose. 220
Also, under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner has a right to
adequate medical and mental health care, where deprivation of such
care would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 221 Courts have
215. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (“Punishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death[.]”); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130,
136 (1879) (“[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the
same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment[.]”).
216. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
217. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
218. See Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996); see also
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).
219. King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 897 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
220. See, e.g., id.
221. See Mintun v. Corizon Med. Serv., No. 1:16-cv-00367-DCN, 2018 WL
1040088 (D. Idaho Feb. 22, 2018) (addressing a claim for lack of adequate mental
health services to a prisoner on the autism spectrum); Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp.
3d 1171 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (failing to provide mentally ill prisoners with adequate
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taken care to limit this protection to serious medical needs, where
“routine discomfort that is part of the penalty that criminal offenders
pay for their offenses against society” does not constitute a serious
medical need. 222 While this represents an expansion of Eighth
Amendment protection beyond use of physical force and historically
barbarous forms of punishment, the analysis does not extend more
broadly to violations based on a totality of conditions of confinement. 223
In civil confinement, the harsh impact of certain state actions may
render the action punitive. Therefore, while Eighth Amendment
constitutional protection would usually serve those confined by the
criminal justice system, rather than in civil confinement settings,
occasionally in hybrid settings evoking criminal and civil purposes the
amendment may apply. For example, a sex offender registry may be
intended by the legislature to create a civil, regulatory remedy, but state
and federal courts have found some to be so restrictive or so arbitrarily
applied that they exert a punitive impact akin to banishment or public
shaming, historically deemed cruel and unusual punishment.224
Whether such registries are deemed civil or criminal, in effect they are
a form of mass public surveillance with lifelong consequences. 225
Internet transparency has also complicated the question, where the
potential social stigma of mass surveillance is exacerbated as sex
offender status can be checked in seconds. As one justice of the Ohio
Supreme Court envisioned: “In this age of instant Internet chat rooms,
imagine the future for his children when the mothers’ network alerts all
the grade-school children to avoid anyone who lives at 123 Elm Street.

mental health care exhibited deliberate indifference and cruel and unusual
punishment).
222. Mintun, 2018 WL 1040088, at *4. See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 349 (1981) (finding the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons”);
Ashann-Ra v. Virginia, 112 F. Supp. 2d 559 (W.D. Va. 2000) (asserting that providing
ill-fitting shoes to a prisoner does not equate to cruel and unusual punishment).
223. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Nothing
so amorphous as overall conditions can rise to the level of cruel and unusual
punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists[.]”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
224. Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1226-27 (D. Colo. 2017).
225. See, e.g., State v. Blankenship, 48 N.E.3d 516, 525 (2015) (O’Donnell, J.,
concurring) (arguing that a lifetime sex offender registry is civil and non-punitive, but
concurring in the judgment).
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These requirements fall directly within the definition of the phrase
‘cruel and unusual.’” 226
Nevertheless, harsh conditions are often deemed a legitimate part
of the punishment imposed by the state. Thus, to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment the deprivation must be so serious that it is
essentially a denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” 227 To be civilized requires a respect for humanity. Thus,
a sentencing program like that reported in Australia, with constant AIsurveillance of persons in home detention, electrically shocking them
before they violate conditions of detention,228 should not withstand
constitutional scrutiny in the United States. Treating inmates like
animals or “less than human” is identified as cruel and unusual
punishment in the United States and against the standards of human
decency. 229 Even zoo animals have received consideration by the
courts in abuse cases as having a basic need for privacy from constant
observation by patrons of the zoo, as well as the need for socialization
with other animals. 230
Constant governmental surveillance may be a designated form of
punishment in many societies. 231 In the U.S., cruel and unusual
punishment may include purely psychological punishment, 232 as well
226. Id. at 534 (O’Neill, J., dissenting).
227. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
228. See supra note 11.
229. See Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that
transporting a prisoner in a dog cage constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Spain
v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 200 (9th Cir. 1979) (maintaining that under the Eighth
Amendment, “prisoners are not to be treated as less than human beings”).
230. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Tri-State
Zoological Park of W. Md., Inc., Civil Action No. MJG-17-2148, 2018 WL 434229
(D. Md. Jan. 16, 2018) (denying a motion to dismiss a claim based on the federal
Animal Welfare Act).
231. For example, the Chinese criminal code adopted in the 1980s included a
punishment translated as “public surveillance,” in which petty offenders are not
imprisoned, but are subject to labor under mass surveillance along with regular
reporting requirements. MICHAEL, supra note 88, at 126.
232. See Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 153 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (identifying numerous cases that hold that “purely
psychological punishments can sometimes be deemed cruel and unusual”). Article I
of the 1987 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment states in part: “[T]he term ‘torture’ means any
act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
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as permanent constant surveillance for life. 233
As the Court
acknowledged in Weems v. United States, when expanding the scope of
the Eighth Amendment to reach state actions outside the bounds of
traditional categories of barbarity, the guiding policy is that “cruelty
might become an instrument of tyranny; of zeal for a purpose, either
honest or sinister.” 234 Justice White, dissenting in Weems, invoked
natural law and an originalist interpretation to the amendment, arguing
cruel and unusual punishment should be defined by the odious practices
of past monarchies from which the United States broke free. 235 Today,
the focus has shifted to proportionality in sentencing, including an
added recognition of the particular vulnerabilities of certain prisoners,
such as juveniles and those with mental illness or intellectual
disabilities. 236
Finding state surveillance to infringe on autonomy rights to such an
extent that the monitoring becomes unconstitutionally punitive is not an
easily reached conclusion, particularly when searches and surveillance
are key to institutional security. For example, a claim of cruel and
unusual punishment based on visual body-cavity searches in prison, one
of the most intrusive forms of state surveillance, was initially dismissed
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person[.]”
233. See, e.g., In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012) (holding lifelong sex
offender registration and notification requirements for juvenile convictions violate the
Eighth Amendment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (“His prison
bars and chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years, but he goes from them to a
perpetual limitation of his liberty.”). But see State v. Blankenship, 48 N.E.3d 516
(Ohio 2015) (upholding, in a divided opinion, lifetime sex offender registration for a
21-year-old adult statutory rape offender against a cruel and unusual punishment
claim).
234. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
235. Id. at 406 (White, J., dissenting) (asserting that drowning,
disembowelment, boiling in oil, and other forms of torture are prohibited under the
Eighth Amendment and are “not warranted by the laws of nature or society”).
236. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding the death penalty as
punishment for a person with an intellectual disability to be cruel and unusual); In re
C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012) (following U.S. Supreme Court precedent
regarding juvenile sentencing and the death penalty when recognizing that juveniles
are less culpable and more capable of rehabilitation than adult offenders, thus
removing them from lifetime sex offender registry status).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019

55

California Western Law Review, Vol. 55 [2019], No. 1, Art. 2
FINAL Brobst camera ready (Do Not Delete)

56

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

1/8/2019 10:36 AM

[Vol. 55

by a federal district court because “the conditions did not constitute a
denial of basic human needs, and the defendants were not personally
involved in creating the conditions.” 237 However, surveillance may
also serve to protect persons in confinement from other forms of
degradation, for example, by deterring physical or sexual abuse, or
identifying medical neglect. Therefore, under an Eighth Amendment
analysis, prisoners have claimed to be subject to too much surveillance,
as well as too little. 238
Currently, an Eighth Amendment analysis is more deferential to the
state for its use of surveillance monitoring than it is for its use of
technology to facilitate removal of all human contact, as would be
possible by remote AI surveillance. In cases addressing solitary
confinement, the Court has shown a longstanding recognition of the
terrible toll of social isolation on prisoners, while the prison system
openly admits to the risk of psychological harm. 239 In 1890, the Court
asserted that solitary confinement serves “as an additional punishment
of such a severe kind that it is spoken of . . . as ‘a further terror and
peculiar mark of infamy.’” 240 There, the Court found a Colorado death
penalty statute violated ex post facto prohibitions by adding the
additional punishment of keeping all prisoners subject to execution in
solitary confinement ignorant of their date of hanging. 241

237. Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 323 (3d Cir. 2016) (reversing the district
court’s ruling on a Fourth Amendment basis).
238. E.g., Lyons v. Wall, C.A. No. 08-498-M, 2012 WL 3682983, at *4 (D.
R.I. Aug. 24, 2012) (unreported) (finding, with respect to plaintiff’s section 1983
claim, that a prison psychologist who took a prisoner “off camera” against his will
(i.e., to a prison cell without a camera), did not inflict cruel and unusual punishment,
despite the prisoner’s claim that he could more easily attempt to commit suicide).
239. See DOJ RESTRICTIVE HOUSING, supra note 19, at i (“[A]ccording to
recent research and reports, as well as the [Federal Bureau of Prisons’] own policy,
confinement in [restrictive housing units], even for relatively short periods of time,
can adversely affect inmates’ mental health and can be particularly harmful for
inmates with mental illness.”); cf. Nearly 20 Percent of Prison and Jail Inmates Spent
Time in Segregation or Solitary Confinement in 2011-12, BUR. OF JUST. STAT., U.S.
DEPT. OF JUST. (Oct. 23, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/
urhuspj1112pr.cfm (claiming that “[r]ates of SPD [serious psychological distress] did
not increase with the length of time inmates had been in restrictive housing”).
240. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 170 (1890) (granting prisoner’s petition for
habeas corpus).
241. Id. at 172.
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The importance of judicial attitudes towards solitary confinement
cannot be understated, when technology has transformed state
institutions allowing for significantly reduced human staffing and
permanent solitary confinement in the United States. 242 One federal
court described a maximum security prison, facing claims of excessive
force and permanent solitary confinement, a modernized “prison of the
future.” 243
Regarding the earliest known practices of solitary confinement in
the 1700s, the Supreme Court notes that the practice was initially an
experiment connected to hospital care when “public attention was
[subsequently] called to the evils of congregating persons in masses
without employment [in prison].” 244 Having been banned as a
punishment in Great Britain, public outcry in the United States also
quickly emerged regarding the use of solitary confinement after it was
revealed that:
[a] considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short
confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next
to impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane;
others still, committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal
better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover
sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the
community. 245

Today, the United States is the only nation in the developed world
that permits extended solitary confinement as a form of punishment. 246
In 2015, the Supreme Court in Davis v. Ayala averred that “years on
end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price,” addressing the solitary
confinement of a prisoner with an intellectual disability who had been
confined awaiting execution for over 40 years. 247 After decades of an
242. See infra Part III(B).
243. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
244. Medley, 134 U.S. at 167.
245. Id. at 169.
246. Brandon Keim, Solitary Confinement: The Invisible Torture, WIRED
(April 29, 2009, 8:30 PM), https://www.wired.com/2009/04/solitaryconfinement/.
247. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See also Ruiz v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1246, 1247 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting from a
denial of application for stay of execution of sentence of death) (describing the nature
of the human toll on the prisoner awaiting execution for 22 years, including

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019

57

California Western Law Review, Vol. 55 [2019], No. 1, Art. 2
FINAL Brobst camera ready (Do Not Delete)

58

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

1/8/2019 10:36 AM

[Vol. 55

equivocal stance toward the imposition of solitary confinement, 248 the
lower federal courts are finally beginning to address its psychological
impact more fully, 249 with special emphasis on the vulnerabilities of
mentally ill prisoners in isolation. 250
In 2018, in Porter v. Clarke, the federal district court considered
the conditions of death row inmates in a Virginia state prison who were
housed in single cells that did not permit any communication between
cells, where inmates were granted an hour of outdoor recreation every
five days, cell phone use on request, and the use of books, television,
and compact disk (CD) players in their cell for entertainment. 251 The
case provides a prescient nod to an understanding of the potential risks
and benefits of an AI or remotely-run prison and whether machine
substitutions for human contact carry serious psychological risks of
social deprivation, particularly under constant surveillance.
As litigation began against the Virginia prison, social contact was
ultimately allowed between death row inmates and outdoor recreation
Nevertheless, the case proceeded and
time was increased. 252
specifically analyzed “whether the deprivation of human contact and
stimulation was an extreme deprivation—that is, whether it caused a
serious or significant physical or emotional injury or the substantial risk
of such an injury.” 253 Repeatedly, the court cites longstanding
precedent establishing that deprivation of all human contact and

“symptoms long associated with solitary confinement, namely severe anxiety and
depression, suicidal thoughts, hallucinations, disorientation, memory loss, and sleep
difficulty”).
248. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (finding segregated
confinement for 30 days as discipline did not implicate a due process liberty interest
when it did not extend the length of sentence).
249. See Porter v. Clarke, 290 F. Supp. 3d 518 (E.D. Va. 2018), appeal filed,
Case No. 18-6257 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Colleen Murphy, Comment, The Solitary
Confinement of Girls in the United States: International Law and the Eighth
Amendment, 92 TUL. L. REV. 697 (2018).
250. See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding deliberate
indifference to the needs of a mentally ill prisoner who committed suicide in solitary
confinement).
251. Porter, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 522-23.
252. Id. at 524.
253. Id. at 527 (internal quotations omitted).
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“complete isolation of the prisoner from all human society” is a serious
deprivation. 254
Importantly, the state argued that access to television and other
entertainment decreased the inmates’ social isolation. 255 The federal
district court was not persuaded, opining that:
The limited communication, stimulation, and contact provided to
plaintiffs before 2015 does not overcome plaintiffs’ showing that the
vast majority of their time—almost every hour of the day—was spent
alone, in a small, practically windowless, cell. When they were
outdoors for five hours a week, they remained alone in an outdoor
cage. Although they had access to television, music, and books, they
had no access to congregate religious, educational, or social
programming. 256

The court in Porter expressly stated that human interaction is a basic
human need, despite the defendants’ assertion that this claim was too
amorphous because basic human needs under an Eighth Amendment
analysis are more concrete, such as exercise or food. 257 Other courts
have identified concrete “minimum essentials” under the Eighth
Amendment to include shelter, clothing, medical care, sanitation,
warmth, and security. 258
In 2018, with more psychological research available than in
decades past, the Porter court turned to psychological expert testimony
on the impact of social isolation:
In particular, prolonged isolation has “led to clinical levels of
depression that include dysphoric mood, constricted affect,
hopelessness, feelings of worthlessness, anhedonia (loss of
enjoyment in even basic pleasures), anergia (a low level or lack of
energy), and suicidal ideation.” Moreover, the restrictive
confinement has caused a substantial reduction in plaintiffs’
“initiative and motivation to maintain contact with family members
and other loved ones”; reduced plaintiffs’ “initiative and motivation
to maintain a healthy physical condition”; and “created a profound
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 528.
See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1245-46 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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disturbance in sleep patterns and” quantities. . . . [P]laintiffs have
found “creative use[s] of the limited items available to them” and
have devised “ways of distracting themselves from boredom by
relying on forms of self-entertainment.” Although these coping
mechanisms allow plaintiffs to deal with the negative effects of their
restrictive confinement on a day-to-day basis, the cruel irony is that,
over time, they “thwart basic desire for human interaction” by
making plaintiffs reliant on “internal resources that have no
connection with meaningful social interaction with others.” As a
result, the coping mechanisms “have ultimately deprived [plaintiffs]
of a core element of what it means to be human” in a “lasting” way
that Dr. Hendricks compared to the effects of war on soldiers’ mental
health. 259

This case is currently pending appeal to Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and it remains to be seen whether such expert testimony is
persuasive enough to tip the balance of interests in favor of the social
rights of prisoners. The psychological evidence of harm certainly
presents a stark contrast to what, in 1890, In re Medley, the court could
only describe using terms like “semi-fatuous.” 260
3. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process and the Liberty
and Privacy Interests
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state shall not “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”261
There is no affirmative right to State protection against harms by third
parties, but the constitutional provision limits state action that may
cause harm, with more protection owed to persons in state-controlled
settings. 262 While the Eighth Amendment may not be available to most

259. Porter, at 529-30 (internal citations omitted and emphasis added) (quoting
from the psychologist’s expert report).
260. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890).
261. U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1.
262. See Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (holding there is no
state duty to enforce a domestic violence protective order in the face of risks of harm
from private individuals); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S.
189, 196-98 (1989) (noting that special duties do not arise merely from state care, but
from state control). Cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 n.8 (1976) (holding that
a state’s deprivation of medical care for a prisoner in custody may violate the Eighth
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persons in civil confinement, the Fourteenth Amendment, in tandem
with parens patriae duties, 263 has served as a critical protection for the
individual rights of persons in institutions such as nursing homes and
hospitals for the mentally ill. While levels of scrutiny and a balance of
interests are discussed in greater depth below, 264 the recognition of a
liberty interest related to freedom from state surveillance in institutional
settings will be briefly outlined in this section.
Typically, a substantive due process claim related to state
observation or social isolation will address a deprivation of liberty. 265
As with claims based on an Eighth Amendment violation, the person
confined may argue that the state’s level of monitoring and observation
of residents is either excessive or insufficient. 266 Claims for deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs in state institutions may ask why
the state did not surveil the persons in state care more to ensure the
resident’s right to personal security and protection from abuse. 267 “And
that right [to protection] is not extinguished by lawful confinement,
even for penal purposes,” as the Court stated in Youngberg v. Romeo. 268
Traditionally, in substantive due process cases involving
confinement, the Court has tended to focus on the governmental duty
to avoid risks to physical health, but more recently the Court hints at a
willingness to consider duties with respect to the mental health of
persons in state care. This is important, for the impact of a deprivation
of a fundamental liberty interest related to exercising autonomy over
privacy and social contact interests is often psychological. For
example, in cases of involuntary commitment, the Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest has included “a right to adequate food,
Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment where standards of adequate
care are regulated by the state).
263. See supra Part I(B).
264. See infra Part IV(B).
265. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315, 324 (1982) (upholding the
liberty interest of an involuntarily committed patient with an intellectual disability
whose arm was broken while in confinement, including a right to be free from bodily
restraint and to be safely confined).
266. See supra note 238.
267. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (asserting the “historic”
right to personal safety and security as a due process liberty interest with respect to
corporal punishment in public schools).
268. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315.
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shelter, clothing, and medical care,” safety, freedom of movement, and
habilitative training. 269 In Vitek v. Jones, the Court explained that state
authority must comply with minimum due process requirements when
imposing unusual or severe conditions on confinement that impact such
interests. 270 Later courts relied on Vitek to include within the purview
of a liberty interest analysis conditions such as involuntary
administration of antipsychotic medications, a form of physical
restraint psychologically imposed. 271
The liberty interest invites a broad interpretation, where the Court
has incorporated the right “generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men,” 272 clearly protecting more than mere physical
health. Such claims are met with a measure of restraint, where, for
example, withholding television access from a prisoner has been
deemed too minor to implicate a liberty interest. 273
In more recent decisions examining solitary confinement, members
of the Court have sought to extend this protection, contemplating that
segregation as a form of non-physical restraint is legally actionable with
evidence of a negative mental health impact, particularly if the state law
carves out a right to avoid the state action. 274 Justice Breyer, dissenting
in Sandin v. Conner, argued that the majority should have given more
weight to the significant change in circumstances of state prison
confinement, if not the length of confinement, to find a liberty interest:
In the absence of the punishment, Conner, like other inmates in
Halawa’s general prison population would have left his cell and
worked, taken classes, or mingled with others for eight hours each
day. As a result of disciplinary segregation, however, Conner, for 30
days, had to spend his entire time alone in his cell (with the exception
269. Id. at 315, 324.
270. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980).
271. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990); Youngberg, 457
U.S. at 313.
272. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923)).
273. Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F.2d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 1984).
274. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 493 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983), which found a prisoner’s liberty
interest to be created by state regulations “requiring . . . that administrative
segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates”).
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of 50 minutes each day on average for brief exercise and shower
periods, during which he nonetheless remained isolated from other
inmates and was constrained by leg irons and waist chains). 275

The majority in Sandin did note, however, that while liberty interests
generally have been related to freedom from restraint, such cases may
also include an extension of a prison sentence or state action which
“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 276
If the severity of the intrusion is common to general prison
practices, such as regular body-cavity searches of prisoners to detect
contraband, courts may not find a liberty interest to be violated. 277 The
Court has been deferential to the exercise of administrative discretion
in prisons, where discipline for misconduct becomes necessary to
maintain order and requires a flexible approach. 278 Nevertheless, due
process rights of persons in confinement remain at the forefront of the
analysis and are required to be taken into account even in highly
restrictive settings. 279
The Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest provides protections
from government action when such action is arbitrary and imposed
without due process. 280 In Pennsylvania, inmates kept on death row for
years after their death sentences were commuted raised cognizable
substantive due process claims for a violation of their liberty interest,
reliant in part on the “scientific consensus” of a significantly harmful
psychological impact. 281 Constant surveillance in confined settings is
275. Id. at 494 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original, internal citation
omitted).
276. Id. at 483-84 (finding no liberty interest violated from 30 days’ solitary
confinement in state prison).
277. Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 323 (3d Cir. 2016).
278. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485.
279. See, e.g., Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661 (W.Va. 1980) (holding that
a tuberculosis carrier detained by the state should have at least the rights of persons
subject to incarceration or involuntary commitment).
280. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982). See also Smith v. Dist.
of Columbia, 306 F. Supp. 3d 223, 243-44 (D.D.C. 2018) (“the touchstone of due
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government”).
281. Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dept. of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 574 (3d Cir. 2017)
(noting research data on the impact of solitary confinement on “mental well-being and
one’s sense of self”).
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arbitrary if the technology is imposed without adequate human controls,
but it has thus far not been deemed an atypical or sufficiently severe
restraint in the courts under the Due Process Clause.
AI left to evolve in its decisionmaking capacity in an uncontrolled
state also potentially creates the risk of unacceptable arbitrariness. That
lack of control would emerge most likely if an AI singularity occurs,
generally defined as “an artificial general intelligence, a self-teaching
system that can outperform humans across a wide range of
disciplines.” 282 Concern with the hypothetical singularity is justified in
one sense because AI has focused on intelligence, 283 and intelligence
without emotion or empathy is akin to handing over control to a
psychopath. 284 As stated by cognitive researcher Margaret Boden,
“[n]on-mathematical simplifying assumptions in AI are legion – and
often unspoken. One is the (tacit) assumption that problems can be
defined and solved without taking emotions into account . . . .”285
Hyperbolic alarm about singularity, however, fearing the end of

282. Stephen Talty, Be(a)ware, SMITHSONIAN 34 (Apr. 2018).
283. See BODEN, supra note 9, at 10-28 (outlining the historical development
of AI research which focused on technological and scientific problem-solving with
overly heuristic and simplistic assumptions about learning, such as the use of logic
gates random associations).
284. “Psychopathy is defined as a mental (antisocial) disorder in which an
individual manifests amoral and antisocial behavior, shows a lack of ability to love or
establish meaningful personal relationships, expresses extreme egocentricity, and
demonstrates a failure to learn from experience and other behaviors associated with
the condition.” HENRY R. HERMANN, DOMINANCE AND AGGRESSION IN HUMAN AND
OTHER ANIMALS: THE GREAT GAME OF LIFE (2017), available at https://www.science
direct.com/topics/neuroscience/psychopathy. See also Charlie Osborne, Meet
Norman, the World’s First ‘Psychopathic’ AI, ZDNet (June 7, 2018, 10:06 GMT),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/meet-norman-the-worlds-first-psychopathic-ai/
(describing an AI which adapts to psychopathic choices based on data input by MIT
researchers); Chris Draper, AI Robot that Learns New Words in Real-Time Tells
Human Creators It will Keep Them in a “People Zoo”, GLITCH.NEWS (Aug. 27,
2015), http://glitch.news/2015-08-27-ai-robot-that-learns-new-words-in-real-timetells-human-creators-it-will-keep-them-in-a-people-zoo.html.
285. BODEN, supra note 9, at 29. See also Chris Frith & Geraint Rees, A Brief
History of the Scientific Approach to the Study of Consciousness, in THE BLACKWELL
COMPANION TO CONSCIOUSNESS 9, 15-16 (Susan Schneider & Max Velmans eds.,
2007) (discussing the challenges of researching unconscious human processes,
including emotions and subjective interpretation).
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humanity’s reign, is unnecessary, and more akin to eschatological
fervor during times of war and crisis. 286
Importantly, federal and state courts have yet to consider, as an
integrated concept, the intersectionality of surveillance and
confinement. The framework for analysis would permit this, however,
as one court noted with respect to violations of cruel and unusual
punishment: “courts may consider conditions in combination ‘when
they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of
a single, identifiable human need’[.]” 287 As the mental health impact
of a loss of privacy becomes known and recognized, better arguments
will be made for a substantive due process right to freedom from
arbitrary surveillance, particularly when cases also involve AI social
substitutes enabling deprivations of human social contact. 288 All of the
various legal protections of individual autonomy to navigate private and
social aspects of human life—state and federal constitutional
provisions, common law doctrines, and regulatory measures—would
work well together to better face the impact of surveillance technology,
including AI. The modern reality is that in state institutions technology
enables the panopticon’s constant surveillance, the metal eye of the
state, where the barely seen man in the central tower may not be man,
but machine.

286. See John Markoff, Misconception: Computers will Outstrip Human
Capabilities Within Many of Our Lifetimes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/science/artificial-intelligence-when-is-thesingularity.html (“[T]he basic mechanisms for biological intelligence are still not
completely understood, and as a result there is not a good model of human intelligence
for computers to simulate[.]”); BODEN, supra note 9, at 154 (asserting that
“intellectual rationality” is not enough to make AI reach humanity’s capabilities); see
also PAUL BOYER, WHEN TIME SHALL BE NO MORE 147 (1992) (describing
evangelical Americans who believe in the end-of-days and accept the intensity of
devastating national security measures, where those killed are viewed only as
“eschatological zombies, signposts marking another stage in a sequence of familiar
[Biblical] events” rather than “flesh-and-blood human beings”).
287. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (internal
citation omitted).
288. See supra Part II(B)(2).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019

65

California Western Law Review, Vol. 55 [2019], No. 1, Art. 2
FINAL Brobst camera ready (Do Not Delete)

66

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

1/8/2019 10:36 AM

[Vol. 55

III. INTRUDING ON THE AUTONOMY OF CONFINED PERSONS: THE
STATE’S INTEREST
In a balance of interests, the individual right to privacy under the
U.S. and several state constitutions reflects a basic need for
autonomy, 289 which may be limited or overridden by justifiable
government intrusion. 290 As the Court asserted in 1972, balancing
security interests with the right of public protest:
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection
to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of
unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent
and discussion of Government action in private conversation. For
private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to our
free society. 291

Framing the right to privacy as a stand-alone right does not
adequately take into account its close relationship to rights to
expression or social contact or resistance to tyranny. They all link
together conceptually in a right to autonomy to navigate the course of
private and social lives. For persons in state confinement, potentially
subject to constant surveillance, chemical restraint, and solitary
confinement, the various legal claims asserting infringement on
autonomy-related rights reveal the legitimacy of the state’s rationales
for imposing such substantial restrictive measures.
When the state’s interest and that of the individual align, the
balance is made easier. Outside of confined settings, the public expects
greater individual freedom and the state recognizes that a free society
is imperative to the survival of a democratically-elected government. 292
Individuals exercise their rights of autonomy to make the choice of
289. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018)
(upholding Fourth Amendment individual rights against unlawful state surveillance
despite “the seismic shifts in digital technology”).
290. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding that a
warrantless search of for cell phone data violates the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement); United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. E. Dist. Mich., So. Div., 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972) (requiring warrant protections before domestic telephonic surveillance of
community organizations may begin in the interest of national security).
291. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. at 314.
292. See supra Part I(B).
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when to enter public space and engage in activities where they may be
observed by others. Therefore, state surveillance by aerial drones in
public places would not necessarily invade privacy interests where
comparable inspection by humans as state agents could have
occurred. 293 Courts have held that surreptitious recording may be
lawful, where individuals have already consented to in-person
disclosure of information to a state agent. 294 Thus, for the public at
large, arguably an undercover officer may record a conversation with a
willing drug dealer, and a Transportation Security Administration
(“TSA”) agent may record a scanned image of a passenger’s body
without violating the Fourth Amendment.
Statutory authorization for intrusions on autonomy are not without
limitation. In the public space of airport security, warrantless airport
searches are lawful if narrowly tailored to legitimate security
purposes. 295 Yet “even with the grave threat posed by airborne terrorist
attacks, the vital and hallowed strictures of the Fourth Amendment still
apply: these searches must be reasonable to comport with the
Constitution.”296 The implementation of full body scanners at TSA
checks that use advanced imaging technology was met with public
outcry, decried as an invasive practice because of the enhanced view of
passengers’ breasts and genitalia observed by a human security guard
in real time. 297 This outcry led to stronger regulatory and policy

293. See Ricker, supra note 18, at 58 (noting the cost and safety advantages of
drone inspection of dangerous locations, such as those used by firefighters, oil and
gas exploration, and search and rescue). But see Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics
in Wash. v. U.S. D.O.J., 160 F. Supp. 3d 226 (D.D.C. 2016) (upholding a national
security exemption from the Freedom of Information Act when denying public access
to government records on FBI domestic drone use, such as that used in rescue
operations).
294. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963) (“The Government
did not use an electronic device to listen in on conversations it could not otherwise
have heard.”).
295. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(permitting random, suspicionless, and warrantless searches of passengers and
luggage by the government in airports).
296. United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 2005).
297. Julian Mark Kheel, How Can I Opt Out of the TSA Body Scanners?,
POINTS GUY (Mar. 13, 2017), https://thepointsguy.com/2017/03/opt-out-tsa-bodyscanners/ (“I’m not sure why you wouldn’t enjoy spending quality time inside a full-
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protections, whereby TSA purportedly no longer stores or prints the
images, the security guard viewing the image is in a separate area and
cannot see the passenger directly, and software is being developed to
provide a more stylized rather than realistic image. 298 Current TSA
policies provide:
TSA has strict privacy standards when using advanced imaging
technology to protect your privacy. Advanced imaging technology
uses automated target recognition software that eliminates
passenger-specific images and instead auto-detects potential threats
by indicating their location on a generic outline of a person. The
generic outline is identical for all passengers. 299

Privacy policies and standard practices are more malleable, of
course, than statutory mandates. But a member of the public arguably
can choose to avoid flying or speaking with those selling illegal
substances.
As with observational privacy, informational privacy is subject to
the exercise of individual autonomy in navigating whether to disclose
information or to keep it private. When the balance of state and
individual interests are not aligned, the state’s purpose is more heavily
scrutinized to ensure that it is necessary and warranted. For example,
with respect to a statutorily-mandated disclosure of patient drug
prescriptions, the Court in Whalen v. Roe held that the state interest

body scanner machine that’s beaming radiation directly into your body in order to see
underneath your clothing.”).
298. Submission to Screening and Inspection, 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107 (2018)
(2016) (amending civil regulation security measures in response to public comment
on privacy concerns). See also The Associated Press, Just What Can They See?! Your
Full Body Scanner Questions Answered, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 31, 2009, 9:42
AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/money/full-body-scanner-questionsanswered-article-1.434194.
299. Security Screening, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/
security-screening (expand the “Security Technology” tab under “Security
Screening”) (last visited Dec. 3, 2018). See also Tim Devaney, TSA Sets Rules for
Full-Body Scanners, HILL (Mar. 2, 2016, 12:42 PM), http://thehill.com/regulation
/transportation/271490-tsa-floats-full-body-scanner-rules (outlining the introduction
of full body scanners in 2008 to the full regulatory approval in 2016).
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justified disclosure, 300 but still strongly emphasized the informational
privacy interest at stake:
The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures. Recognizing that in some circumstances
that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution, nevertheless New
York’s statutory scheme, and its implementing administrative
procedures, evidence a proper concern with, and protection of, the
individual’s interest in privacy. 301

In each of these examples, the judiciary serves as a check by
ensuring that state interests do not unduly infringe on the privacy
interests of individuals who remain at liberty in society, acknowledging
that the interests may be in alignment where the state is also bound to
protect individual autonomy. When the autonomy rights of the
individual are increasingly limited without consent, however, the state
interest must support the intrusion with an increasingly valid purpose.
Because an inmate or confined patient is mandated to reside in the state
facility without consent, the state interest in restrictive measures should
be weighty. Therefore, in a time of rapid innovation in surveillance
technology and autonomous AI that facilitates human isolation, often
first implemented in institutional settings out of the public eye, it is
imperative that courts carefully review the importance of the state
interest involved.
A. Common State Interests to Intrude on Privacy: Safety, Security,
Efficiency, and Cost
Some state interests are common to most institutional settings,
whether housing prison inmates, patients in a mental hospital, or
nursing home residents. Security and safety are perhaps the most
important of these common concerns, interests also shared by both the
individual confined and the state. The common law doctrines of state

300. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“[T]he State’s carefully designed program includes numerous safeguards intended to
forestall the danger of indiscriminate disclosure”).
301. Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
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police power and the state as parens patriae reinforce the duty of the
government to ensure the safety of persons in their care and custody.302
Yet enhanced surveillance technology in facilities both promotes
and runs afoul of the parens patriae and public health goals of
promoting the safety and well-being of the individual in a complex
determination of how the individual functions in society. For example,
among persons with mental illness, constant surveillance may increase
paranoia and fear of state discipline or it may bring comfort and a sense
of security. Technology may isolate humans from social contact or it
may decrease the stigma of human observation if persons are able to
adjust to an increased degree of surveillance.
Clearly an important security interest is the duty of prison officials
“to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” 303
Hudson v. Palmer is commonly cited for describing penological
interests that may justifiably invade a prisoner’s right to privacy, “chief
Confined persons may
among which is internal security.” 304
specifically request isolation or surveillance to avoid these risks.305
Advances in surveillance technology may facilitate deterrence of abuse
perpetrated not only by other inmates and residents, but by state
employees, as institutional abuse remains a serious concern for the
involuntarily committed patient, the nursing home patient, and the
inmate. 306 Surveillance and restrictive confinement also serves an

302. See supra Part I(C).
303. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994).
304. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984). See also Parkell v. Danberg,
833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016).
305. E.g., Lyons v. Wall, C.A. No. 08-498-M, 2012 WL 3682983 (D. R.I. 2012)
(objecting to prison’s denial of suicidal prisoner’s request for “on camera”
surveillance); YouTube Channel for The Nat’l Consumer Voice for Quality LongTerm Care, Balancing Privacy and Protection: Surveillance Cameras in Nursing
Home Residents’ Rooms (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0n
FXI7UoB8 (presenting options for patients and their guardians to consent to constant
video surveillance in residential facilities to deter and identify elder abuse).
306. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (applying an Eighth
Amendment analysis in requiring a conscious disregard of an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety, as opposed to criminal negligence, when holding that prison staff
members’ disregard of prison rape constitutes punishment under the Eighth
Amendment); The Nat’l Consumer Voice, supra note 305.
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important function in preventing suicide and other forms of selfharm. 307
New technology also poses new security concerns. For example,
prison administrators currently struggle with the risk of prisoners
illicitly receiving cell phones and other contraband by drone delivery
over prison walls. 308 Whether such a risk causes a need for additional
searches, including visual body-cavity searches of prisoners, remains to
be seen. Thus, security risks and how security is achieved may vary
significantly, impacting the balance of interests.
At times, the interest in security has been stated in absolutist terms.
In Johnson v. Phelan, in 1995, the Seventh Circuit argued: “Interprisoner violence is endemic, so constant vigilance without regard to
the state of the prisoners’ dress is essential. Vigilance over showers,
vigilance over cells—vigilance everywhere, which means that guards
gaze upon naked inmates.” 309 Few courts have endowed the state’s
security interest with such weight, applying a balancing test analysis
which is highly fact-sensitive and subject to evolving standards of
decency. 310 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit recently held that female guard
observation of a male detainee using toilet and shower facilities raised
a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim. 311

307. See Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, Position Statement, Prevention
of Juvenile Suicide in Correctional Settings 3 (Oct. 2012), available at
https://www.ncchc.org/filebin/Positions/Prevention-of-Juvenile-Suicide-inCorrectional-Settings.pdf (identifying three levels of required medical observation for
confined juveniles who may be suicidal).
308. See Josh Saul, Prisoners Use Smuggled Phones and Drones, But Justice
Department Plans to Jam Airways, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 8, 2018, 1:53 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/prison-cell-phone-drone-jam-justice-departmentrosenstein-774330; Devin Coldewey, Federal Prisons Seek Methods to Shut Down
Contraband-Toting Drones, CORRECTIONSONE (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.correct
ionsone.com/prison-technology/articles/38440187-Federal-prisons-seek-methods-toshut-down-contraband-toting-drones/.
309. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995).
310. See Patchette v. Nix, 952 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted) (stating that the Eighth Amendment “draw[s] its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the process of a maturing society”);
see also infra note 458 (addressing cross-gender surveillance of inmates).
311. See Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919 (9th Cir.
2017).
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Unfortunately, state surveillance bears the concomitant risk of
placing the confined in an even more vulnerable state. These persons
are already more likely to be subject to the lawful use of force by the
government, such as body cavity searches, physical or medical restraint,
or forced movement, practices which are largely self-regulated by the
facility officials. 312 Unlawful use of force or medical neglect is more
easily concealed when the surveillance records are controlled by the
same agency monitoring the confined person. 313
The modern government facility system holds millions of
individuals in confinement who themselves constitute a major sector of
the public. 314 Their selection for confinement, punishment and/or
treatment is continually challenged on due process grounds, and
occasionally equal protection grounds, enhancing concern over the
disparate impact of advanced surveillance technology in facilities. 315
Thus, a key state interest is that its use of technology in confinement
exemplify standards of fairness and equity, considering not only levels
of need to ensure security, but levels of impact based on demographics,
such as race, gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, and other
important forms of identity. 316

312. E.g., J.B. ex rel. Benjamin v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336, 342 (3d Cir. 2015)
(upholding strip search with body cavity inspection of juvenile detainee as a lawful
exercise of parens patriae authority where it promoted penological interests in facility
safety, and inspection of the detainee for evidence of parental abuse of the child);
Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 185 (Alaska 2009) (balancing the
patient’s fundamental due process privacy and liberty interests against the hospital’s
compelling state interest under its parens patriae authority to force administration of
psychotropic medications in the best interests of a patient with limited capacity).
313. See Mary D. Fan, Missing Police Body Camera Videos: Remedies,
Evidentiary Fairness, and Automatic Activation, 52 GA. L. REV. 57 (2017) (revealing
that most police departments do not adequately enforce body camera use and have no
procedures to do so).
314. See generally Reuben Jonathan Miller & Amanda Alexander, The Price
of Carceral Citizenship: Punishment, Surveillance, and Social Welfare Policy in an
Age of Carceral Expansion, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 291 (2016).
315. E.g., Smith v. Ryan, 137 S. Ct. 1283 (2017) (Breyer, J.) (commenting, in
a denial of certiorari, on the “terrible price” of long-term solitary confinement while
awaiting the death penalty with regard to a prisoner whose intellectual disability the
Ninth Circuit had been struggling to assess).
316. See infra note 497 and accompanying text.
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Finally, in terms of efficiency and cost, state and commercial
interests may align, but state and individual interests may not. 317 Cost
and efficiency are legitimate state interests in privacy claims, interests
which the courts consider closely in a feasibility analysis of restrictive
means. 318 Advocates for those confined suggest that the government is
lured by the surveillance technology industry to purchase ever more
intrusive products for its state institutions, such as AI-based hallway
cameras or drones hovering over recreational areas in facilities. 319
The state may argue that cost savings justify the elimination of
human staff and any negative impact on those confined. Indeed,
institutional funding is a persistent concern, where courts may construe
efforts to accommodate constitutional rights, such as remodeling a
facility to ensure greater privacy, to be too costly to be a reasonable
accommodation. 320 Where over half of the operating costs of a prison
are attributed to human labor, 321 replacement of human staff with
remote constant surveillance is cost-effective, but not necessarily

317. See generally Quill, supra note 6, at 89 (“But today’s technologists are
different from Comte’s [early 1800s] techno-spiritual elite in that they often operate
at the head of corporations that provide services and products for a fee, many of which
owe their success as much to marketing as to their contributions to the general
welfare.”).
318. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (noting the dangerous temptation of less costly surveillance technology
that risks greater infringement on privacy rights). “And because GPS monitoring
is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design,
proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’” Id.
(quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)). See also Teague v. Schimel,
896 N.W.2d 286, 310 (Wis. 2017) (holding that the Wisconsin statutory procedure to
correct inaccurate criminal record information in a large state database with digital
fingerprint identifiers was inadequate to safeguard the claimant’s liberty interest, and
criticizing the procedures and technology as “quick, cheap, and easy”).
319. See TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET
INSIDE OUR HEADS 344 (2016) (“[T]he goals of the attention merchants are generally
at odds with ours[.]”).
320. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333 (9th Cir. 1988) (addressing
remodeling of facilities to ensure privacy during strip searches and body-cavity
searches).
321. ALAN ELSNER, GATES OF INJUSTICE: THE CRISIS IN AMERICA’S PRISONS
211 (2d ed. 2006).
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justifiable when considering the basic human need for privacy and
social contact.
Safety, security, efficiency, and cost, as well as fairness in
application, are thus all common legitimate concerns for state
institutions when designing and implementing restrictive measures.
Not all persons in confinement, however, bear the same levels of
concerns or the same needs, as will be discussed below in
differentiating state interests in penal and civil state institutions from a
historical perspective.
B. The State Interest to Intrude on Prisoner Autonomy
Simply put, while the confinement may feel quite similar at times
for those confined, the primary difference between confinement of
criminals and patients is the goal of punishment in criminal settings and
treatment in medical settings. For prisoners, “[t]he limitations on the
exercise of constitutional rights arise both from the fact of incarceration
and from valid penological objectives—including deterrence of crime,
rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security.” 322 Inmates pose
particular challenges in ensuring safe confinement because they may
have a demonstrated tendency towards violence or deception.
In 1984, in Hudson v. Palmer, the Court posited that “in traditional
Fourth Amendment terms [a privacy right] is fundamentally
incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and
their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal
order.” 323 In addition to security, restraint on individual rights also may
be justified, according to the Court, on practical grounds and as
“reminders that, under our system of justice, deterrence and retribution
are factors in addition to correction.” 324
Identifying the intentions behind the state’s restrictive measures
presupposes that prison itself is a legitimate enterprise. Historically,
punishment through prison confinement was considered a softer
approach than the death penalty, torture, and public humiliation that
preceded it. 325 Foucault explains that in the early 1800s, the arrival of
322.
323.
324.
325.
Suffering,

O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1984).
Id. at 524.
See Pieter Spierenburg, Four Centuries of Prison History: Punishment,
the Body, and Power, in INSTITUTIONS OF CONFINEMENT: HOSPITALS,

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol55/iss1/2

74

Brobst: The Metal Eye: Ethical Regulation of the State’s Use of Surveill
FINAL Brobst camera ready (Do Not Delete)

2018]

1/8/2019 10:36 AM

THE METAL EYE

75

penal institutions “[made] it possible to substitute for force or other
violent constraints the gentle efficiency of total surveillance; of
ordering space according to the recent humanization of the codes and
the new penitentiary theory.” 326 Prison itself was a substantial and
civilized reform of the penological system, allowing for redemption and
reform of the prisoners within the prison walls. 327
In Jeremy Bentham’s influential 18th century Panopticon,
proposing an architectural structure with a central observational tower
designed for constant surveillance over the confined surrounding the
tower, Bentham saw a more humane form of state control, applicable
not only to prisons, but to work-houses, mad-houses, poor houses,
hospitals, and schools. 328 He wrote that the panopticon’s success lay
not in absolute perfect surveillance, which would be practically
impossible at the time; rather, “that, at every instant, seeing reason to
believe as much, and not being able to satisfy himself to the contrary,
[the prisoner] should conceive himself to be so [surveilled].”329
Benthamites would acknowledge that “all punishment is evil”, but
suggest that prison confinement as a form of punishment, is justifiable
under utilitarian principles if it “promises to exclude some greater
evil.” 330 In effect, Bentham argues that punishment should be

ASYLUMS, AND PRISONS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, 1500-1950 17,
22 (Norbert Finzsch & Robert Jütte eds., 1996).
326. FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 249.
327. In Medieval times in the 1500s, Henry VIII of England had 72,000
“vagabonds” hanged, a time when police and investigative services were first
instituted. BLOCH, supra note 3, at 245. See also FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 11.
(“From being an art of unbearable sensations punishment has become an economy of
suspended rights”). “In short, penal imprisonment, from the beginning of the
nineteenth century, covered both the deprivation of liberty and the technical
transformation of individuals.” Id. at 233.
328. See Jeremy Bentham, Panopticon; or, The Inspection-House: Containing
the Idea of a New Principle of Construction Applicable to Any Sort of Establishment,
in which Persons of Any Description are to be Kept Under Inspection; and in
Particular to Penitentiary-Houses (1787), in JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM, vol. 4 (John Bowring ed., William Tait, 1843), available at
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/bentham-the-works-of-jeremy-bentham-vol-4.
329. Id. (providing a detailed description of the panopticon’s structure in Letter
I “Idea of the Inspection Principle” and Letter II).
330. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION 158 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Clarendon Press 1996) (1780).
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efficacious for reform and deterrence, and proportionate to the severity
of the offense. 331
Reform was to be achieved through work and industriousness, but
prison was to be more than a factory of communal workers. 332 It was
also meant to separate and awaken criminals, keeping them in solitude,
away from each other’s vices, while granting them the opportunity to
rediscover in their conscience “the voice of good.” 333 In a confined
setting, for Foucault, heavily influenced by Bentham’s Panopticon,
“the prison became a sort of permanent observatory” 334 allowing for
effective distribution of persons, experimentation, fear and control.335
When one is aware of being constantly observed, it reduces the need for
physical control and promotes self-subjugation. 336
In American prisons today, the use of electronic video surveillance
achieves the same purpose: “Some cameras are so well hidden, they
are not suspected by inmates to be present. On the other hand, rumors
abound among inmates that there are cameras where none exist.”337
One federal district court quoted with approval the justifications of
wardens and guards for this electronic surveillance system:
“[i]t is a significant advantage to have inmates uncertain as to what
is being monitored, what is recorded, and what is in the field of
view. . . . Prison surveillance cameras provide staff and officials a
steady and valuable stream of intelligence information which is used
in prison investigations and is often used to support prison infractions
and/or criminal prosecutions.” 338

331. Id. at 176.
332. FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 122.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 126.
335. Id. at 203 (describing Bentham’s Panopticon as a laboratory for human
social and behavioral experimentation). But see Macias, supra note 99, at 1030 n.3
(identifying the scholarship of Bentham’s Panopticon beyond Foucault, which focuses
on both positive and negative effects of state surveillance).
336. FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 203.
337. Florer v. Schrum, No. C11–5135 BHS/KLS, 2012 WL 2995071, at *2
(W.D. Wash. June 23, 2012) (denying prisoners, in the interests of security, a
discovery motion for physical possession of video surveillance tapes, but permitting
viewing the content of the tapes).
338. Id. at *2-*3.
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Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Johnson v. Phelan, also
supported the state’s use of surveillance: “Anonymous visual
inspections from afar are considerably less intrusive and carry less
potential for ‘the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’” of bodily
searches under an Eighth Amendment analysis. 339
While Bentham saw the panopticon as a utilitarian good, he still
considered discomfort part of that good. In recommending that the
panopticon include for each prisoner a raised iron bed with bedding, he
noted that its purpose was not comfort, which would “gain[]
nothing”. 340 Courts today agree that prison conditions may be
“restrictive and even harsh,” but they may not be inhumane. 341 It is a
fine line to be drawn. For Bentham, approved punishments would be
inhumane if they caused the physical injury of torture or death,
recommending the following instead: “Outrageous clamour may be
subdued and punished by gagging; manual violence, by the strait
waistcoat; refusal to work, by a denial of food till the task is done.”342
Today, surveillance in penal institutions is meant to keep order and
thereby protect the inmates from abuse by each other or by staff, with
some lawsuits indicating a need for more surveillance. 343 The softer
approach of the prison as a modern form of punishment is not the
339. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 148 (7th Cir. 1995).
340. Bentham, Panopticon, supra note 328 (Postscript Part I, Section VIII
“Bedding”).
341. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) (“Prison conditions may be restrictive and even harsh, but
gratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no
legitimate penological objectiv[e], any more than it squares with evolving standards
of decency[.]”).
342. Bentham, Panopticon, supra note 328 (Postscript Part I, Section XIV “Of
Punishments”).
343. E.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 520 (2011) (finding an Eighth
Amendment violation in part due to “CRAMPED conditions [that] promote unrest
and violence, making it difficult for prison officials to monitor and control the prison
population”) (all caps in original); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (holding
that prison staff may be found deliberately indifferent to transsexual prisoners’ risk of
rape when placed in the general prison population in violation of the Eighth
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause); Ferreira v. Arpaio, No. CV-1501845-PHX-JAT, 2017 WL 6554674, at *8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2017) (addressing a
section 1983 claim by the mother of an inmate beaten to death by his cell mate,
specifically claiming a violation of the due process right to be free from violence from
other inmates).
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experience for some, where incarceration is “a question of survival,
nothing more.” 344
Arguably, AI could potentially provide a physically safer and more
neutral institutional environment than that seen in the nightmare realm
of supermax prisons, but it would potentially be devoid of real human
contact, bearing a risk of psychological harm. Supermax prisons, which
arose in the 1990s, used surveillance and isolation strategies at their
most extreme level. 345 Some supermax cells where prisoners were
isolated for years were reportedly constantly illuminated and deprived
prisoners of any outdoor recreation or visual contact with staff or other
inmates. 346 This level of social isolation in combination with constant
surveillance has reportedly led to suicidality and other serious mental
health impacts. 347 Although designed to address the most vicious
offenders, supermax prisons frequently house mentally ill inmates who
are considered disruptive to the general prison population.348
Nationally, the highest rates of restrictive housing and solitary

344. RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
130 (1997) (assessing the rise of private prisons, particularly for less violent offenders,
when public prisons faced overcrowding, gang culture, and racial tensions and “the
prison experience [became] a question of survival, nothing more”).
345. ELSNER, supra note 321, at 158.
346. Id. at 156 (noting that in person visitation with legal counsel was
permitted).
347. See, e.g., Valle v. Florida, 564 U.S. 1067 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of stay of execution) (identifying, with respect to an Eighth Amendment
claim, studies that show a high rate of suicide attempts among prisoners on death row,
with the national wait for execution averaging 15 years); Brown, 563 U.S. at 520
(finding that California’s overcrowded prisons had an 80% higher suicide rate than
the national average, where “[b]ecause of a shortage of treatment beds, suicidal
inmates may be held for prolonged periods in telephone-booth-sized cages without
toilets”). But see Christopher J. Mumola, Suicide and Homicide in State Prisons and
Local Jails, NCJ 210036, BUR. OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Aug. 21, 2005)
(finding a sharp overall decline in rates of suicide in prison, with higher rates in
smaller institutions, among the youngest and oldest inmates, and during the first week
of incarceration). Note that the latter BJS study did not differentiate the impact on
prisoners in solitary confinement and isolation.
348. ELSNER, supra note 321, at 156-58. See also Documentary Examines Life
Inside America’s Supermax Prisons, CBS News (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.cbs
news.com/video/documentary-examines-life-inside-americas-supermax-prisons/
(stating that approximately 40 supermax prisons are currently in operation in the
U.S.).
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confinement are currently found among prisoners convicted of violent
crime, prisoners with serious mental health diagnoses, young prisoners,
and lesbian, gay, or bisexual prisoners. 349
Persons with mental illness are now overrepresented in prison
institutions as a result of the now infamous American movement to deinstitutionalize mental hospitals. 350 With this movement, which began
in the 1960s, mentally ill patients were often released without the state
providing them with adequate community support. 351 By 2001, 40
states had been sued for inadequate mental health treatment in jails and
prisons, often after an inmate committed suicide. 352 Today, the criminal
justice system has become the number one provider of mental health
services in the country. 353 Accordingly, prison staff face greater
struggles as they manage the serious mental health needs of inmates.
As the Executive Director of the National Sheriff’s Association stated:
The problem continues to escalate. It is a major quality-of-life issue
for severely mentally ill patients, because they are more likely to be
beaten, victimized or commit suicide than those who are sick. The

349. Nearly 20 Percent of Prison and Jail Inmates, supra note 239.
350. ELSNER, supra note 321, at 92.
351. Id. (noting that released mental patients increasingly faced lack of
treatment, homelessness, and addiction, eventually breaking the law, which resulted
in “U.S. prisons [being] turned into de facto insane asylums”). See also Lappin, supra
note 19, at 1 (“Inmates with mental health problems present a host of challenges and
often need staff-intensive services. Over the past several years these challenges have
become particularly difficult – the number of inmates with mental illness continues to
increase and our agency operates within constrained budgets.”).
352. ELSNER, supra note 321, at 96.
353. E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., THE TREATMENT OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS IN PRISONS AND JAILS: A STATE SURVEY, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., at
37 (2014), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/treatmentbehind-bars/treatment-behind-bars.pdf. (finding that in the District of Columbia and
forty-four out of fifty states, at least one jail or prison in the state holds more persons
with serious mental illness than the largest psychiatric hospital operated by the state);
Thomas Insel, Post by Former NIMH Director Thomas Insel: A Misfortune Not a
Crime, NIH.GOV: NIMH (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/
2014/a-misfortune-not-a-crime.shtml (“Our current system, if these new numbers are
accurate, treats mental illness for many, not as a misfortune but a crime with little
promise of recovery.”).
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handling and control of these inmates pose a serious safety threat to
staff. 354

That the state contributed to the source of enhanced security problems
faced by prison institutions is inherently problematic, particularly when
the state has a clear parens patriae duty of care in both mental
institutions and prisons.
While security and order are legitimate state interests well
recognized in nearly all contexts of civil and penal state confinement,
the Court has yet to clearly assert that surveillance and a loss of privacy
promote a legitimate punitive goal. However, courts do recognize that
certain uses of surveillance are a form of cruel and unusual
punishment. 355 Thus, when imposing surveillance as a restrictive
measure, the state would do well to argue an interest in security or
deterrence, rather than an interest in punishment.
This is not to suggest that imprisonment for the purpose of
retributivism is not a proper goal of sentencing, as that has remained a
long-established goal according to the Court: “The infliction of
punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter. This is what
the word means today; it is what it meant in the eighteenth century . . .
.” 356 To chastise promotes a purpose of correction, to train or curb
behavior, and is not merely a deliberate imposition of suffering. 357
In the 1980s, surveillance capabilities were limited, including timelapse VHS, early CCTV cameras, and the first multi-camera
recorders, 358 thus the Hudson Court’s assessment of what constitutes an
354. ELSNER, supra note 321, at 95.
355. See supra Part II(B)(2).
356. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (quoting Judge Posner in
Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816
(1986)).
357. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661 (1977); Bloom v. Toliver, 133
F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1332 n.8 (N.D. Okl. 2015).
358. See generally April White, A Brief History of Surveillance in America,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 2018), available at https://www.smithsonianmag.com/
history/brief-history-surveillance-america-180968399/ (asserting that today “we’re
talking about a scale of surveillance that scarcely seems fathomable from the
perspective of the 1960s, 1970s, or even the 1980s”). Compare The History of
Surveillance: The 1980s, IFSEC GLOBAL, https://www.ifsecglobal.com/historysurveillance-1980s/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (providing examples of iconic 1980s
surveillance technology), and DOJ BRIEF NO. 2, supra note 7, at 2 (“the advent of
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expectation of privacy in a prison cell cannot compare to current
surveillance technology. In Hudson, the Court examined regular
searches for contraband via a guard’s shake-down of an inmate’s cell,
rather than constant observation with remote technology. 359 The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished Hudson’s more minor privacy
intrusion when applying a Fourth Amendment analysis to a right to
bodily privacy in body-cavity searches: “We conclude that a right to
privacy in one’s own body, unlike a right to maintain private spaces for
possessions, is not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and
is so fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable even in
the prison context.” 360 Thus, a revisiting of Hudson and the necessity
of the state’s interest may be warranted, should a cell be subject to far
more intrusive surveillance than a physical cell search.
Courts will consider not only the expressed state interest, such as
security generally or the benefit of a specific type of restrictive measure,
but also how the measure is implemented. In Parkell v. Danberg, the
Third Circuit applied a Hudson incompatibility analysis and found that
body-cavity searches in prison are subject to Fourth Amendment
protections of a reasonable expectation of bodily privacy. 361 The case
addressed an allegedly excessive security practice involving a Delaware
state prison inmate: “[t]hree times per day officers ‘strip searche[d]’
him, visually inspecting his anus and genitals while he ’was forced to
squat naked and cough loudly.’” 362 Similarly, in Canady v. Boardman,
the Seventh Circuit asserted that “all forced observations or inspections

computers and other automated data handling equipment raises new issues about the
security of intelligence data”), with Ron Alalouff, IDIS to Promote Video Surveillance
System Convenience at IFSEC International 2018, IFSEC GLOBAL (May 24, 2018),
https://www.ifsecglobal.com/idis-promote-video-system-convenience-ifsecinternational-2018/ (listing new products that offer motion detection and image
analysis from 200 meters away in the dark, use of a centralized single monitor for a
myriad of video surveillance applications, and enhanced smartphone cameras), and
Scally, supra note 33 (identifying new trends such as improved body camera
surveillance and deep learning analytics from visuals).
359. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). See generally supra note
323 and accompanying text discussing Hudson.
360. Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016).
361. Id.
362. Id. at 321.
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of the naked body implicate a privacy concern,” in a case involving strip
searches of a male prisoner by female guards. 363
In each case, the necessity of the restrictive measure chosen was
carefully scrutinized, when other means could effectuate the same
protective result without infringing on the prisoner’s individual rights
to the same degree. As discussed in Part IV below, ideally
improvements in prison management will be developed considering the
state’s interest in achieving a proper balance of security and protection
of individual rights; such improvements, depending on the confinement
needs, may incorporate new innovative technology or no technology at
all.
C. The State Interest to Intrude on Patient Autonomy
As with prisons, confinement of medical and mental health patients
have notorious origins.
While treatment, rehabilitation, and
compassionate care have emerged as duties of care for state institutions,
along with the commonly held goals of security, safety, and costefficiency, 364 this was not originally the case. Early hospitals in
America, as late as the 1900s, were scrutinized publicly with “grave
reservations,” in that the institutional setting was accompanied by a
legacy of “memories of the pesthouse and the almshouse, of poverty
and death.” 365
Yet before the creation of these institutions, medical care could be
an exercise of even greater depravity for those without means. In
describing the French enslavement of Protestants on galley ships in the
early 1700s, the Reverend Bion recounts: “The stench is most
intolerable, insomuch as that there is no slave, though ever so weak, but
will rather choose to tug at his oar, and expire under his chain, than to
retire to this loathsome hospital.” 366 The hospital he describes was a

363. Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir. 1994).
364. See supra Part III(A).
365. Morris J. Vogel, The Transformation of the American Hospital, in
INSTITUTIONS OF CONFINEMENT: HOSPITALS, ASYLUMS, AND PRISONS IN WESTERN
EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, 1500-1950 39, 48-49 (Norbert Finzsch & Robert Jütte
eds., 1997).
366. Rev. J. Bion, An Account of the Torments, The French Protestants Endure
Aboard the Galleys (1708), in AN ENGLISH GARNER, SOCIAL ENGLAND ILLUSTRATED:
A COLLECTION OF XVIITH CENTURY TRACTS 433, 445 (Thomas Seccombe ed., E.P.
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dark closet below deck, where persons were segregated from the rest of
the crew for medical and disciplinary purposes. 367
As medicine developed, middle-class patients came to expect
individualized care and the privacy of house calls. 368 Foucault
identified the gradually emerging administrative structure of the
hospital facility as one registering and monitoring individuals,
separating them by disease and diagnosis, until, “[o]ut of discipline, a
medically useful space was born.” 369 Foucault also famously addressed
the origins of the insane asylum, where “[f]ear appears as an essential
presence,” 370 eventually replacing repression and restraint with
authority and surveillance. 371 By the Twentieth Century, state-funded
medical care through major social programs such as Medicare,
Medicaid, and the Veterans Administration, became more readily
available, but consistently reimbursed at a lower rate than private care,
resulting in greater risks of low quality care. 372
Surveillance in civil institutions is key to safety and security,
particularly when addressing mental illness and aggression or
suicidality. 373 In such dire cases, the state has both an interest and a
duty as parens patriae to engage in observation to avoid the danger of

Dutton & Co.) (excluding a publication date as a reprint and revision of the eight
volume collection of letters and essays comprising the original English Garner by
Prof. Edward Arber (circa 1909)).
367. Id.
368. See Vogel, supra note 365, at 49 (“hospital medicine had been secondclass medicine”).
369. FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 144.
370. MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF
INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON 245 (Richard Howard trans., Tavistock
Publications, 1967) (1961).
371. Id. at 251.
372. See Johnson, supra note 66 (providing an alarming exposé of the health
and safety impact of underfunding Illinois state nursing homes); Scott Bronstein &
Drew Griffin, A Fatal Wait: Veterans Languish and Die on a VA Hospital’s Secret
List, CNN (Apr. 23, 2014, 07:22), https://www.cnn.com/2014/04/23/health/veteransdying-health-care-delays/index.html (reporting that approximately 1,500 veterans
were forced to wait months to see a doctor at a Veterans Administration hospital in
Phoenix); Vogel, supra note 365, at 53.
373.
See Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, supra note 307 and
accompanying text.
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harm to those in its care. 374 Nevertheless, in civil institutions with less
urgent needs, state statutes tend to respect the rights of autonomy of
institutional residents; for example, by permitting constant video
surveillance in nursing home bedrooms only with the prior written
consent of the patient or guardian. 375 Unlike prisons, medical and
mental health institutions do not serve a population of persons with only
criminal records.
Therefore, perhaps more than security, in the United States today
cost-efficiency parallels the state interest in quality of care in medical
and mental health institutions. Even with quality care, the demands
placed on staff may be great. Some long-term care patients require
constant and intensive monitoring to avoid dangers to themselves or
others, such as aggressive Alzheimer’s patients or persons with
traumatic brain injury; or they may present elopement risks, seeking to
leave the facility without notice. 376 When such monitoring is provided
in person by staff serving only one patient, it is effective but costly.377
Thus, facility administration may resort to constant internal and
external remote video surveillance in order to reduce staff costs, while
still serving as an aid in locating patients in crisis. 378
Here, the combination of human assessment and expanded
technological tools appears to be working well in the interests of the
state. According to hospital safety management experts, “many
hospitals take a multi-layered, integrated approach where access
control, video surveillance, RFID [radio frequency identification
tracking wristbands] and motion sensors all work together.” 379 As far
as the impact on patient’s rights, integrating RFID technology with
374. E.g., Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2017) (addressing
the state’s duty to prevent suicide in prison confinement).
375. See supra note 21.
376. Robin Hattersley, Preparing for the Silver Tsunami Part 2: Responding to
Elderly Patient Wandering & Elopement, CAMPUS SAFETY MAG., April/May 2018, at
28.
377. Id. See also Cost of Dementia Care at Home, in Adult Day Care, Assisted
Living or in Nursing Homes, DEMENTIA CARE CENTRAL, https://www.dementiacare
central.com/assisted-living-home-care-costs/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (stating the
average national cost of assisted living with memory care in the United States in 2018
as $4,500/month, with nursing home care in more advanced cases ranging from
$150/day to over $300/day).
378. See generally Hattersley, supra note 376, at 30.
379. Id.
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software that allows for remote surveillance decreases the privacy of
the patient, but permits greater freedom of movement in safe areas
while alerting staff when the patient enters unsafe areas. 380 Thus,
surveillance can potentially contribute to greater protection of
individual autonomy.
In mental institutions confining those subject to involuntary
commitment, the state interest requires closer examination. These
settings reflect hybrid state purposes, according to the courts,
particularly when patients were committed as criminal defendants or
when the dangers they pose to the institutional community mirror those
found in prison settings. 381 For example, forced psychotropic
medication may be warranted not only for the purpose of treatment, as
in medical settings, but for the purpose of restraint and the protection
of others in the facility. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
held that regular body-cavity searches of sex offenders committed to
involuntary commitment are warranted, despite an existing right to
bodily privacy, because of the patients’ greater risk of obtaining cell
phones as contraband. 382
Regardless of the level of risk, in general, a state medical or mental
health facility as parens patriae may justify intrusion into autonomy
rights for patient protection, with substantial discretion given to the
views of medical providers. 383 Such deference may heighten the risk
of state abuse of power by ignoring the inherent punitive nature of
restrictive measures in civil confinement, thus leading to an increase in
claims for Eighth Amendment protection of the individual rights of
persons in civil involuntary commitment. 384

380. Id.
381. See generally Brobst, Miranda, supra note 192 (addressing the legal risks
in criminal-civil hybrid institutions with respect to the privilege against selfincrimination and court-ordered disclosures in mental health treatment of juvenile
inmates); Benjamin J. Bogos, On the Legal Standard for Evaluating Free Exercise
Claims in the Context of Sex Offender Civil Commitment, 11 AVE MARIA L. REV. 443
(2013) (analyzing the tension between treatment and penological goals for involuntary
civil commitment of convicted sexual offenders creating a lack of uniformity in lower
court interpretation of prisoner/patient claims).
382. Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir. 2009) (arguing that prisons
and mental hospitals for sexually dangerous patients have comparable security risks).
383. Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 185 (Alaska 2009).
384. See generally supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
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Courts examining the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination highlight the risk of coercion and abuse of power in
hybrid settings of confinement such as custodial interrogation of
prisoners by prison mental health providers, or law enforcement
interrogation of patients in medical or mental health institution.385
Justice Douglas stated in his concurring opinion in McNeil v. Director,
Patuxent Institution:
Whatever the Patuxent procedures may be called—whether civil or
criminal—the result under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is the same. As we said in In re Gault, there is the threat
of self-incrimination whenever there is ‘a deprivation of liberty;’ and
there is such a deprivation whatever the name of the institution, if a
person is held against his will. 386

In a key decision in 2017, explicating the policy concerns of hybrid
settings, the federal district court in Hallford examined the Fifth
Amendment claim of a patient involuntarily committed in a local
psychiatric hospital. 387 The patient was questioned by Secret Service
agents regarding involvement in a protest march, which revealed
enough information to later convict him of a federal weapons charge. 388
Finding that the patient, Hallford, was unlawfully coerced by the state,
the court highlighted the facts of the case: at the time of questioning,
Hallford was tired, ill, naked, and shivering; the psychiatric nurse told
him he had to speak with the agents; he was denied an attorney; and he
was never Mirandized. 389 The district court emphatically stated that the
institutional setting for this patient was not home.

385. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that admission at trial
of in-custody pre-trial statements, made without Miranda warnings in a court-ordered
competency examination, violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination); United States v. Robinson, 439 F.2d 553, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(arguing that being held in custody without an attorney at a psychiatric facility is
“even more conducive to compulsion than Miranda’s [setting]”).
386. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (internal citation omitted).
387. United States v. Hallford, 280 F. Supp. 3d 170 (D.D.C. 2017), appeal filed,
No. 17-3093 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
388. Id. at 179-182.
389. Id.
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He had just suffered a serious and painful medical episode that
required immediate attention at a hospital. After arriving at the
hospital and displaying signs of mental instability, he was
involuntarily committed to the hospital and told that he could not go
home. 390

The court recognized that there is potential for an unlawfully coercive
environment in all state institutions, including use of isolation,
surveillance, and other significant losses of privacy and autonomy.
Therefore, state interests in restrictive measures in confinement may
appear legitimate and range from security to medical treatment to costefficiency, but must be balanced against the individual rights of those
persons confined.
IV. ALIGNING THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS TO ENSURE
REASONABLENESS IN THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY TO MONITOR AND
CONTROL CONFINED PERSONS
Individual autonomy in controlling one’s privacy is a core right,
derived from natural law concepts of autonomy, common law police
power and parens patriae, as well as state and federal constitutions. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota aptly stated in 1976, without the benefit
of the array of federal privacy jurisprudence which was to follow in the
next several decades: “At the core of the privacy decisions, in our
judgment, is the concept of personal autonomy—the notion that the
Constitution reserves to the individual, free of governmental intrusion,
certain fundamental decisions about how he or she will conduct his or
her life.” 391
Determining how the right is impacted by emerging surveillance
capabilities requires vigilance in the courts and other branches of
government. 392 Justice Black noted the challenges of defining the

390. Id. at 183 (“At the time of his involuntary commitment, Hallford was
hundreds of miles from home in an unfamiliar city.”).
391. Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 909-10 (Minn. 1976), superseded by
statute, Civil Commitment Act, Minn. Laws ch. 282, art.2, §100, as stated in In re
Civil Commitment of Raboin, 704 N.W.2d 767 (Min. App. 2005).
392. See generally Mark Fenwick et al., Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens
When Technology is Faster than the Law?, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 561 (2017)
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concept, where “‘[p]rivacy’ is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept
which can easily be shrunken in meaning but which can also, on the
other hand, easily be interpreted as a constitutional ban against many
things other than searches and seizures.” 393 Similarly, in 1963, the
Court applied a broadly defined test in holding that under the Fourth
Amendment, the trial court should make its determination of
reasonableness “from the facts and circumstances of the case and in the
light of the ‘fundamental criteria’ laid down by the Fourth Amendment
and in opinions of this Court applying that Amendment.” 394
In order to refine the standards of analysis to address emerging
technology, the courts should consider applicable balancing test factors
in a modern light. The former assertion by the Court skeptically calling
efforts to better delineate the reasonableness test in privacy cases a
“Procrustean application” to be avoided, 395 is now outmoded. Today’s
vastly enhanced surveillance capabilities require much greater judicial
guidance regarding available common law and constitutional privacy
protections. While the courts recognize changing times, 396 they do not
follow an Orwellian prophecy that if the state simply takes all privacy
away, then humans will no longer expect, want, or need privacy. 397
Some concepts of constitutional analysis are solidly in force
without serious debate. For example, consent to surveillance should
only be acceptable if it is based on meaningful choice. 398 When a
(asserting that greater effort is needed by lawmakers to reasonably regulate emerging
disruptive technologies in order to facilitate the market and protect the public).
393. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
394. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
395. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (quoting Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963)).
396. Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The lack of privacy and the hazards to peace of mind
and body caused by people living not in individual houses but crowded together in
large human beehives, as they so widely do, are facts of modern [industrialized] living
which cannot be ignored.”).
397. See Robinson v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cty., 164 Cal. Rptr. 389, 394
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980), hearing granted and opinion on rehearing not for publication
(1984) (rejecting “a subjective measure of privacy which contains the Orwellian
flaw,” where judges should not “merely recite the expectations and risks without
examining the desirability of saddling them upon society”).
398. A stark and somewhat odd example of modern consent to constant
surveillance is the spectacle of reality television, where, in the interests of celebrity,
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nursing home resident signs a contract to permit constant video
surveillance of the resident’s bedroom, one must wonder whether the
facility has already cut staff; thus, would not signing the consent form
result in an absence of necessary monitoring or a breach of care? 399 In
fact-sensitive analyses, it would benefit the courts to expressly carve
out established and emerging factors of interest, many of which have
been gathered and discussed in Sections B and C below.
Other developing approaches to balancing interests in institutional
settings reflect an internal tension, even if the relevant factors and
interests are clearly outlined. For example, in high risk institutional
settings where security administration is “inordinately difficult,” courts
generally take a pragmatic approach and accord a higher degree of
deference to supervisory authorities when choosing restrictive
measures. 400 In contrast, even recent decisions suggest in broad terms
that privacy in the home is “a protection of families and personal
privacy” 401 and that the state may not invade the “sanctity of the
home.” 402 If the right to privacy of the home includes a nursing home
patient’s bedroom, an involuntarily committed patient’s hospital room,
or a prison cell, then deference to the state’s interest in security should
not be taken for granted.
Regulation of the state’s use of technology as a restrictive measure
in confinement must be human-centered. Therefore, implementing
surveillance technology as a punitive measure for the purpose of
humiliation must not be permitted by the courts. Nor should the courts
permit intrusive restrictive measures, adopted for no purpose other than
expediency and cost-efficiency, without regard to the impact on those
confined. Of course, in any balance of interests related to surveillance

the ordinary person consents to exposing his or her domestic life as visual
entertainment. See WU, supra note 319, at 245.
399. See supra note 21.
400. See Klinger v. Dept. of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 732 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1185; J.H. Coverdale et al., Respecting the Autonomy of Chronic
Mentally Ill Women in Decisions About Contraception, 44(7) HOSP. CMTY.
PSYCHIATRY 671 (1993), available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/
8354506 (addressing the complex ethical issues for institutions working with patients
with serious mental illness who make privacy decisions, such as consenting to
contraceptive implants, when they are delusional and when they are not).
401. Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (2018).
402. Id. at 1672.
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of confined persons, it is important to consider that the state and
individual interests are frequently in alignment. 403 Acting as parens
patriae and under constitutional principles, the state has a duty to protect
not merely the physical health, but the well-being of those it has
confined.
The discussion below first comparatively examines the specific
legal balancing tests applied to the most common constitutional claims
for a deprivation of autonomy in confined settings. Subsequent sections
then address specific factors to balance in an age of surveillance
technology, with a special emphasis on the growing scientific and
medical research elucidating its human impact.
A. Levels of Scrutiny and Overlapping Federal Constitutional Claims
Whether institutional methods and use of technology to restrict
privacy rights of confined persons must be the least restrictive, the best
alternative, reasonable, or merely one of a number of available means
differs according to the legal basis under which the right is asserted.
Claims addressed herein include those supported by the Fourth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.404 Each
legal approach benefits from incorporating new research-based
understandings of the importance of privacy to human well-being, but
some require reinterpretation of the legal meaning of surveillance and
observation.
In Turner v. Safley, the Court held that violations of the
constitutional rights of prison inmates are subject to rational basis
review, and the Ninth Circuit summarized the application of relevant
factors as follows:
The Court provided four factors to guide reviewing courts in
applying this test: 1) the existence of a valid, rational connection
between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental
interest put forward to justify it; 2) the existence of alternative means
of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates; 3) the

403. See supra Part III.
404. As discussed above in Part II(A), state constitutions may offer additional
and even more robust protections of individual privacy and autonomy. However, in
the interests of brevity, and for reasons noted above, a federal analysis is the primary
focus of this section.
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impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will
have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources generally; and 4) the absence of ready alternatives as
evidence of the reasonableness of the regulation (the presence of
obvious easy alternatives may evidence the opposite).405

Each constitutional basis for addressing restrictions on autonomy
through surveillance and AI in state institutions will be addressed
separately, followed by a discussion of commonly overlapping claims.
1. Fourth Amendment Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
While Turner v. Safley only addresses prison incarceration, the
Fourth Amendment remains a vital source of protection from
unreasonable surveillance of persons confined in both civil and penal
state institutions.406 Generally, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the
state from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures, which
require both a subjective and objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy on the part of the person searched. 407 While the sanctity of the
home is traditionally protected, in Hudson v. Palmer, the Court held
that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in prison cells from
shake-down searches of property by guards. 408 More broadly, “[a] right
of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally
incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and
their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal
order.” 409 This decision was limited in part to its facts, where, for
example, observational body-cavity searches have not been subject to

405. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1988) (addressing
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).
406. See, e.g., Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying a
Fourth Amendment rights analysis in mental hospital body-cavity search). See supra
Part II(B)(1).
407. See supra Part II(B)(1) (outlining the historical development of the Fourth
Amendment constitutional analysis).
408. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1983).
409. Id. at 528. With respect to pre-trial detainees, there was initially a
presumption that they had retained at least a “diminished expectation of privacy.”
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979).
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the restrictions of Hudson and a reasonable expectation of bodily
privacy is upheld. 410
After 35 years, with new surveillance technology necessitating
more evolved decisions, the Court may revisit the reasonableness of
other forms of “close and continual surveillance,” such as truly constant
remote surveillance of prison cells with capabilities assessing a
prisoner’s mood, alcohol intake, and other physiological characteristics
such as heart rate. In 2018, in Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme
Court demonstrated readiness to support individual privacy rights under
the Fourth Amendment against ever more intrusive technology. 411 The
Court upheld informational privacy rights in private cell phone data
against state intrusion, recognizing “the seismic shifts in digital
technology that make possible the tracking of [individuals] . . . for years
and years.” 412
However, under a Fourth Amendment analysis in the prison setting,
employing the least restrictive means of engaging in a search or seizure
is not required of the state, suggesting an approach deferential to
governmental interests in security.
“Less-restrictive-alternative
arguments are too powerful: a prison always can do something, at some
cost, to make prisons more habitable, but if courts assess and compare
these costs and benefits then judges rather than wardens are the real
prison administrators.” 413 The state also faces new security challenges
where prisoners make creative use of technology to obtain contraband,
such as drone drop-offs over prison walls. 414 Thus state institutions
might well counter the privacy arguments of prisoners with assertions
of a heightened need for restrictive security measures of their own.
Nevertheless, when upholding state surveillance measures that
would equate to a search, the Turner elements do require an
examination of necessity and the “ready instruments” the Constitution
410. Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that
a right to privacy in one’s own body, unlike a right to maintain private spaces for
possessions, is not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so
fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable even in the prison
context.”).
411. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
412. Id. at 2219 (denying application of the third party doctrine).
413. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 145 (7th Cir. 1995) (relying on Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559-60 (1979) and Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)).
414. See supra note 308.
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provides for an assessment of the impact on individual rights. 415 For
example, the highly invasive practice of strip searches in group settings
requires some showing of necessity, although the courts remain
unsettled on how particular prison policies must be in determining
levels of risk among prisoners warranting such routine searches. 416 In
a hospital setting housing civilly committed sex offenders, courts have
been willing to uphold routine body-cavity searches in the interests of
security and detection of contraband. 417 Perhaps technology will
improve the privacy rights of prisoners from invasive searches, as new
innovative means to detect contraband are developed.
2. Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must be able to show that
(1) “objectively, the deprivation of a basic human need was sufficiently
serious” based on “contemporary standards of decency,” 418 posing a
“substantial risk of serious harm”; 419 and (2) that subjectively the prison
officials “acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which
addresses both excessive punishment and deliberate indifference to
inhumane conditions. 420 An Eighth Amendment claim is arguably
more difficult to prove, where an added culpable mental state is
required, as seen in the wanton and deliberate indifference elements of
the analysis. 421

415. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 843 (2006); Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 578 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 325 (1967); see also Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1683 (2018)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (suggesting a need to consider the “real effect” of the intrusion).
416. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 566
U.S. 318 (2012).
417. See, e.g., Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2009).
418. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
419. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
420. See Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996); see also
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).
421. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (requiring an objective deprivation of a basic
human need that is sufficiently serious based on “contemporary standards of
decency”); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (requiring a subjective intent
of deliberate indifference on the part of state actors imposing the punishment).
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In determining the culpable state of malice regarding a claim of
cruel and unusual punishment, a fact-sensitive inquiry may consider:
(1) the extent of the injury suffered; (2) the need for the application of
force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force
used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials;
and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful
response. 422 As already discussed, restrictive security measures, such
as excessive solitary confinement or harassing strip searches, may
satisfy the court that the state’s action is an added punishment, both
cruel and unusual. While blanket surveillance may assist the state in
defending against an Eighth Amendment claim requiring malicious
intent, the application of new technologies may cause concern if they
result in detrimental psychological harm.
Many of the recent non-physical cases of cruel and unusual
punishment have addressed excessively harsh conditions in solitary
confinement, made possible in part by new surveillance technologies
and facilities that remove most human contact. 423 Therefore, claims
under the Eighth Amendment for privacy and social isolation
deprivations may particularly benefit from new research into the
psychological impact of technology on persons in confinement.424
Ideally, this will enable the courts to place particular emphasis on
realigning the balance of interests in hybrid criminal-civil institutional
settings, permitting proper recognition of the punitive nature of privacy
violations under civil order so that such patients may assert claims
under the Eighth Amendment. 425
3. Substantive Due Process Deprivation of Liberty
A substantive due process claim on the basis of a state deprivation
unlawfully infringing on a person’s liberty interest may face varying
422. See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2017) (addressing
a claim of cruel and unusual punishment for the solitary confinement of a mentally ill
inmate); Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1993) (examining an
excessive force claim for the forced medication of an inmate in a prison mental health
unit).
423. See, e.g., Palakovic, 854 F.3d. at 223-24; see also supra note 345 and
accompanying text (addressing supermax prisons).
424. See infra Part IV(B).
425. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol55/iss1/2

94

Brobst: The Metal Eye: Ethical Regulation of the State’s Use of Surveill
FINAL Brobst camera ready (Do Not Delete)

2018]

1/8/2019 10:36 AM

THE METAL EYE

95

levels of scrutiny. As stated above, in prison settings, a low rationalbasis standard of review has been applied, such as reviewing prison
mail and marriage regulations in Turner v. Safley – “when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is
valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 426
In civil settings, this may not be the case. The state has an affirmative
duty to persons it holds in care or custody to ensure their personal
security and protection from abuse and other forms of harm, supported
in part by parens patriae duties of care. 427 Identifying liberty as freedom
from restraint may be interpreted in numerous ways, particularly when
the Court has also referenced the pursuit of happiness in the liberty
context. 428 Thus, the Amendment is relatively flexible in addressing
technology-related infringements on autonomy in both civil and
criminal institutions. In addition, innovative technology could reduce
the need for some substantive due process claims if reasonable
electronic surveillance prevented other deprivations of liberty, such as
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 429
While the Court in Turner expressly declined to adopt a least
restrictive means test for prisoners’ constitutional claims, the Court did
assert that “the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence
that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an ‘exaggerated response’ to
prison concerns.” 430 Therefore, as new technologies are adopted in
institutions of confinement, if they are imposed arbitrarily without due
process and involve intrusive surveillance, they could clearly implicate
a liberty interest and violate a fundamental right to privacy owed to
those in confinement.

426. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987) (addressing the privacy
interests of inmates with respect to inmate-to-inmate correspondence and the right to
marry).
427. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980); see also supra note 270 and
accompanying text discussing Vitek.
428. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (asserting that the
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest incorporates “the right generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men”); supra note 267.
429. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982).
430. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
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4. Overlapping Constitutional Claims
The Court has been hesitant to expand the scope of Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process protections for fear of implying a
general right to privacy in all aspects of life. That is, due process claims
may not serve as a catch-all privacy right. 431 Specifically, if other
substantive claims are more expressly applicable, the Court may
determine that the Fourteenth Amendment claim is not available.
Although persons in civil confinement, such as nursing home residents
or mental hospital patients, may more readily assert a Fourteenth
Amendment claim as they have less of a risk of an overlap: the Eighth
Amendment relates to the criminal justice system, and the heightened
security concerns of prisons would more likely create Fourth
Amendment concerns.
Whether a liberty interest due process claim is foreclosed by other
constitutional claims requires a somewhat nuanced interpretation. 432 If
a more substantive, directly applicable claim is available, then the due
process claim is purportedly not viable; but if the claims address
different interests regarding the same act both may state a claim. 433

431. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 266 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(following Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)); Evans v. Chalmers, 703
F.3d 636, 646 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012) (asserting that a Fourth Amendment specific
application forecloses a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim); Bratton-Bey v.
Straughan, Civil Action No. DKC 13-1964, 2015 WL 434142, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 2,
2015) (following Evans, 703 F.3d 636, for the proposition that the Substantive Due
Process Clause is not a “catch-all” remedy for state harms); Norwood v. Thompson,
No. 2:05-CV-0904, 2006 WL 840384, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2006) (following
Graham, 490 U.S. 386, when stating, “the substantive due process clause is not a
‘catch-all’ clause under which constitutional claims of any nature can be asserted”).
432. Compare County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)
(addressing a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, asserting that
Graham does not require a Fourth or Eighth Amendment analysis, but if either clause
is directly applicable then a Fourteenth Amendment claim is foreclosed), with
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (1989) (holding that an “explicit textual source of
constitutional protection” will foreclose a more generalized substantive due process
claim), and Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[S]ubstantive due
process is not an appropriate substitute for analysis under provisions of the
Constitution that address a subject directly, and in particular does not trump the fourth
amendment.”).
433. Smith v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-10666, 2015 WL 12731913,
at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2015) (“Failure to institute procedural safeguards to prevent
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Courts have not uniformly applied this limitation, as recent federal
decisions have found viable substantive due process and Eighth
Amendment claims for some privacy intrusions, 434 but not in cases of
excessive force. 435 Judge Easterbrook posited for the majority in
Phelan v. Johnson that:
Any practice allowed under the due process analysis of Turner is
acceptable under the eighth amendment too—not only because the
objective component of cruel and unusual punishment is more
tolerant toward wardens, but also because the eighth amendment has
a demanding mental-state component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), holds that the standard
is criminal recklessness. The guard or warden must want to injure the
prisoner or must know of and disregard a substantial risk that harm
will befall the prisoner. 436

However, the Third Circuit more recently compared the two balancing
tests with regard to suicide in solitary confinement, asserting that there
is little difference between the analyses:
[W]hen a plaintiff seeks to hold a prison official liable for failing to
prevent a detainee’s suicide, a pre-trial detainee may bring a claim
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that is
essentially equivalent to the claim that a prisoner may bring under
the deprivation of liberty can, itself, be a Fourteenth Amendment violation, separate
from the Fourth Amendment particularity inquiry.”).
434. E.g., Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (D. Colo. 2017) (providing
injunctive relief on the basis of both federal Eighth Amendment and substantive due
process claims for punitive privacy violations relating to the sex offender registry in
Colorado). But see Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (asserting that
Substantive Due Process is not a distinct, overlapping source of constitutional
protection in excessive force cases in prison, where the clause provides no greater
protection than the Eighth Amendment, but withholding interpretation of whether
overlapping protections could be available to detainees or persons with “unrestricted
liberty”).
435. See Bieros v. Nicola, 860 F. Supp. 226, 230-32 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (asserting
that the Fourth Amendment no longer applies in excessive force cases once a person
is arrested and becomes a pre-trial detainee, nor does the Eighth Amendment apply
until the person is convicted and sentenced, but that excessive force claims for pretrial detainees would invoke the Fourteenth Amendment to provide substantive due
process protections).
436. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 149 (7th Cir. 1995).
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the Eighth Amendment. Thus, whether a pre-trial detainee or a
convicted prisoner, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the individual had
a particular vulnerability to suicide, meaning that there was a ”strong
likelihood, rather than a mere possibility,” that a suicide would be
attempted; (2) that the prison official knew or should have known of
the individual’s particular vulnerability; and (3) that the official acted
with reckless or deliberate indifference, meaning something beyond
mere negligence, to the individual’s particular vulnerability. 437

More clarity from the courts regarding the relationship between the
Fourteenth Amendment and other constitutional claims would be
beneficial as liberty interests face new challenges to privacy with
expansive surveillance technology, and existing balancing tests in
institutional settings are often deferential to the state.
As Patrick Henry stated to the members of the congressional
convention when arguing for a Bill of Rights to be added to the
Constitution:
If you will, like the Virginia government, give them knowledge of
the extent of the rights retained by the people, and the powers of
themselves, they will, if they be honest men, thank you for it. Will
they not wish to go on sure grounds? But if you leave them
otherwise, they will not know how to proceed; and, being in a state
of uncertainty, they will assume rather than give up powers by
implication. 438

The tremendous power differential between those in power in state
institutions and the most vulnerable persons they house calls for public
knowledge of the extent of rights retained, as Henry warned, and a well
informed understanding of why those rights are essential. Today,
advances in scientific and medical research on the impact of
technological surveillance on human well-being shed light on how best
to balance the interests between the state and the individual rights to
privacy, autonomy, and social contact.

437.
438.

Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2017).
Henry, supra note 2, at 448.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol55/iss1/2

98

Brobst: The Metal Eye: Ethical Regulation of the State’s Use of Surveill
FINAL Brobst camera ready (Do Not Delete)

2018]

1/8/2019 10:36 AM

THE METAL EYE

99

B. Incorporating Scientific and Medical Research When Evaluating
the Impact of Technology on Human Well-Being in State Institutions
Modern research in psychology, sociology, and evolutionary
biology provide greater support for what the Founders and the Court
have intuitively understood to be true about the human species. 439 That
is, invasions of privacy that infringe on autonomy rights negatively
impact human well-being by reducing a sense of security and safety,
confidence, trust, mutual respect, freedom, and enjoyment of life.
That dual aspect of privacy means that the individual should have the
freedom to select for himself the time and circumstances when he
will share his secrets with others and decide the extent of that
sharing. This is his prerogative not the States’. The Framers, who
were as knowledgeable as we, knew what police surveillance meant
and how the practice of rummaging through one’s personal effects
could destroy freedom. 440

In a modern framework, invasions of privacy and ubiquitous
surveillance tend to produce in humanity a sense of fear, paranoia,
suspicion, distrust, isolation, insecurity, conformity, and depression.441
As the Fifth Circuit stated in 1987, “indiscriminate video surveillance
raises the specter of the Orwellian state.” 442

439. See, e.g., MICHAEL, supra note 88, at 3 (identifying common themes of a
human need for privacy in (a) anthropological research, (b) developmental
psychology which demonstrates that control over privacy facilitates self-identity in
infants, and (c) evolutionary biology which establishes that “a balance between
privacy and participation is one of the basic features of [higher forms of ] animal
life”).
440. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323-24 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
441. See, e.g., McCahill, supra note 69, at 60 (identifying the fear of crime and
terrorism as a political incentive and justification for public CCTV systems in Britain,
systems which then contribute to a “universally shared and overwhelming sensation
of insecurity”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); GANDY, JR., supra note
23, at 230 (“[G]rowing mistrust leads to expanded surveillance, and each cycle pushes
us further from the democratic ideal[.]”); see also GLASSNER, supra note 31, at xvii
(arguing that given the paucity of credible data of largescale abuses, 1990s electronic
surveillance systems “were implemented to protect children from fiends who reside
primarily in the imaginations of adults”).
442. See United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987).
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The public’s paranoia and distrust is not always rational, which
may be the point of commodifying fear. For example, incentivized by
the insurance industry, consumers have reportedly purchased more
home security systems in recent years, despite the fact that burglary
rates have already fallen by more than 25% in the last decade. 443
Historical use of surveillance and segregation as a form of state police
power in public health contexts have, at times, demonstrated existing
societal prejudices and unlawful deprivations of liberty rights. 444 Thus,
historical moments of heightened fear or crisis enable the government
to override individual privacy interests more easily. Fortunately, the
courts serve as a particularly useful check on this exercise of emergency
power.
When defining the basic human needs of confined persons, the
courts evince an increased willingness to consider advances in scientific
and medical research in producing evolving standards of humane
treatment. For example, in holding that social isolation in solitary
confinement bears a terrible toll on the psychological well-being of
prisoners, one district court found that “there is a large and growing
body of literature—both academic and legal—discussing the
potentially devastating effects of prolonged periods of
isolation.” 445 This expanded understanding is taking hold amongst
policy makers outside of the judicial system as well. The National
Commission on Correctional Health Care adopted new standards for
solitary confinement in 2016, which include the principle that “[a]dults
and juveniles in solitary confinement should have as much human
443. Ronda Kaysen, Do Security Systems Make Your Home Safer?, N.Y.
TIMES: RIGHT AT HOME (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/22/
realestate/do-security-systems-make-your-home-safer.html.
444. E.g., Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (N.D. Ca. 1900) (finding a local
health ordinance limiting mandatory quarantine against bubonic plague to a single
district of over 15,000 Chinese American residents in San Francisco to be an exercise
of authority with an “evil eye and unequal hand”); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419,
443-44 (1827) (asserting that state police power provides the authority to address
public health emergencies), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Oklahoma
Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995).
445. Porter v. Clarke, 290 F. Supp. 3d 518, 532 (E.D. Va. 2018), appeal filed,
Case No. 18-6257 (4th Cir. 2018). See also Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 225
(3d Cir. 2017) (“[W]e first acknowledge the robust body of legal and scientific
authority recognizing the devastating mental health consequences caused by longterm isolation in solitary confinement[.]”).
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contact as possible with people from outside the facility and with
custodial, educational, religious and medical staff.” 446
Perhaps the most basic question is why do humans as a species care
about being watched? Psychologists and cognitive researchers suggest
an evolutionary benefit when a species is capable of knowing it is being
watched, as it permits communication and an identification of
threats. 447 Biologists, in turn, suggest that human eyes, like many
predatory species, have larger, whiter sclera that “vastly improved our
ability to communicate with others – the same reason our complex
language capacities evolved.” 448 Neurologists have identified the
brain’s amygdala as a center that manages facial recognition, as well as
a sense of fear and the need for fight or flight. 449 This function is found
in humans as young as four months old, subconsciously detecting the
visual cue of being watched by even an averted side gaze. 450
Observing others and being observed is also important
developmentally in forming social relationships. There is comfort in
being watched, in vulnerable or intimate moments, but a reticence and
wariness in being watched by strangers, particularly when it is onesided. 451 Developmental psychologists note the importance of learning
when to trust human interactions, in order to learn “what is good and
safe, and what to fear and avoid by ‘emotional referencing’.” 452 It
follows that some of the highest needs for privacy and autonomy are
446. Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, Solitary Confinement (Isolation)
(2016), https://www.ncchc.org/solitary-confinement (Principle 15).
447. See Susie Nielson, The Psychological Explanation for When You Feel Like
You’re Being Watched, N.Y. MAG.: THECUT (July 18, 2017), https://www.thecut.com
/article/the-psychology-of-feeling-like-youre-being-watched.htm.
448. Ilan Shrira, How You Know Eyes are Watching You, PSYCHOL. TODAY:
THE NARCISSUS IN ALL OF US (Feb. 16, 2011), https://www.psychologytoday
.com/us/blog/the-narcissus-in-all-us/201102/how-you-know-eyes-are-watching-you.
449. David Nield, Ever Feel Like You’re Being Watched? It’s Not Just You,
SCIENCE ALERT (May 19, 2017), https://www.sciencealert.com/the-science-behindwhy-you-think-you-re-being-watched.
450. Id.
451. See Colwyn Trevarthen & Vasudevi Reddy, Consciousness in Infants , in
THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO CONSCIOUSNESS 42, 49-50 (Max Velmans & Susan
Schneider eds., 2007) (discussing the development of human consciousness in infants
and the importance of human social relationships to learn “what is good and safe, and
what to fear and avoid by ‘emotional referencing’”).
452. Id.
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found among persons in confinement – those most likely to be
constantly surveilled at all times by strangers who have the power to
determine whether to assist the person or whether to impose
disciplinary measures or additional restraints.
Research on the need for human socialization spans the breadth of
developmental and behavioral psychology, which the courts regularly
draw on in determining the best interests of the child in abuse and
dependency cases. 453 Furthermore, the fact that courts are willing to
consider the basic need for socialization in other animals, based on a
growing body of research, suggests that humans in confinement deserve
even better. For example, in addressing allegations of violations of the
federal Animal Welfare Act against a zoo in Maryland, the court
highlighted some of the same psychologically stressful conditions other
courts have considered with respect to prison inmates: “Lions are highly
social, live in prides, and require enriching environments . . . . The lion
at the Tri-State Zoo is confined to a barren enclosure in social isolation
with no visual privacy from the public.” 454
One psychologist who studies the impact of solitary confinement
on humans in prison noted that:
Over a long period of time, solitary confinement undermines one’s
sense of self. It undermines your ability to register and regulate
emotion. The appropriateness of what you’re thinking and feeling is
difficult to index, because we’re so dependent on contact with others
for that feedback. And for some people, it becomes a struggle to
maintain sanity. 455

Of course, the impact of conditions of confinement may vary and some
suggest that restrictive measures should be tailored to certain categories
453. See, e.g., Nat’l Child Traumatic Stress Network, Fact Sheet, Children with
Traumatic Separation: Information for Professionals, NCTSN.ORG (2016), available
at
https://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/resources//children_with_traumatic_
separation_professionals.pdf (addressing the occurrence of posttraumatic stress
among children who are separated from caregivers or isolated from other social
contact, including, for example, removal from the home by child protective services).
454. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Tri-State Zoological
Park of W. Md., Inc., No. MJG-17-2148, 2018 WL 434229, at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 16,
2018) (denying a motion to dismiss a claim based on the federal Animal Welfare Act
under 50 C.F.R. § 17.3).
455. Keim, supra note 246.
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of persons, such as those with particular illnesses, 456 or of a certain
gender 457 or age. 458 In finding a violation of the privacy rights of a
female inmate who was forcibly made naked by a nurse in front of male
guards, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained:
Persons in prison must surrender many rights of privacy which most
people may claim in their private homes. Much of the life in prison
is communal, and many prisoners must be housed in cells with
openings through which they may be seen by guards. Most people,
however, have a special sense of privacy in their genitals, and
involuntary exposure of them in the presence of people of the other
sex may be especially demeaning and humiliating. When not
reasonably necessary, that sort of degradation is not to be visited
upon those confined in our prisons. 459

Medical and mental health research may help the courts determine, in a
reasonableness analysis, whether differential impacts are based on
significant biological or cultural differences. Juvenile brain research,
for example, has been particularly influential in judicial opinions
related to restrictive measures in sentencing youth in confinement. 460
One area where mental health or sociological research could be
beneficial is in determining whether hidden or open surveillance
produces a greater risk of infringement on autonomy rights. As
discussed previously, prison officials have expressed a preference for
456. E.g., Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 1992), reh’g denied, 253
F.3d 707 (finding no equal protection or due process violation for segregating
prisoners who had tested positive for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus).
457. See Murphy, supra note 249 (recommending gender-specific regulations
for restricting solitary confinement of juvenile girls). But see Riddick v. Sutton, 794
F. Supp. 169 (E.D. N.C. 1992) (female guards viewing male inmates using toilet and
shower only a de minimus infringement on a constitutional right to privacy).
458. Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 11, 11-13 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring
in the decisions to grant certiorari, vacate, and remand) (summarizing the recent
Supreme Court decisions which hold that children are “constitutionally different”
from adults for the purpose of proportionate sentencing and punishment, based in part
on advances in juvenile brain science research).
459. Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
460. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732-33 (2016)
(following recent Supreme Court precedent identifying juveniles as generally less
culpable and more likely to be rehabilitated due to their greater “immaturity,
recklessness, and impetuosity[,]” which usually lessens with age and development).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019

103

California Western Law Review, Vol. 55 [2019], No. 1, Art. 2
FINAL Brobst camera ready (Do Not Delete)

104

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

1/8/2019 10:36 AM

[Vol. 55

hidden surveillance, 461 while civil institutions have opted for consent
and transparency where possible. 462 If a diner sees a surveillance
camera in every corner of a restaurant, would the diner be disturbed to
know that the restaurant owner is actually watching the diner remotely
in real time or would the diner prefer not to know?
There are many reasons why hidden surveillance could betray trust
more than open surveillance. Surreptitious surveillance increases the
vulnerability of persons who do not have the information, and therefore
the choice, to respond accordingly to protect their privacy. 463 If the
surveillance camera is hidden in the restaurant, then the diner has no
autonomy to choose whether to exercise his or her privacy rights and
eat somewhere else in peace. As the Texas attorney and rancher stated
in his claim regarding unlawful government surveillance cameras
placed on private property:
The prevalence of inexpensive technology increasingly eliminates
the distinction between what private citizens keep private and what
they display in public. All the government needs to do, as it did in
the present case, is sneak a camera in some place where nobody
knows. Thus, the decreasing cost of technology leaves us all
vulnerable to government spying. 464

Therefore, on a larger scale, the act of secrecy may be one of tyranny.
Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch argued: “Visible powers are feared
less than invisible ones . . . . It shows itself in supreme clarity in police,
prisons, and soldiers . . . .” 465
While this suggests that hidden state surveillance should be more
heavily scrutinized than open surveillance, the question is more
461. Florer, supra note 337 and accompanying text.
462. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
463. See LINOWES, supra note 3, at 172 (arguing that the unobtrusive nature of
surveillance makes it difficult to detect when one’s rights are violated); REGAN, supra
note 3, at 29 (explaining theorist Charles Fried’s view that privacy is integral to
healthy social relationships “which we would hardly be human if we had to do without
– the relationships of love, friendship, and trust”).
464. Sidney Fussell, Man Sues Feds After Finding Spy Camera on His Property
and Refusing to Give It Back, GIZMODO (Feb. 22, 2018, 12:05 PM),
https://gizmodo.com/man-sues-feds-after-finding-spy-camera-on-his-property1823229134. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
465. BLOCH, supra note 3, at 267.
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complicated with respect to incompetent persons with particularly
challenging needs. For example, some current AI technology merely
provides an enhanced form of existing technology, such as a companion
pet that reminds a person to take medication, 466 medical delivery
systems, 467 or autonomous swarms of bionic insects for commercial use
in manufacturing. 468 Other forms increasingly provide sophisticated
applications, such as medical diagnostic assessments with massively
complex data sets. 469 If these technologies were used knowingly in the
context of informed consent to achieve a beneficial purpose, many
would be grateful for the advantages.
However, when these artificial tools enter the arena of social
engagement or observation, they are not presumptively beneficial.
More medical and mental health research is needed to determine
whether attempts at AI social innovation ultimately serve to disturb or
demean the vulnerable humans they are meant to help. For example,
one humorist noted that she purchased a robo-cat for her 90 year-old
mother who has dementia and lives in a nursing home that does not

466. See Talty, supra note 282 (discussing the Hasbro companion pet).
467. Rachel Becker, I Launched a Blood-Delivery Drone, VERGE (Apr. 13,
2018, 4:38 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/13/17206398/zipline-dronesdelivery-blood-emergency-medical-supplies-startup-rwanda-tanzania.
468.
See, e.g., BionicANTS, FESTO, https://www.festo.com/group/en/
cms/10157.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (selling ANT (autonomous networking
technologies) with intelligent cooperative behavior with physical designs inspired by
nature, such insect legs and octopus tentacles, for commercial use); REPORT FOR THE
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT, U.S. OFFICE OF THE SEC. OF DEFENSE, VISION OF
FUTURE WARFARE: PREPARING FOR A RENAISSANCE IN STRATEGIC WARFARE 30 (July
2012 revised), available at http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FO
ID/Reading%20Room/Other/Litigation%20Release%20-%20Vision%20of%20
Future%20Warfare%20201207.pdf (describing military research into the use of
robotic fire ants “with the battlefield dominated by large numbers of small semiautonomous machines, networked together and capable of rendering an area
impassable to troops”). But see Alexis C. Madrigal, Drone Swarms are going to be
Terrifying and Hard to Stop, ATLANTIC (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.
com/technology/archive/2018/03/drone-swarms-are-going-to-be-terrifying/555005/.
469. See, e.g., Clayton R. Pereira et al., Handwritten Dynamics Assessment
through Convolutional Neural Networks: An Application to Parkinson’s Disease
Identification, 87 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN MED. 67 (May 2018) (improving early
stage detection of Parkinson’s disease with computer-aided diagnosis that assesses
handwriting features of patients through machine-based convolutional neural
networks that use deep learning to examine visual imagery).
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permit real cats as pets. 470 Her mother’s initial reaction was terse and
disturbed, saying, “What the hell is that?” followed by “I think it’s
stupid,” and “It’s not a real cat,” while glaring at the cat and refusing to
touch it. 471 A social worker at the nursing home later informed the
daughter, “[the residents] really have to be pretty far gone for those to
work.” 472
Similarly, a veteran’s hospital in California employed the use of
Paro baby seal companion bots in hopes of comforting residents and
reducing the need for anti-anxiety medication. 473 One of the hospital’s
therapists disclosed that the residents “[will] bark at it, they’ll pet it,
they’ll sing to it. We find it works better with people with dementia
because if the residents are aware that it’s not real, we find that
sometimes they don’t engage with it as much.” 474
Whether deceptive technology is justified at a certain point,
providing comfort when no reasonable alternatives are available, is a
fair question. 475 But for those with the cognitive ability to live based in
reality, replacing human contact with an artificial substitute without
consent is a betrayal of trust in the social compact and a deficient
approach to care akin to gaslighting. 476 Moreover, residents of state
institutions may be especially vulnerable to being used as test subjects

470. Joyce Wadler, Loving Robo Cat Needs Home, N.Y. TIMES: I WAS
MISINFORMED (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/nyregion/
loving-robo-cat-needs-home.html.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Angela Johnston, Robotic Seals Comfort Dementia Patients but Raise
Ethical Concerns, KALW LOC. PUBL. RADIO (Aug. 17, 2015), http://kalw.org/post/
robotic-seals-comfort-dementia-patients-raise-ethical-concerns#stream/0.
474. Id.
475. Robin Hattersley, Preparing for the Silver Tsunami Part 1: Preventing
Elderly Patient Wandering and Elopement, CAMPUS SAFETY MAG. 16, 19 (Mar. 2018)
(reporting memory care centers that paint the bedroom doors of facilities to look like
there is no door in order to prevent elopement), https://www.campussafety
magazine.com/hospital/elderly-patient-wandering-elopement.
476. The classic film Gaslight (1944) is based on the 1938 play by Patrick
Hamilton, set in the 1870s, a time when new technologies brought about newfound
suspicions. See generally Alissa Wilkinson, What is Gaslighting? The 1944 Film
Gaslight is the Best Explainer, VOX (Jan. 21, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.vox.
com/culture/2017/1/21/14315372/what-is-gaslighting-gaslight-movie-ingridbergman.
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for new AI applications in caregiving, particularly if such technology
reduces costs. For example, companion bots, mental health assessment
kiosks, and robot guards could all provide surveillance capabilities and
methods of control for state agents.
Waxing fantastic, these governmental efforts to use technology to
create a more controlled environment for confined persons could create
virtual utopia for prisoners and patients, or dystopian Rooms 101.477
Without an opportunity to be useful, to learn by error, and mediate the
vagaries of real life, endeavors key to Bentham’s utilitarian
panopticon, 478 the world appears a dismal place. In 1899, Oliver
Wendell Holmes wrote in Law and Science and Science in Law, that
the unattainability of an ideal “so keeps forever before us something
more to be done, and saves us from the ennui of a monotonous
perfection.” 479 In short, the serendipitous nature of human life,
including opportunities for social interaction and moments of privacy
and introspection, make life worth living.
And yet, most adults have the autonomy to choose whether or not
to engage with such technology. Their reasons for doing so are not
always sanguine. For example, in Japan, thousands of humanoid
companion robots fill the need for sex, conversation, and company in a
nation suffering from a concerning population decline. 480 One

477. In his 1949 novel 1984, George Orwell crafted Room 101 as a punitive
horror chamber tailored to the fears of specific prisoners. In the television series
Altered Carbon (Netflix 2018) (Season 1 episode “Force of Evil”), a similar
penological approach is used with recursive virtual reality.
478. See FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 122.
479. Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 99, at 463.
480. See Births Sink to Record Low of 946,060 as Deaths Surge and Marriage
Dims, THE JAPAN TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/
2018/06/01/national/births-sank-record-low-946060-2017-deaths-surged-marriagedimmed/#.WxFgY-4vzIU (finding from 2017 data that Japanese women will bear an
average of 1.43 children, lower than the 2.1 children needed to sustain and grow a
population); Japan’s Population Shrinks for Seventh Consecutive Year as it Falls to
126.70 Million, THE JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.japantimes.co.jp
/news/2018/04/13/national/japans-population-shrinks-seventh-consecutive-yearfalls-126-70-million/#.WxFepu4vzIU (reporting that the World Health Organization
defines an aging society as one with an older than 65 population exceeding 7%, and
Japan’s older than 65 population exceeded 27.7% in 2017, defined not only as a superaged society but the world’s most-aged society).
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commentator suggested that “[f]or a population that is literally dying
out, a little company – even if it is artificial – is better than none.” 481
On a less extreme level, domestic chatbots in the U.S. attempt to
insert a facsimile of emotional chatter into conversation beyond mere
informational assistance. 482 Woebot, designed to provide constantly
available personal emotional support for therapeutic mental health
purposes, was designed with the belief that competent “humans open
up more when they know they’re talking to a bot,” because human-tohuman conversation is fraught with the risk of stigma and discomfort. 483
Indeed, some evidence indicates that veterans with posttraumatic stress
disorder have found speaking to a robotic console that reads and
responds to facial and verbal cues helpful and comforting. 484 The
model is likened to writing in a journal or speaking to a religious
confessional, providing a degree of anonymity helpful for disclosure of
painful information. 485 However, psychologists make clear that AIbased mental health assessments are not a replacement for treatment or
learning how to cope with the greater challenges of real human social
interaction. 486
For example, while an AI caregiver or mental health kiosk could
recognize human emotion from physiological cues such as breathing,
481. Dean Cornish, Love, Intimacy, and Companionship: A Tale of Robots in
Japan, SBS: DATELINE (June 21, 2017, 5:21 PM), https://www.sbs.com.au/news/
dateline/article/2017/04/11/love-intimacy-and-companionship-tale-robots-japan. See
Alison Nastasi, Quiet Photos That Capture Japan’s Loneliness Epidemic,
FLAVORWIRE (Aug. 16, 2017), http://flavorwire.com/609219/quiet-photos-thatcapture-japans-loneliness-epidemic (describing an aging population and a “celibacy
syndrome” that presents a “looming national catastrophe).
482. See Arielle Pardes, The Emotional Chatbots are Here to Probe Our
Feelings, WIRED (Jan. 31, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/replikaopen-source/?mbid=social_fb (applying a sequence-to-sequence deep learning model
to mimic and replicate the tones and modulation of human speech and the appearance
of talking about feelings).
483. See id. (emphasis added).
484. See Gale M. Lucas et al., Reporting Mental Health Symptoms: Breaking
Down Barriers to Care with Virtual Human Interviewers, FRONTIERS IN ROBOTICS
AND AI (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frobt.2017.
00051/full.
485. Robbie Gonzalez, Virtual Therapists Help Veterans Open Up About
PTSD, WIRED (Oct. 17, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/virtualtherapists-help-veterans-open-up-about-ptsd/.
486. Id.
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verbal cues such as speed and intonation, and visual cues such as facial
expressions, 487 the technology would never be able to use the empathy
and familiarity with the human experience that a human being would. 488
That is, AI which learns to become sentient will never become
empathetic with humans if humans have nothing to offer AI. 489 Also,
the reported inherent personal biases in AI programming that favor their
designers’ demographics would likely ultimately favor AI over
humanity: “Technologies are as much products of the context in which
they are created as they are potential agents of change.” 490 In
487. BODEN, supra note 9, at 73 (discussing the methods of AI interpretation of
human emotion as “relatively crude”). “There’s no attempt to make [AI companions]
use emotions in solving their own problems, nor to illuminate the role that emotions
play in the functioning of the mind as a whole. It’s as though emotions are seen by
these AI researchers as optional extras: to be disregarded unless, in some messily
human context, they’re unavoidable.” Id. at 75.
488. The human capacity to interpret the needs and feelings of others is also
subject to inherent limitations, shown by our continued implicit biases and prejudices.
See generally Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New
Narrative, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 193 (2018) (addressing the legal difficulty in applying
and defining unconscious implicit bias in discrimination litigation); see also ALEX
CAMPOLO ET AL., AI NOW 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2017) (“training data, algorithms,
and other design choices that shape AI systems may reflect and amplify existing
cultural assumptions and inequalities”).
489. The film Ex Machina (A24 Films 2015) reflects this concern through the
AI humanoid Ava, who asks her human creator the following rhetorical question:
“Isn’t it strange to create something that hates you?” However, in the film A.I.
Artificial Intelligence (Warner Bros./Dreamworks Pictures 2001), adult actor Jude
Law, an AI humanoid, tells the AI child, “They hate us, you know, the humans.” The
child protests and insists his human mother loves him, but Law responds, “She loves
what you do for her, as my customers love what it is I do for them.” Cf. Steven
Goldberg, The Changing Face of Death: Computers, Consciousness, and Nancy
Cruzan, 43 STAN. L. REV. 659 (1991) (discussing the growing legal and research focus
on human self-awareness, as shown in the evolving definition of brain death, a
movement which purportedly attempts to distinguish humanity from other animals
and from AI).
490. CAMPOLO ET AL., supra note 488, at 4, 18 (“AI is not impartial or
neutral.”). See also Jason P. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and
Implicit Racial Bias, 66 EMORY L.J. 765 (2017) (addressing the uneven racialized
application of public school video surveillance to combat school violence and
maintain order and control); Piccone, supra note 14 (discussing the difficulty of
constraining inherent biases in military applications of AI due to “inherent biases in
how visual and audio recognition features operate in real time”); How We are Not
Like Robots After All, SPIRITUALITY & HEALTH 32 (Jan./Feb. 2012) (addressing the
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discussions identifying the lack of diversity among technology leaders,
some have argued that autonomous programming bias inherently
emerges due to the programmer’s own isolated view of the world,
which has a tendency to create modern surveillance that is decidedly
privileged in its luxury to focus on the other, never on itself. 491
In the 1990s, as judicial and legislative attention to technology’s
impact on personal privacy began to gain traction, Priscilla Regan
warned of the commodification of privacy protections, where relegating
human control of personal privacy through the private sector would
result in the “privacy haves” and the “privacy have-nots” based largely
on wealth. 492 In her vision, the poor and the marginalized would be
more likely to be subject to state surveillance. 493 The wealthy, by
contrast, would likely live relatively peaceful, private lives, able to
afford the security technology necessary to keep clear of the masses and
mass surveillance.
With historically disproportionate numbers of racial minorities in
prison, 494 and low-income families whose only option is a state-funded

human emotions research of psychologist Lisa Feldman Barrett of Northeastern
University, Massachusetts General Hospital, and Harvard School of Medicine, which
finds that recognizing human emotions requires context, memory, and the ability to
anticipate unexpressed emotions, much more than facial recognition or physiological
indicators).
491. See CAMPOLO ET AL., supra note 488, at 4; LEWIS, supra note 87, at 25.
Lewis, a professor of American Studies, remarked that “middle-class white men are
finally getting a taste of what women, poor people, and racial and sexual minorities
have long known about the burden of living under supervision.” LEWIS, supra note
87, at 51.
492. REGAN, supra note 3, at 237.
493. See Jeffrey Gilleran, Why Should We Trust Baltimore Police with Aerial
Surveillance Technology?, THE BALT. SUN (Feb. 26, 2018, 10:30 AM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-op-0227-aerialsurveillance-20180226-story.html (“New surveillance capabilities raise concerns
about how powerful investigatory tools typically reserved for military purposes may
now be turned against certain communities.”).
494. See John Gramlich, The Gap Between the Numbers of Blacks and Whites
in Prison is Shrinking, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2018/01/12/shrinking-gap-between-number-of-blacks-and-whites-inprison/ (noting a narrowing of the gap between incarcerated African-Americans as
compared to white or Hispanic Americans, but explaining that there are still more
African-Americans imprisoned in state and federal prison in the U.S. than any other
racial group).
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facility for medical and mental health care, 495 clearly some members of
society would be more at risk of infringements on autonomy through
surveillance technology. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides some protection against biased applications of
surveillance and isolation measures, but the applied uniformity of
institutional settings and structures does not raise these issues
frequently. 496
Scientific and medical research have much to offer the courts in
realigning the balance of interests regarding restrictive measures
imposed on persons in state confinement. In an age of innovation in
surveillance and AI technologies, courts will need to express clear
principles and draw on improved understandings of the psychological
impact of such innovation. Specifically, the courts should address the
fact that these methods of constant surveillance could facilitate safer
and more rehabilitative confinement, but they could also represent a
failure to develop more humane approaches respecting the basic human
need for autonomy in navigating both privacy and social contact.
Ultimately, the court must consider what is reasonable when examining
restrictive measures, but not by the standards of a pre-digital age and
not willfully blind to advances in psychological research.
C. Key Factors to Determine the Reasonableness of Restrictive
Measures
As previously discussed, in constitutional claims the use of
restrictive measures to surveil persons in confinement generally
requires a showing of necessity and a measure of the impact on
495. From 1990-2017, enrollment nearly doubled in the Medicaid, a state and
federal program providing assistance to low-income families to receive medical and
long-term care. Total Medicaid Enrollment from 1966-2017 (in millions), STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/245347/total-medicaid-enrollment-since-1966/
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
496. Cf. Bullock v. Sheahan, 568 F. Supp. 2d 965, 973-74 (N.D. Ill. 2008)
(holding that a blanket strip search policy for discharged male prisoners, but not
female prisoners, was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause), with Timm v.
Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1209 (1991) (identifying
differences in male and female prison institutions including number and age of
prisoners, types of crimes committed, length of sentence, and frequency of incidents
involving violence, escapes, or contraband, when holding that differential gender
practices in strip searches did not violate equal protection).
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individual autonomy. Also, courts should consider that any state
surveillance, particularly of persons who are confined without consent,
has a potential detrimental social and psychological impact. To better
outline which additional balancing test factors may be relevant when
addressing surveillance technology as a restrictive measure, identifying
trends in case law is critical, particularly in the absence of statutory
protections.
Certain factors are generally recognized. If there is an opportunity
for individual consent to surveillance, as shown in contractual
agreements for cameras in nursing home bedrooms, then due
consideration must be given to the resident’s contractual right. 497 This
comports with the primacy of individual autonomy rights regarding
privacy. If there is statutory authorization for consent, 498 regulatory
restriction on surveillance, 499 or mandates for restrictive measures, 500
the courts will show deference to the other branches of government,
subject to a judicial check enforcing common law doctrines and
constitutional provisions to ensure the protection of individual
autonomy rights. Finally, with respect to state institutions, courts will
give some deference to state administrators to ensure adequate security
measures because of the complex nature of maintaining control and
safety for large and potentially dangerous populations, and for those
with serious medical or mental health needs. 501

497. See supra note 21.
498. E.g., Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act of 2016, 50 ILL.
COMP. STAT. § 706/10-20(a)(4)(A) (“Cameras must be turned off when . . . the victim
of a crime requests that the camera be turned off, and unless impractical or impossible,
that request is made on the recording[.]”).
499. E.g., Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
(upholding the law enforcement practice of giving pre-arraignment arrestees greater
privacy for body-cavity searches than post-arraignment detainees, notwithstanding
the equal protection argument that the individual’s privacy interest is the same in both
cases).
500. E.g., 28 C.F.R. § 550.10 (2017) (authorizing disciplinary measures against
inmates who refuse to comply with inspections and testing for the use of alcohol).
501. See, e.g., Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 501 U.S. 1209 (1991) (asserting that prison officials are owed deference in
choice of restrictive measures due to their “exceedingly complex task” of
safeguarding institutional security); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332-33
(9th Cir. 1988) (finding justification for elevated security for maximum security
prisons under a Fourth Amendment analysis).
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Statutory protections may significantly favor state actors. For
example, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),
“[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions
shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs”; and a court may not
grant or approve any prospective relief unless it “finds that such relief
is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary
to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 502 Section 1983 civil rights
actions are not available for negligence claims, and deliberate
indifference in state institutions must meet the high standard of
“shocking the conscience.” 503
Statutory and regulatory measures may also apply an internal
balancing test analysis, similar to a due process liberty interest analysis,
with less deference to the state. For example, regulation of the federally
administered PACE outpatient program for elder care permits physical
and chemical restraints, but “only when other less restrictive measures
have been found to be ineffective to protect the participant or others
from harm.” 504
Below are more specific factors that the courts have and should
consider when addressing constitutional claims regarding the use of
technology as a restrictive measure to observe humans in state
confinement without their consent. As will be shown, while an
egregious violation involving one factor may sufficiently support a

502. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Porter v.
Clarke, 290 F. Supp. 3d 518 (E.D. Va. 2018), appeal filed, Case No. 18-6257 (4th Cir.
2018) (granting a motion for injunctive relief against solitary confinement under the
PLRA).
503. See, e.g., Smith v. District of Columbia, 306 F. Supp. 3d 223, 242-46
(D.D.C. 2018) (suggesting that requisite split-second decisions by state actors that
cause harm do not shock the conscience, relying on County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
532 U.S. 833 (1998), where the U.S. Supreme Court followed the same rationale
regarding the disciplinary actions of prison guards).
504. 42 C.F.R. § 460.114 (2017). Note that regulations for this program
(Program for All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE)) also grant patients the right
“[t]o be treated with dignity and respect, be afforded privacy and confidentiality in all
aspects of care, and be provided humane care.” Id. § 460.112(a)(2).
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claim, a combination of restrictive measures may also create a more
severe impact on the individual. 505
1. Intensity of Restrictive Measures
The reasonableness of observational restrictive measures considers
the intensity of the impact, such as the length of time imposed and
whether the measures are based on visual or auditory surveillance or
tactile contact.
Constant surveillance is more invasive and therefore more heavily
scrutinized. For example, placing a violent male prisoner in a paper
gown for security measures, who is seen only occasionally by female
guards, “does not rise to the level of constant surveillance, as might
occur had a camera been installed in the cell or if the door were barred
and not solid (thus affording a constant visual from the hall).” 506 In
contrast, regular and close observation of toilet functions of male
inmates by female guards is distinguishable and warrants a Fourth
Amendment claim. 507 Global positioning system (“GPS”) ankle
bracelets are lawful tools in home detention, viewed by some as less
invasive than prison confinement despite their use of constant
geolocation tracking. 508 Recent military research by the U.S. Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) is designing clothing
fabrics that can monitor heart and breathing rates, which could also
serve as a useful form of remotely monitoring the health of persons in
confinement, particularly those with serious medical needs. 509

505. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1991), when addressing factors in a cruel and
unusual punishment claim, and noting that “courts may consider conditions in
combination ‘when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the
deprivation of a single, identifiable human need’”).
506. Hickman v. Jackson, No. 2:03CV363, 2005 WL 1862425, at *10 (E.D.
Va. Aug. 3, 2005).
507. Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir.
2017).
508. E.g., Gonzalez Fuentes v. E.L.A., 167 D.P.R. 400, 2006 WL 6110919
(P.R. 2006) (denying prisoners convicted of murder the privilege of release under
electronic surveillance, which they asserted was an acquired right under the
Constitution of Puerto Rico to continued liberty under electronic surveillance).
509. NET ASSESSMENT, supra note 468, at 36.
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Litigation has not addressed GPS ankle bracelets that visually
record images, but some engage in auditory surveillance, which could
violate attorney-client privilege when defendants meet with their
defense attorneys. 510 Auditory surveillance also arguably constitutes a
more invasive form of constant surveillance than geolocation. Others
have the capability of continuous alcohol intake monitoring, where
spikes in remotely monitored data from sweat analysis serve as a
grounds to revoke probation. 511 Moreover, in Carpenter v. United
States, in the context of Fourth Amendment protections against police
access to geolocation information on cell phones, the Supreme Court
has recently held that the third-party doctrine does not apply. 512 That
is, disclosure to third party wireless service providers of constant
physical location information does not diminish the individual’s
expectation of privacy in the same information with respect to others,
including the state. Finally, constant surveillance of confined persons
need not be merely a silent metal eye in a post-modern panopticon, but
could instead be an autonomous machine with a constant, persuasive,
elusive voice reminiscent of historic concerns with subliminal
messaging in technology. 513
510. See Waldo Covas Quevedo, Caution: Your GPS Ankle Bracelet is
CRIME
REPORT
(Oct.
25,
2013),
Listening,
THE
https://thecrimereport.org/2013/10/25/2013-10-caution-your-gps-ankle-bracelet-islistening/.
511. See People v. Buell, 16 Cal. App. 5th 682, 690-91 (2017) (addressing the
reliability of continuous remote alcohol intake monitoring by a third party company
contracted by the county probation office); see, e.g., Alcohol Monitoring SCRAM
Cam®, SCRAM SYSTEMS, https://www.scramsystems.com/products/scramcontinuous-alcohol-monitoring/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (“Standalone alcohol
monitoring or CAM with home curfew monitoring at the flip of a switch[.]”).
512. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).
513. See Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1149 (M.D. Ga. 1991), aff’d,
958 F.2d 1084 (11th Cir. 1992), reh’g denied, 964 F.2d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 916 (1992) (noting, in addressing a claim against musician
Ozzy Osbourne for wrongful death due to subliminal suicidal messages, that “[t]he
most important character of a subliminal message is that it sneaks into the brain while
the listener is completely unaware that he has heard anything at all”). See generally
Victoria Stern, A Short History of the Rise, Fall, and Rise of Subliminal Messaging,
SCI. AM. (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-short-historyof-the-rise-fall-and-rise-of-subliminal-messaging/ (noting continued research
demonstrating a subtle response from subliminal messaging, including an influence
on emotions); Richard Gafford, The Operational Potential of Subliminal Perception,
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Visual observation has been heavily scrutinized, particularly when
it is indiscriminate and ubiquitous. The detailed information obtained
by visual images is far more invasive than auditory observation such as
eavesdropping. 514 In both, however, the intrusion is exacerbated when
the activity is recorded. The Tenth Circuit explained:
The showing of necessity needed to justify the use of video
surveillance is higher than the showing needed to justify other search
and seizure methods, including bugging. The use of a video camera
is an extraordinarily intrusive method of searching. Here, the
incident in which an unidentified individual was observed
masturbating provides an excellent example of this intrusiveness. No
other technique would have recorded - at least in graphic visual detail
- an apparently innocent individual engaging in this very personal
and private behavior. 515

Also, visual observation is legitimately more intrusive for certain
individuals. For example, even if all inmates are equally subject to cells
with open bars or showers without curtains, the courts have found
constitutional privacy violations for inmates in settings that involve
cross-gender observation of nudity, or when they are accompanied by
religious objections. 516 Observation of the difficulties of a person with

U.S. CIA, (Sept. 18, 1995), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-ofintelligence/kent-csi/vol2no2/html/v02i2a07p_0001.htm (describing suggestive
techniques by operatives to influence behavior, but not including subliminal
messaging, and concluding “that there are so many elusive variables and so many
sources of irregularity in the device of directing subliminal messages to a target
individual that its operational feasibility is exceedingly limited”); LINOWES, supra
note 3, at 7 (discussing early efforts to impart audio subliminal messaging in
advertising and public malls).
514. See United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1442-43 (10th Cir.
1990) (“Because of the invasive nature of video surveillance, the government’s
showing of necessity must be very high to justify its use.”).
515. Id. at 1442.
516. But see MacDonald v. Angelone, 69 F. Supp. 2d 787 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(finding that an open toilet serves as a reasonable security measure in prison); Riddick
v. Sutton, 794 F. Supp. 169 (E.D. N.C. 1992) (finding that female guards viewing
male inmates using the toilet and shower creates only a de minimus infringement on
a constitutional right to privacy).
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a disability using bathroom facilities also warrants greater privacy
protections. 517
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit suggested that prisoners
experience visual observation by guards when using a shower or toilet
as less invasive than body-cavity searches. 518 Tactile contact as a form
of observation appears to be most heavily scrutinized, thus metal
detectors would arguably be preferable to body-cavity searches by
guards. 519 The type of physical contact may impact the analysis, with
strip searches potentially more intrusive than pat-down searches. 520
Medical examinations may warrant different standards of observational
privacy. 521 Gender and biological differences are also key factors in
the constitutionality of searches, where female inmates may justifiably
receive more privacy than male inmates during strip searches. 522
As a matter of observational privacy, the manipulation of the body
to force a more intrusive view, particularly one involving nudity, is
deemed more dehumanizing than simply having a guard view a prisoner
naked, even one of a different gender. 523 It could be argued that remote
surveillance or searches by machine eliminate the emotional stigma that
accompanies observation or contact by human staff. However, in South
Korea, one of the concerns raised by prisoners subject to observation

517. See LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 394 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding that an
open but inaccessible toilet for person with a disability violates Eighth Amendment).
518. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995).
519. Id. at 145.
520. United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1442-43 (10th Cir. 1990).
521. See Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, supra note 446 (providing that
principles of respect and medical confidentiality are owed to inmates in solitary
confinement, where privacy should be maintained as much as possible).
522. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 566 U.S.
318, 346 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (identifying the added intrusiveness of
menstruation or lactation for women during body-cavity searches); Bullock v. Dart,
599 F. Supp. 2d 947, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (noting menstruation may warrant greater
privacy for women during strip searches).
523. Compare Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding a
constitutional privacy right violation for a male inmate to be regularly strip searched
by female guards), and Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that a
female inmate who was viewed naked by male guards constituted a violation of her
constitutional right to privacy), with Hickman v. Jackson, No. 2:03CV363, 2005 WL
1862425 (E.D. Va. 2005) (holding that a male inmate who was occasionally viewed
naked by female guards did not constitute a violation of privacy rights).
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by the first autonomous robotic prison wardens was that the machines
would handle them roughly and have no capacity to care why this
matters. 524
The intensity of solitary confinement perhaps best demonstrates the
heightened impact of combining restrictive measures. Constant
surveillance, coupled with the restriction of freedom of movement and
social contact, facilitates the effectiveness of state control of confined
persons. However, with the advent of alarming evidence of the
detrimental psychological impact of extended solitary confinement,
such forced, state-sanctioned isolation is now more heavily
scrutinized. 525 Therefore, at minimum, indeterminate social isolation
in state confinement under federal law should be held unconstitutional.
With or without psychological harm, the relative lack of consent
will also impact the intensity of a restrictive measure’s impact, even as
society is adapting to surveillance in the public sphere. In a laborrelated survey conducted by the American Management Association,
55% of employers use video surveillance to monitor the workplace and
employee performance. 526 Other than restrictions on employers
observing and constraining union or other concerted employee activity
under the National Labor Relations Act, 527 there is no federal law that
prohibits such workplace surveillance. 528
Examples of web applications available to employers to assess
employee productivity include automatic tracking of web browsing
patterns, monitoring of keystrokes, and repeatedly taking webcam
pictures of employees to produce a “focus score.” 529 Such methods are
524. See articles cited, supra note 10.
525. See Valle v. Florida, 564 U.S. 1067 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of stay of execution); supra note 347 and accompanying text.
526. More Video Surveillance in the Workplace. But is it Legal?, GOVDOCS,
https://www.govdocs.com/can-employers-use-video-surveillance-monitor-workers/
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
527. See Gordon B. Schmidt & Kimberly W. O’Connor, Fired for Facebook:
Using NLRB Guidance to Craft Appropriate Social Media Policies, 58 BUS.
HORIZONS 571 (2015), available at http://daneshyari.com/article/preview/101
3883.pdf.
528. More Video Surveillance, supra note 526; Jo Ellen Whitney, Workplace
Surveillance in a World Where Everyone’s Watching, 22 No. 5 IOWA EMPLOY. L.
LETTER 1 (2015).
529. Big Brother Isn’t Just Watching: Workplace Surveillance Can Track Your
Every Move, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
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not necessarily productive. The use of surveillance drones by the Union
Pacific Corporation to monitor compliance with railyard safety
guidelines received employee backlash in part because some workers
became distracted by the drones risking additional hazards.530
Additionally, union representatives asserted that using the drones to
identify the need for discipline of workers caused concern among the
workers. 531 Hence, the proliferation of Bentham’s panopticon to other
sectors in the society at large has functioned according to its design.532
This employment context is relevant to the present analysis, because as
in other private spheres, if an employee does not wish to be observed,
he or she may choose another job. However, in state institutions, while
the wardens, physician assistants, and other staff may be subject to
surveillance technology by consent, the confined persons they subject
to constant surveillance have no similar opportunity to consent or opt
out. Thus, constant surveillance without any ability to avoid it or to opt
out should be recognized as more harmful psychologically.
2. Availability of Less Restrictive Measures
Judicial interpretation of state interests in security must properly
consider what type of security is necessary, without assuming that any
and all security measures are necessary. For obvious reasons, the levels
of security and need for surveillance or isolation will be measured, for
the most part, by the degree of danger posed to the resident or inmate
and to the community in confinement. Therefore, employing more
restrictive means to intrude on the privacy and liberty of confined
persons is not legally justified if a less restrictive means is available.

2017/nov/06/workplace-surveillance-big-brother-technology (“Over time it can build
a picture of typical user behaviour and then alert when someone deviates.”). See also
Matt Novak, Amazon Patents Wristband to Track Hand Movements of Warehouse
Employees, GIZMODO (Jan. 31, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://gizmodo.com/amazonpatents-wristband-to-track-hand-movements-of-war-1822590549 (“It’s becoming
more and more common for companies to monitor their employees through invasive
technology, as there are virtually no laws to stop it.”).
530. Paul Ziobro, Hovering Drones Irk Rail Workers, WALL STREET J., Mar.
15, 2018, at B1.
531. Id. at B1-B2.
532. See BENTHAM, PANOPTICON, supra note 328.
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For example, a Fourth Amendment analysis would properly
consider differing privacy intrusions based on technological
capabilities:
While the Court understands that a video camera might be necessary
to monitor Llufrio’s safety and ensure that he did not escape from the
interview room while under arrest and unattended, the Government
presents no reason why it would need to record the sounds from the
room other than for incriminating purposes while Llufrio sat
alone. 533

Similarly, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care
adopted new standards for persons in solitary confinement, including a
provision providing that if visual privacy is not possible during medical
examinations, then auditory privacy should be assured. 534
Beyond tailoring the restrictive measure to the degree of necessity,
other considerations such as availability and feasibility must also be
taken into account. Various constitutional balancing tests related to
privacy require that the state consider the technological options
currently available, 535 which suggests that the court can alter its
determinations of reasonableness as surveillance and privacy
technology innovate over time. Even if a restrictive measure is
relatively severe, if it is warranted and there is no feasible alternative,
then the court may uphold the constitutionality of the measure. For
example, the California CURES database for prescription drug
monitoring holds information relevant to medical malpractice and
criminal investigations, but may invade patient privacy when accessed
for such investigative purposes. 536 In balancing state and personal
533. United States v. Llufrio, 237 F. Supp. 3d 735, 745 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
534. Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, supra note 446 (Principle 13).
535. For example, an airport screening is reasonable as an administrative search
under the Fourth Amendment if “(1) it is no more extensive or intensive than
necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or explosives; (2) it is
confined in good faith to that purpose; and (3) passengers may avoid the search by
electing not to fly.” United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005)
(emphasis added) (upholding the governmental use of full-body scanners on
passengers in airports to protect against acts of terrorism).
536. Lewis v. Super. Ct., 3 Cal. 5th 561, 576 (2017). See also Or. Prescription
Drug Monitoring Prog. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 998 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967
(D. Ore. 2014) (noting that a district court was persuaded that a reasonable expectation
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privacy interests, including feasibility and necessity, the court noted in
dicta that “adequate protections against public disclosure do not obviate
constitutional concerns as privacy interests are still implicated when the
government accesses personal information without disseminating it.”537
Examining the means of technological surveillance is also
important. With regard to the potential for disclosure of confidential
information in a digitized medical database, Justice Brennan stated:
[T]he Constitution puts limits not only on the type of information the
state may gather, but also on the means it may use to gather it. The
central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly
increase the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not
prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate the
necessity of some curb on such technology. 538

The burden is on the state to prove that available technologies and
approaches have been considered. 539 If an approach would be less
restrictive, but it is not practically available or financially feasible, it
will not be deemed an available means. The Alaska Supreme Court,
interpreting the state’s constitutional rights of privacy and liberty in
cases of involuntary medical care, held that “the patient’s best interests
[must be] considered in light of any available less intrusive
treatments.” 540 In that state, availability requires a showing of
feasibility and a means that would satisfy the state’s compelling interest
in requiring treatment. 541 Specifically, the court determined that the
psychiatric services of the Office of Children’s Services in Alaska
of privacy remained, where “the only way to avoid submission of prescription
information to the PDMP is to forgo medical treatment or to leave the state. This is
not a meaningful choice.”), rev’d, 860 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2017) (reversed on the basis
of standing).
537. Lewis at 577.
538. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).
539. Cf. Matter of United States, 256 F. Supp. 3d 246, 252 (E.D. N.Y. 2017)
(holding, in an examination of the All Writs Act, that the government did not present
sufficient evidence that its wiretapping efforts were foiled by discontinuation of cell
phone technology where “the complete lack of any showing of necessity weighs
heavily against the government”).
540. Kiva O. v. State Dep’t of Health & Soc. Serv., 408 P.3d 1181, 1190
(Alaska 2018).
541. Id.
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adequately considered family visitation and therapy before requiring a
child in care to be placed on the antidepressant Lexapro; but that the
state had acted too quickly in approving the mood stabilizing
medication Risperdal when the child was depressed but not suicidal. 542
Pragmatic concerns also impact feasibility. In a claim of cruel and
unusual punishment, the Seventh Circuit identified a valid privacy
interest in avoiding cross-gender observation in prison, but not a
feasible alternative to the practice: “There are too many permutations
to place guards and prisoners into multiple classes by sex, sexual
orientation, and perhaps other criteria, allowing each group to be
observed only by the corresponding groups that occasion the least
unhappiness.” 543 Similarly, budgetary shortfalls are also a valid
consideration, possibly preventing a claim of cruel and unusual
punishment for cramped and uncomfortable conditions. 544 Courts are
beginning to take pause and try to recognize when use of technology is
expedient or a “cheap” replacement for human staffing. Thus, courts
have upheld some claims for harm resulting from poor technology
applications in confined settings. 545 Comparably, when inexpensive
technology is available that would improve state systems and treatment
of persons in their care and custody, such as effecting the reduction of
arrestee misidentification, the courts readily suggest that such
technology should have been adopted. 546

542. Id. at 1192-93.
543. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 147 (7th Cir. 1995).
544. See id. at 149-50. But see Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 520 (2011); supra
note 343.
545. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional
surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the
ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police
resources and community hostility’” (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426
(2004)); see also Teague v. Schimel, 896 N.W.2d 286, 310 (Wis. 2017) (criticizing
the state fingerprint database procedures and technology as “quick, cheap, and easy”
and providing an unacceptable risk of error).
546. E.g., Smith v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-10666, 2015 WL
12731913, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2015) (“In a prior order in this case, Judge Feess
lamented ‘out-of-date Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which has failed to require
the use of unique[biometric] identifiers despite the availability of simple
and cheap technologies that would avoid the kind of repeated mis-identification that
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In short, the technology must work, which includes the ability for
sufficient human control to ensure it works. Interestingly, emerging AI
technology makes this assessment more difficult. For example, if the
surveillance were conducted and assessed only by machines without
human direction, those harmed would have to seek remedies from
inventors and manufacturers under existing legal remedies. Twenty
years ago, attributing fault to humanity’s creation of unpredictable
systems such as AI was highly speculative:
It is not clear what the law will, or should, do when artificial
intelligences make mistakes, thereby damaging property, causing
monetary losses or killing people. Perhaps we will blame nature or
the inchoate forces of the universe. But the legal system is unlikely
to rest there; we will not long accept equating the damage done by
an unexpected tornado with the mistakes made by programs that are,
at some level, human artifacts. 547

Today, with nascent autonomous drone and car industries, lawsuits for
harm caused by autonomous machines has, as predicted, focused on
human design defects, criminal recklessness, and negligent
supervision. 548
Lethal AI weapons have numerous opponents in the scientific
community concerned about the lack of human control over life and
death decision-making. This has drawn the attention of the United
he has endured,’ but ultimately held that Plaintiff could not state a Fourth Amendment
particularity claim, given the current state of the law.”).
547. Curtis E. A. Karnow, Liability for Distributed Artificial Intelligences, 11
BERK. TECH. L.J. 147, 154 (1996).
548. E.g., Tina Bellon, Fatal U.S. Self-Driving Auto Accident Raises Novel
Legal Question, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2018, 2:18 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-autos-selfdriving-uber-liability-anal/fatal-u-s-self-driving-auto-accident-raisesnovel-legal-questions-idUSKBN1GW2SP (suggesting that liability for autonomous
vehicle accidents could potentially attach to the transportation service, the car
manufacturer, the technology and software design companies, and the human “safety”
driver behind the wheel). See generally Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of
Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 559 (2015) (“Common law courts look to whether
a given digital activity is ‘like’ an activity for which there are already rules. Legal,
policy, and academic debates become battles over the proper analogy or metaphor.”);
F. Patrick Hubbard, Sophisticated Robots: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and
Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803 (2014) (arguing that existing regulatory and
common law liability systems adequately provide a balance of fairness in promoting
safety and innovation with a sophisticated robotics industry).
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Nations, but has yet to result in an international treaty or consensus. 549
Human soldier-machine symbiosis, coined “centaur warfare,” may
remove some of the concerns related to uncontrollable autonomous
technology. 550 Military contractors envisioning future warfare propose
“the synergistic merger of molecular biology, nanotechnology, and
information technology, pointing to useful new directions in the design
of mechanical devices.” 551 Would prison wardens eventually be
equipped with the same technology to control prison populations on
American soil or police officers on American residential streets? 552 In
a state institutional setting, the potential alternatives available for
controlling persons in confinement raise deep concerns regarding the
ability of human inmates, patients, or residents to assert their rights to
autonomy.
While lack of control of AI surveillance or use of robotic discipline
in institutions should clearly raise constitutional claims, there is also a
risk of overreaching by human overseers recklessly adopting new
technology. Technology is merely a tool for human actors and thus is
susceptible to humanity’s coercion and bias. For example:
AI technologies are also being deployed in the very legal institutions
designed to safeguard our rights and liberties, with proprietary risk
assessment algorithms already being used to help judges make
sentencing and bail decisions, potentially amplifying and
naturalizing longstanding biases, and rendering them more opaque to
oversight and scrutiny. 553

549. See UN Reopens Lethal Autonomous Weapons Talks with an Eye on
Defining ‘Killer Robots’, THEDEFENSEPOST (Apr. 9, 2018), https://thedefensepost.
com/2018/04/09/un-lethal-autonmous-weapons-killer-robot-talks/; Heather M. Roff,
The Strategic Robot Problem: Lethal Autonomous Weapons in War, 13 J. MIL. ETHICS
211 (2014).
550. Lester, supra note 14.
551. NET ASSESSMENT, supra note 468, at 31.
552. See articles cited supra note 10 (discussing South Korea’s first robotic
prison guards).
553. CAMPOLO ET AL., supra note 488, at 4 (2017). Cf. Blake A. Klinkner,
Artificial Intelligence and Virtual Law Offices Expected to be Top Technological
Trends Impacting the Legal Profession in 2017, 40 WYO. LAW. 52 (Feb. 2017)
(describing the use of predictive analytics to interpret precedent and compose legal
briefs, interpret opposing counsel’s strategy, and draft contracts); Amanda McAllister,
Note, Stranger than Science Fiction: The Rise of A.I. Interrogation in the Dawn of
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However, in 2016, in State v. Loomis, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
determined that formally authorized use of predictive analytical tools in
sentencing did not violate the due process rights of a defendant when
the sentence was based on accurate information. 554
In contrast, the Iowa Court of Appeals in 2018 distinguished
Loomis when determining that use of the Iowa Risk Revised tool in
sentencing was a due process violation, where there was “the use of an
unspecified algorithm in sentencing (if that is what the IRR is).”555
Thus, it appears that courts are willing to consider AI assistance in the
justice system, but wisely require that it be subject to human analysis
and constraints. If court systems were readily to approve system
technology in state institutions without proper restraint and caution, it
would not bode well for vulnerable claimants subject to constant
surveillance and dehumanizing social isolation.
CONCLUSION
Whether the executive or legislative branches are quick or slow to
respond to the need for privacy protections as new technologies emerge,
the judiciary has a crucial role in ensuring the reasonableness of
surveillance. The courts continue to acknowledge the basic human
need for autonomy in navigating privacy and social interactions, which
has longstanding protections for persons in state confinement in
common law doctrines of police power and parens patriae, the United
States Constitution, and a growing number of state constitutions with

Autonomous Robots and the Need for Additional Protocol to the U.N. Convention
Against Torture, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2527 (2017) (suggesting that as the United
Nations examines lethal autonomous weapons restrictions, it should also consider
prohibiting AI interrogation techniques which could use existing facial and physical
bodily response interpretation software); Melanie Reid, Rethinking the Fourth
Amendment in the Age of Supercomputers, Artificial Intelligence, and Robots, 119 W.
VA. L. REV. 863 (2017) (addressing the constitutional implications of autonomous
investigative robocops).
554. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 757 (Wis. 2016) (noting that the
COMPAS risk assessment was one of several factors considered by the trial court,
which had declined to give weight to expert testimony explaining that COMPAS was
not designed to be used in sentencing and therefore bore a “tremendous risk of over
estimating an individual’s risk”).
555. State v. Guise, No. 17-0589, 2018 WL 2084846, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May
2, 2018).
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express privacy provisions. Also, recognition of a growing body of
social science and medical research has better informed the courts
regarding the impact of new technology on human well-being,
particularly with regard to surveillance and social isolation in
confinement. As the courts carve a more civilized path, indeterminate
solitary confinement under constant surveillance, now facilitated by AI
and remote surveillance, may be seen as a substantive due process
violation, as well as cruel and unusual punishment.
Protecting the social and privacy rights of prisoners and residential
patients in state facilities is essential for the protection of the rights of
all persons. Institutionalized members of society have the least political
and social power yet face the greatest potential infringements on their
privacy and their right to a social existence. A focus on their specific
needs best demonstrates the appropriate balance of interests when
innovation in surveillance may be meted out on this population first
because it is unable to resist. Some enforced surveillance and social
isolation are necessary to protect persons in confinement and ensure
security in facilities, as demonstrated in cases with a high-risk of selfharm or harm to others. But all such restrictive measures must be
subject to a rigorous balance of interests. The right to autonomy of
navigating privacy and social contact is too important. The Seventh
Circuit aptly stated: “But where it is reasonable . . . to respect an
inmate’s constitutional privacy interests, doing so is not just a palliative
to be doled out at the state’s indulgence. It is a constitutional
mandate.” 556
Upon a review of precedent focusing on the interplay between the
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments’ functions in privacy and
isolation claims of confined persons, it is clear that the courts continue
to uphold the primacy of a core individual right to autonomy. Courts
in the United States have acknowledged the impact of changing
technology on privacy for over a century, but in recent years there is a
newfound judicial understanding of the “seismic shifts” 557 in
technological innovation.
Moving forward, the judiciary continues to encourage the active
adoption of state statutory and constitutional privacy provisions, while
556. Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 188 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in
original).
557. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
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reiterating the importance of the “broad and idealistic concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency” 558 for persons in
state confinement. The states, in turn, have manifested a willingness to
do so, seen in the growth of numerous express state constitutional
privacy provisions in the last two decades, an effort that Congress has
not been willing or able to achieve as yet. Nonetheless, both federal
and state courts have the common law and constitutional legal tools on
hand to keep a check on state institutions enamored of new forms of
surveillance technology, including AI surveillance. Most important of
all, with respect to confined persons, is that state interests always
include not only the effective maintenance and control of state
institutions, but the well-being of persons in state care and the
protection of their individual rights. This is the state as parens patriae.
It is a matter of no small concern that new technologies could
facilitate confining persons in brightly lit, modern institutions in
isolation under constant surveillance. This would transform state
confinement into a new form of oblivion, a status which the earliest
prisons and mental hospitals offered the forgotten, condemned in dark,
unsanitary facilities. 559 As the Supreme Court stated in upholding a
claim for cruel and unusual punishment: “There may be involved no
physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is instead the total
destruction of the individual’s status in organized society.” 560 Such a
prospect is neither constitutionally permissible nor ethically acceptable.
Whether one is confined in state custody or care due to mental illness,
severe disability, or criminal conviction, respecting human autonomy
558. This declaration is quoted in hundreds of state and federal cases in the
United States in upholding Eighth Amendment rights. See Mintun v. Corizon Med.
Serv., No. 1:16-cv-00367-DCN, 2018 WL 1040088 (D. Idaho 2018) (deprivation of
mental health services); Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 2010) (transportation
in dog cage); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1245 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (excessive
force and solitary confinement in a modernized “prison of the future”); LaFaut v.
Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 394 (4th Cir. 1987) (unusable and exposed toilet facilities for a
paraplegic inmate); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (deprivation of
medical care); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (beating with a strap).
559. See FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 370, at 245.
560. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (laying out the origins of the
Eighth Amendment based on the English Declaration of Rights of 1688 and the Magna
Carta – “[Denaturalization] is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for
it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the
development.”).
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in navigating core needs for privacy and social contact remain integral
to sustaining a civilized and humane society.
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